The split and gap between “is” and “ought,” or between “facts” and “values” or “norms,” as proposed by Hume,Moore and others,are fictitious for two reasons.First,there are no purely objective “facts,” beca...The split and gap between “is” and “ought,” or between “facts” and “values” or “norms,” as proposed by Hume,Moore and others,are fictitious for two reasons.First,there are no purely objective “facts,” because facts always involve subjective intervention by cognitive agents.Second,there are no purely subjective “norms,” because norms must have objective foundations and theoretical bases.Why do we “must” and “should”?This is determined by a combination of the following factors:first,our needs,intentions,and goals—where intentions and goals originate from needs,and the strength of our intentions often depends on the strength of needs.However,needs themselves have objective grounds.Second,the current state of affairs often deviates significantly from our needs and intentions.We therefore strive to change the status quo and create a vision that aligns with our needs and intentions.Third,we rely on the relevant broad scientific principles—including those of the natural sciences,social sciences,and humanities—as well as on social consensus,such as cultural traditions and conventions.Fourth,we depend on our rational thinking ability:faced with the current situation,and drawing upon relevant theories and social consensus,we rationally deliberate on what we must or should do—how we can satisfy our needs,achieve our goals,and turn our visions into reality.Thus,there exists a common thread linking our needs,interests,intentions,goals,the distant reality,and our rational capacity.This commonality bridges the gap between “facts” on the one side and “values” and “norms” on the other.展开更多
Using the opportunity of responding to Wang’s critiques,this short article clarifies a number of important points related to the topic of human dignity.It argues that,only in moving beyond his a priori reasoning by a...Using the opportunity of responding to Wang’s critiques,this short article clarifies a number of important points related to the topic of human dignity.It argues that,only in moving beyond his a priori reasoning by assuming humans to be rational agents can the Kantian theory of dignity be applied to actual humans;only in taking our moral potential as a recommended way of human self-identification can the is-ought dichotomy be resolved;only in respecting human dignity can punishment be justified;and only from its function in shaping our visions and attitudes can a teleological metaphysics be helpful.展开更多
This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investig...This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.展开更多
文摘The split and gap between “is” and “ought,” or between “facts” and “values” or “norms,” as proposed by Hume,Moore and others,are fictitious for two reasons.First,there are no purely objective “facts,” because facts always involve subjective intervention by cognitive agents.Second,there are no purely subjective “norms,” because norms must have objective foundations and theoretical bases.Why do we “must” and “should”?This is determined by a combination of the following factors:first,our needs,intentions,and goals—where intentions and goals originate from needs,and the strength of our intentions often depends on the strength of needs.However,needs themselves have objective grounds.Second,the current state of affairs often deviates significantly from our needs and intentions.We therefore strive to change the status quo and create a vision that aligns with our needs and intentions.Third,we rely on the relevant broad scientific principles—including those of the natural sciences,social sciences,and humanities—as well as on social consensus,such as cultural traditions and conventions.Fourth,we depend on our rational thinking ability:faced with the current situation,and drawing upon relevant theories and social consensus,we rationally deliberate on what we must or should do—how we can satisfy our needs,achieve our goals,and turn our visions into reality.Thus,there exists a common thread linking our needs,interests,intentions,goals,the distant reality,and our rational capacity.This commonality bridges the gap between “facts” on the one side and “values” and “norms” on the other.
文摘Using the opportunity of responding to Wang’s critiques,this short article clarifies a number of important points related to the topic of human dignity.It argues that,only in moving beyond his a priori reasoning by assuming humans to be rational agents can the Kantian theory of dignity be applied to actual humans;only in taking our moral potential as a recommended way of human self-identification can the is-ought dichotomy be resolved;only in respecting human dignity can punishment be justified;and only from its function in shaping our visions and attitudes can a teleological metaphysics be helpful.
文摘This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.
