In order to study supply chain of the telecom value-added service,a multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game model with multiple telecom operators and multiple service providers whose income is composed of i...In order to study supply chain of the telecom value-added service,a multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game model with multiple telecom operators and multiple service providers whose income is composed of information fee division and advertisement was constructed.Then a demonstration was simulated,and the results were compared with the situation of service providers' income only from information fee division.The simulated and compared results indicate that,the enterprises in the supply chain have the nature of pursuing the maximum profits in capital markets;meanwhile,first-mover advantages and some enterprise can get more profits with the information asymmetry.展开更多
In this article, we introduce and study some new classes of multi-leader-follower generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-uniform spaces where the number of leaders and followers may be finite or in...In this article, we introduce and study some new classes of multi-leader-follower generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-uniform spaces where the number of leaders and followers may be finite or infinite and the objective functions of the followers obtain their values in infinite-dimensional spaces. Each leader has a constrained correspondence. By using a collective fixed point theorem in locally FC-uniform spaces due to author, some existence theorems of equilibrium points for the multi-leader-follower generalized constrained multiobjective games are established under nonconvex settings. These results generalize some corresponding results in recent literature.展开更多
In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their c...In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their competitiveness in this market.Particularly,the attractive multi-energy retail packages are the key for retailers to increase their benefit.Therefore,combined with incentive means and price signals,five types of multi-energy retail packages such as peak-valley time-of-use(TOU)price package and day-night bundled price package are designed in this paper for retailers.The iterative interactions between retailers and end-users are modeled using a bi-level model of stochastic optimization based on multi-leader multi-follower(MLMF)Stackelberg game,in which retailers are leaders and end-users are followers.Retailers make decisions to maximize the profit considering the conditional value at risk(CVaR)while end-users optimize the satisfaction of both energy comfort and economy.Besides,a distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the Nash equilibrium of above MLMF Stackelberg game model while the particle swarm optimization(PSO)algorithm and CPLEX solver are applied to solve the optimization model for each participant(retailer or end-user).Numeral results show that the designed retail packages can increase the overall profit of retailers,and the overall satisfaction of industrial users is the highest while that of residential users is the lowest after game interaction.展开更多
The mechanical properties of multi-lead rubber bearings （MLRBs） were investigated by experiment and finite element analysis. First, the vertical stiffness, horizontal stiffness and yielded shear force were tested fo...The mechanical properties of multi-lead rubber bearings （MLRBs） were investigated by experiment and finite element analysis. First, the vertical stiffness, horizontal stiffness and yielded shear force were tested for four MLRB specimens and two specimens of the single-lead rubber bearings （ SLRBs）. Then, the MLRBs were modeled by the explicit finite element analysis software ANSYS/ LS-DYNA, in order to evaluate the horizontal force-displacement hysteretic curves under static vertical and dynamical horizontal loadings. The disagreement between the tested and theoretical values was less than 11.4%, and MLRBs and SLRBs were similar in vertical stiffness, pre-yield stiffness and yield stiffness.展开更多
基金supported by Research Start Fund of Northwest A&F University and Youth Fund of Communication University of China under Grant No.XNG1035partly performed in the project"On-line Multi-attribute Procurement Auction Mechanism Design and Multi-agent System Implementation"supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.71001009
文摘In order to study supply chain of the telecom value-added service,a multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game model with multiple telecom operators and multiple service providers whose income is composed of information fee division and advertisement was constructed.Then a demonstration was simulated,and the results were compared with the situation of service providers' income only from information fee division.The simulated and compared results indicate that,the enterprises in the supply chain have the nature of pursuing the maximum profits in capital markets;meanwhile,first-mover advantages and some enterprise can get more profits with the information asymmetry.
基金supported by the Scientific Research Fun of Sichuan Normal University(11ZDL01)the Sichuan Province Leading Academic Discipline Project(SZD0406)
文摘In this article, we introduce and study some new classes of multi-leader-follower generalized constrained multiobjective games in locally FC-uniform spaces where the number of leaders and followers may be finite or infinite and the objective functions of the followers obtain their values in infinite-dimensional spaces. Each leader has a constrained correspondence. By using a collective fixed point theorem in locally FC-uniform spaces due to author, some existence theorems of equilibrium points for the multi-leader-follower generalized constrained multiobjective games are established under nonconvex settings. These results generalize some corresponding results in recent literature.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52077146)the Sichuan Science and Technology Program(No.2023YFSY0032).
文摘In the competitive energy market,energy retailers are facing the uncertainties of both energy price and demand,which requires them to formulate reasonable energy purchasing and selling strategies for improving their competitiveness in this market.Particularly,the attractive multi-energy retail packages are the key for retailers to increase their benefit.Therefore,combined with incentive means and price signals,five types of multi-energy retail packages such as peak-valley time-of-use(TOU)price package and day-night bundled price package are designed in this paper for retailers.The iterative interactions between retailers and end-users are modeled using a bi-level model of stochastic optimization based on multi-leader multi-follower(MLMF)Stackelberg game,in which retailers are leaders and end-users are followers.Retailers make decisions to maximize the profit considering the conditional value at risk(CVaR)while end-users optimize the satisfaction of both energy comfort and economy.Besides,a distributed algorithm is proposed to obtain the Nash equilibrium of above MLMF Stackelberg game model while the particle swarm optimization(PSO)algorithm and CPLEX solver are applied to solve the optimization model for each participant(retailer or end-user).Numeral results show that the designed retail packages can increase the overall profit of retailers,and the overall satisfaction of industrial users is the highest while that of residential users is the lowest after game interaction.
文摘The mechanical properties of multi-lead rubber bearings （MLRBs） were investigated by experiment and finite element analysis. First, the vertical stiffness, horizontal stiffness and yielded shear force were tested for four MLRB specimens and two specimens of the single-lead rubber bearings （ SLRBs）. Then, the MLRBs were modeled by the explicit finite element analysis software ANSYS/ LS-DYNA, in order to evaluate the horizontal force-displacement hysteretic curves under static vertical and dynamical horizontal loadings. The disagreement between the tested and theoretical values was less than 11.4%, and MLRBs and SLRBs were similar in vertical stiffness, pre-yield stiffness and yield stiffness.
