The paper examines a particular aspect of the way semiosis models complex anthroposemiotic activity as exemplified by the "persuasion path" implicit in any source or origin of intentional influence in human ...The paper examines a particular aspect of the way semiosis models complex anthroposemiotic activity as exemplified by the "persuasion path" implicit in any source or origin of intentional influence in human communication.Now,in theory,we should be able to account for every stage in the process of semiosis,and this ability has a bearing on the way signs are to be classified according to the nature of their immediate objects.The topic is a pretext,consequently,for exploring the stages in semiosis from the dynamic object to the sign via the immediate object in selected pictorial examples of purpose and intentionality in semiosis,since,to be understood successfully—indeed,to function at all—any such persuasive or influential activity depends upon the formal organisation of its representation.The paper thus presents one possible explanation of the role of the immediate object in cases of evident intentionality.However,in view of the fact that Peirce never developed a clear idea of semiosis,it is necessarily speculative and abductive.展开更多
This paper compares the manner in which C.S.Peirce’s late semiotic theory deals with the problems posed by the dynamic object and the interpretation of signs with that of the earlier,better-known system of 1903.It sh...This paper compares the manner in which C.S.Peirce’s late semiotic theory deals with the problems posed by the dynamic object and the interpretation of signs with that of the earlier,better-known system of 1903.It shows how non-specialist interpreters of signs are often led to suggest that there is more to,for example,a painting than the summation of the lines,forms and colours to be found on the canvas,in other words,to suggest that the sign’s dynamic object may be quite different from its representation as the sign’s immediate object.Now the 1903ten-class system is composed of the sign and two relational criteria,the fi rst of which being the sign’s mode of representation,which is no other than the relation holding between the sign and what,at the time,was defi ned simply as its object.This means that the object itself is not a relevant feature of the system,and therefore this latter,even when the mode of representation is associated with Peirce’s hypoicons,is unable to account for discrepancies between what observers interpret as the sign’s object and the way the sign represents it.One explanation for this discrepancy can be found in Peirce’s late,hexadic conception of semiosis,which,in 1908,explicitly integrated immediate and dynamic objects and a typology of which the criteria were not the earlier categories but three universes of experience by means of which Peirce was able to expand considerably the inventory of the sorts of entities qualifying as a sign’s dynamic object.The paper draws on these advances to show how immediate and dynamic objects can diverge,and how different interpreters come to widely differing conclusions concerning the objects of signs and how they are interpreted.展开更多
文摘The paper examines a particular aspect of the way semiosis models complex anthroposemiotic activity as exemplified by the "persuasion path" implicit in any source or origin of intentional influence in human communication.Now,in theory,we should be able to account for every stage in the process of semiosis,and this ability has a bearing on the way signs are to be classified according to the nature of their immediate objects.The topic is a pretext,consequently,for exploring the stages in semiosis from the dynamic object to the sign via the immediate object in selected pictorial examples of purpose and intentionality in semiosis,since,to be understood successfully—indeed,to function at all—any such persuasive or influential activity depends upon the formal organisation of its representation.The paper thus presents one possible explanation of the role of the immediate object in cases of evident intentionality.However,in view of the fact that Peirce never developed a clear idea of semiosis,it is necessarily speculative and abductive.
文摘This paper compares the manner in which C.S.Peirce’s late semiotic theory deals with the problems posed by the dynamic object and the interpretation of signs with that of the earlier,better-known system of 1903.It shows how non-specialist interpreters of signs are often led to suggest that there is more to,for example,a painting than the summation of the lines,forms and colours to be found on the canvas,in other words,to suggest that the sign’s dynamic object may be quite different from its representation as the sign’s immediate object.Now the 1903ten-class system is composed of the sign and two relational criteria,the fi rst of which being the sign’s mode of representation,which is no other than the relation holding between the sign and what,at the time,was defi ned simply as its object.This means that the object itself is not a relevant feature of the system,and therefore this latter,even when the mode of representation is associated with Peirce’s hypoicons,is unable to account for discrepancies between what observers interpret as the sign’s object and the way the sign represents it.One explanation for this discrepancy can be found in Peirce’s late,hexadic conception of semiosis,which,in 1908,explicitly integrated immediate and dynamic objects and a typology of which the criteria were not the earlier categories but three universes of experience by means of which Peirce was able to expand considerably the inventory of the sorts of entities qualifying as a sign’s dynamic object.The paper draws on these advances to show how immediate and dynamic objects can diverge,and how different interpreters come to widely differing conclusions concerning the objects of signs and how they are interpreted.
