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Observation on the Intervention Effect of Timesensitive Incentive Model Combined with Specialized Rehabilitation Nursing in Patients with Severe Pneumonia and Respiratory Failure
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作者 Jie Yang Hong Bing +1 位作者 Yewei Jiang Ruofeng Zhang 《Journal of Clinical and Nursing Research》 2025年第6期319-324,共6页
Objective:To explore the effect of implementing a time-sensitive incentive model combined with specialized rehabilitation nursing in patients with severe pneumonia and respiratory failure.Methods:Seventy-eight patient... Objective:To explore the effect of implementing a time-sensitive incentive model combined with specialized rehabilitation nursing in patients with severe pneumonia and respiratory failure.Methods:Seventy-eight patients with severe pneumonia and respiratory failure admitted from January 2024 to February 2025 were selected and randomly divided into two groups using a computer-based random drawing method.The control group(39 patients)received routine nursing,while the observation group(39 patients)received a time-sensitive incentive model combined with specialized rehabilitation nursing.Lung function and adverse emotional states were compared between the two groups.Results:After 2 weeks of nursing,the lung function of the observation group was higher than that of the control group(P<0.05),and the adverse emotional states of the observation group were lower than those of the control group(P<0.05).Conclusion:Implementing a time-sensitive incentive model combined with specialized rehabilitation nursing in patients with severe pneumonia and respiratory failure can improve lung function and emotional state. 展开更多
关键词 Severe pneumonia with respiratory failure Time-sensitive incentive model Specialized rehabilitation nursing Online publication:July 8 20251.Introduction
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Optimization of Chinese power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism
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作者 SUN Jin-ting LI Ying +1 位作者 TIAN Si-jie ZHANG Lin-yue 《Ecological Economy》 2017年第1期59-68,共10页
With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterp... With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterprises need to optimize the incentive mechanism of R&D staff,to arouse the R&D staff's enthusiasm and creativity,to adapt to the new market competition and further improve market value.Whilst the incentive mechanism optimizing processing needs to consider not only the changing market environment but also the personal and working characteristics of R&D staff.This paper summarizes the characteristics of the current Chinese power enterprises' R&D staff:staff's theory quality is high,but insensitive to the market;they are confronted with heavy workload and diversified job choices;managers can observe their behavior choices or not;besides,the process of R&D is complex and the market reactions of R&D achievements are uncertain.Based on the premise of the above features,two incentive models are established in this paper from the point of view of enterprise managers.One is for the situation when staff's behavior choices can be observed;the other is for the situation when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed.Through solving the model,we analyze the optimization path of electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism under these conditions:(1) when staff's behavior choices can be observed,managers can pay more to the R&D staff who develop products with higher output value,in order to encourage them to work harder.(2) when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed,managers should take reasonable strategies according to the different situations:a.when R&D staff incentive totally depend on the market value of the R&D achievements,managers should allocate workload rationally according to their different technical levels;b.when the market reactions of R&D results become more precarious,managers need to reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;c.when R&D staff become more risk averse,managers should reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;on the contrary,managers should improve the incentive intensity and reduce the fixed salary level. 展开更多
关键词 electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive model incentive mechanism optimization
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