This paper deals with personal data use by firms in the e-business environment from the viewpoint of business administration and information ethics. Whereas the tremendous development of information and communication ...This paper deals with personal data use by firms in the e-business environment from the viewpoint of business administration and information ethics. Whereas the tremendous development of information and communication technology (ICT) has made it easier for firms to acquire, store, share, and utilise personal data on their customers, firms that use personal data are exposed to risks related to privacy issues. Since individuals fear the invasion of their privacy, the failure of a firm to appear or remain trustworthy would make it difficult for it to maintain accurate, up-to-date databases and to construct desirable business processes, which would affect the bottom line. Therefore, modern firms should do what they can to ensure that their customers trust them. For them, one promising way to remain trustworthy is to behave as a moral agent. Although it is difficult for any firm to meet the conditions necessary to be a moral agent, competence in behaving as a moral agent is a hard-to-imitate capability af firms for which personal data use is vital for enjoying the benefits of business relationships in the e-business environment.展开更多
The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal...The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.展开更多
基金Supported by the MEXT Research Project "Global Business and IT Management: Global eSCM" at the Research Institute of Commerce, Meiji University.
文摘This paper deals with personal data use by firms in the e-business environment from the viewpoint of business administration and information ethics. Whereas the tremendous development of information and communication technology (ICT) has made it easier for firms to acquire, store, share, and utilise personal data on their customers, firms that use personal data are exposed to risks related to privacy issues. Since individuals fear the invasion of their privacy, the failure of a firm to appear or remain trustworthy would make it difficult for it to maintain accurate, up-to-date databases and to construct desirable business processes, which would affect the bottom line. Therefore, modern firms should do what they can to ensure that their customers trust them. For them, one promising way to remain trustworthy is to behave as a moral agent. Although it is difficult for any firm to meet the conditions necessary to be a moral agent, competence in behaving as a moral agent is a hard-to-imitate capability af firms for which personal data use is vital for enjoying the benefits of business relationships in the e-business environment.
文摘The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.
