China has long been recognized as a major producer and exporter of sporting goods,with its share of global sporting goods exports continuing to rise steadily.The implementation of the RCEP agreement presents both oppo...China has long been recognized as a major producer and exporter of sporting goods,with its share of global sporting goods exports continuing to rise steadily.The implementation of the RCEP agreement presents both opportunities and challenges for China’s sporting goods export trade.To achieve sustained growth,enterprises must enhance their innovation capacity,improve product quality,strengthen brand influence,and refine marketing strategies.At the same time,they must proactively manage risks related to exchange rate fluctuations and rising international logistics costs.展开更多
This study examines the current state of vocational education in Guizhou and its role in facilitating the export of Guizhou goods beyond regional boundaries, and explores various strategies for vocational education to...This study examines the current state of vocational education in Guizhou and its role in facilitating the export of Guizhou goods beyond regional boundaries, and explores various strategies for vocational education to contribute to rural revitalization, including the optimization of professional and curriculum systems, the deepening of industry-education integration and school-enterprise cooperation, the enhancement of brand development and marketing efforts, the strengthening of cross-border e-commerce and international cooperation capabilities, and the improvement of policy support and resource allocation systems. The findings aim to provide a theoretical foundation for Guizhou vocational education to support local economic development.展开更多
In order to avoid the worsening of wealth inequality,it is necessary to explore the influencing factors of wealth distribution and discuss measures to reduce wealth inequality.We investigate the wealth distribution in...In order to avoid the worsening of wealth inequality,it is necessary to explore the influencing factors of wealth distribution and discuss measures to reduce wealth inequality.We investigate the wealth distribution in the goods exchange market by using the kinetic theory of rarefied gas.The trading objects are two kinds of commodities(commodities A and B)and the trading subjects are agents of two groups(dealers and speculators).We deduce the interaction rules according to the principle of utility maximization and consider the transfer of agents in the Boltzmann equation.The steady solution of the Fokker-Planck equation for a special case is obtained and the effects of trading strategy and transfer frequency on the steady distribution are analyzed in numerical experiments.The conclusions illustrate that the transfer of agents is conducive to reducing the inequality of wealth distribution.展开更多
With the continuous promotion of the Belt and Road initiative,the sporting goods manufacturing industry,as a key sector of Chinese enterprises’“going global”strategy,is actively expanding the markets of countries a...With the continuous promotion of the Belt and Road initiative,the sporting goods manufacturing industry,as a key sector of Chinese enterprises’“going global”strategy,is actively expanding the markets of countries along the Belt and Road.However,there are significant differences in political,economic,and social environments among countries along the Belt and Road,which bring considerable uncertainties to the transnational investment of enterprises.Based on the investment environment of 70 countries along the Belt and Road,this paper constructs a risk evaluation index system including five dimensions:political and legal,economic and financial,socio-cultural,investment environment,and bilateral relations.The Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation(CRITIC)method is used to determine weight,Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS)method is employed to evaluate the investment risks of each country.Furthermore,cluster analysis is used to classify the countries into low,medium,and high-risk levels.Finally,policy recommendations are proposed based on the characteristics of countries with different risk levels,providing decision-making references for sporting goods manufacturing enterprises in selecting suitable countries for investment,enhancing risk prevention capabilities,and improving investment success rates.展开更多
With the promotion of the“Belt and Road Initiative”,Chinese sporting goods manufacturing enterprises are increasingly active in foreign investment in countries along the route,but due to regional differences,the inv...With the promotion of the“Belt and Road Initiative”,Chinese sporting goods manufacturing enterprises are increasingly active in foreign investment in countries along the route,but due to regional differences,the investment risks they face are becoming increasingly complex.Based on CNKI and Web of Science databases,this paper systematically combines the theoretical framework and research progress of sporting goods manufacturing enterprises’outbound investment and its risk research,and focuses on analyzing the evolution,motivation,characteristics,and risk generation mechanism of enterprises’outbound investment mode.It further discusses the types and causes of investment risks,the evolution and application of risk assessment methods,and deeply analyzes the unique risk characteristics of sports manufacturing enterprises.On this basis,combined with the shortcomings of existing research,a future research direction is put forward,which provides a reference for follow-up theoretical research and practical operation.展开更多
As a crucial process in the coordinated strikes of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), weapon-target assignment is vital for optimizing the allocation of available weapons and effectively exploiting the capabilities of UA...As a crucial process in the coordinated strikes of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), weapon-target assignment is vital for optimizing the allocation of available weapons and effectively exploiting the capabilities of UAVs. Existing weapon-target assignment methods primarily focus on macro cluster constraints while neglecting individual strategy updates. This paper proposes a novel weapon-target assignment method for UAVs based on the multi-strategy threshold public goods game(PGG). By analyzing the concept mapping between weapon-target assignment for UAVs and multi-strategy threshold PGG, a weapon-target assignment model for UAVs based on the multi-strategy threshold PGG is established, which is adaptively complemented by the diverse cooperation-defection strategy library and the utility function based on the threshold mechanism. Additionally, a multi-chain Markov is formulated to quantitatively describe the stochastic evolutionary dynamics, whose evolutionary stable distribution is theoretically derived through the development of a strategy update rule based on preference-based aspiration dynamic. Numerical simulation results validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method, and the impacts of selection intensity, preference degree and threshold on the evolutionary stable distribution are analyzed. Comparative simulations show that the proposed method outperforms GWO, DE, and NSGA-II, achieving 17.18% higher expected utility than NSGA-II and reducing evolutionary stable times by 25% in large-scale scenario.展开更多
This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,coo...This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.展开更多
In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers in...In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.展开更多
Under the new normal of China’s economic development,bike-sharing,a new product of the“Internet+”era,opens the door to a novel lifestyle for the society,and is in the stage of rapid development.Nevertheless,with th...Under the new normal of China’s economic development,bike-sharing,a new product of the“Internet+”era,opens the door to a novel lifestyle for the society,and is in the stage of rapid development.Nevertheless,with the explosive growth of the number of bicycles,some new problems gradually come out,such as disorderly parking,serious damage and waste of resources,which in turn restrict its further development.Based on the theory of public goods,this article studies the quasi-public goods attributes and problems of bike-sharing,as well as provides feasible measures for its long-term development,so as to realize the co-governance and sharing among enterprises,consumers and government.展开更多
Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public inter...Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.展开更多
Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a rea...Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a reasonable scheme will be affected by many factors. This paper presents the characteristic of the large goods, summarizes the process of designing a loading and reinforcing scheme of large good, then probes the factors of affecting the loading and reinforcing scheme and gives a detail analysis. It’s considered that those out-of-gauge and overweight degree of goods, center-of- gravity height of a loaded wagon, position of center-of-gravity of goods, type of wagon for using, reinforcement material and reinforcement method, transport expense and transport organization could affect a scheme in the aspects of safety, economy, rapidity and convenience. This conclusion will instruct and help to make a good scheme.展开更多
The implementation of closed loop supply chain system is becoming essential for fashion leather products industry to ensure an economically sustainable business model and eco-friendly industrial practice as demanded b...The implementation of closed loop supply chain system is becoming essential for fashion leather products industry to ensure an economically sustainable business model and eco-friendly industrial practice as demanded by the environmental regulations, consumer awareness and the prevailing social consciousness. In this context, this research work addresses a closed loop supply chain network problem of fashion leather goods industry, with an objective of minimizing the total cost of the entire supply chain and also reducing the total waste from the end of life product returns. The research work commenced with a literature review on the reverse and closed loop supply chain network design problems of fashion and leather goods industry dealt in the past. Then, the identified CLSCND problem is solved using a mathematical model based on Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programme (MINLP) and then a suitable Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) developed for the CLSCND is implemented for obtaining optimum solution. Both the MINLP model and HGA are customized as per the CLSCND problem chosen and implemented for the industrial case of an Indian Fashion Leather Goods Industry. Finally, the solutions obtained for MINLP model in LINGO 15 and for HGA in VB.NET platform are compared and presented. The optimum solution obtained from the suitable HGA is illustrated as an optimum shipment pattern for the closed loop supply chain network design problem of the fashion leather goods industry case.展开更多
In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters...In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.展开更多
We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished...We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.展开更多
In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude ...In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.展开更多
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list tha...The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list that retains controversies is better for carbon emission reduction than a short common list.This study examines four mechanisms of longer lists:enlarging market scales,enriching product mixes,enhancing product sophistication,and enriching trade patterns.Using China’s emerging EG trade during the 2001-2015 period as a case study,this study compares four EG lists with different EG.The results show that:(1)a longer list reduces carbon emissions from both imports and exports,making domestic regions with different advantages have better chances of improving carbon efficiencies.(2)Product sophistication reduces the emission gap between trading partners,regardless of the length of EG lists.(3)China’s EG exports contribute to carbon reduction in leading regions,while EG imports provide laggard regions with better chances of reducing carbon emissions.These findings provide three implications for future list-making:it is important to(1)seek a long and inclusive list rather than a short common list,(2)shift the focus from environmental end-use to the technological contents of products,and(3)balance the demand of laggard regions to import and the capacity of leading regions to export.展开更多
The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the...The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for more robust,greener and healthier global development”at the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations,which sheds light on the direction of global development.The GDI,proposed by China,has galvanized support from the international community as an international public goods to promote common development.Following the historical trends of human development,the GDI breaks through the limitations of the hegemonic stability theory and the free-riding curse to expand and innovate the theoretical perception of international public goods with the right approach to principles and interests.With a people-oriented approach and the basic principles of green and innovative development,the GDI both addresses urgent challenges and attaches importance to enhancing development capabilities and creating supporting conditions to offer a holistic solution to global challenges.Through the implementation of multiple pathways under international cooperation,the GDI will build a consensus on global development,increase the momentum of global development,and play an important role in creating a community with a shared future for mankind.展开更多
The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research s...The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.展开更多
The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public...The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.展开更多
基金Jilin International Studies University 2025 Batch National College Students’Innovation Training Program Project,Opportunities,Challenges,and Strategies of China’s Sporting Goods Export under the Background of RCEP(Project No.:202510964038)。
文摘China has long been recognized as a major producer and exporter of sporting goods,with its share of global sporting goods exports continuing to rise steadily.The implementation of the RCEP agreement presents both opportunities and challenges for China’s sporting goods export trade.To achieve sustained growth,enterprises must enhance their innovation capacity,improve product quality,strengthen brand influence,and refine marketing strategies.At the same time,they must proactively manage risks related to exchange rate fluctuations and rising international logistics costs.
基金Supported by 2024 Planning Project of the China Vocational Education Association"Research and Practice on the Route of Guizhou Vocational Education in Serving the Export of Guizhou Goods Beyond Regional Boundaries in the Context of Rural Revitalization".
文摘This study examines the current state of vocational education in Guizhou and its role in facilitating the export of Guizhou goods beyond regional boundaries, and explores various strategies for vocational education to contribute to rural revitalization, including the optimization of professional and curriculum systems, the deepening of industry-education integration and school-enterprise cooperation, the enhancement of brand development and marketing efforts, the strengthening of cross-border e-commerce and international cooperation capabilities, and the improvement of policy support and resource allocation systems. The findings aim to provide a theoretical foundation for Guizhou vocational education to support local economic development.
文摘In order to avoid the worsening of wealth inequality,it is necessary to explore the influencing factors of wealth distribution and discuss measures to reduce wealth inequality.We investigate the wealth distribution in the goods exchange market by using the kinetic theory of rarefied gas.The trading objects are two kinds of commodities(commodities A and B)and the trading subjects are agents of two groups(dealers and speculators).We deduce the interaction rules according to the principle of utility maximization and consider the transfer of agents in the Boltzmann equation.The steady solution of the Fokker-Planck equation for a special case is obtained and the effects of trading strategy and transfer frequency on the steady distribution are analyzed in numerical experiments.The conclusions illustrate that the transfer of agents is conducive to reducing the inequality of wealth distribution.
文摘With the continuous promotion of the Belt and Road initiative,the sporting goods manufacturing industry,as a key sector of Chinese enterprises’“going global”strategy,is actively expanding the markets of countries along the Belt and Road.However,there are significant differences in political,economic,and social environments among countries along the Belt and Road,which bring considerable uncertainties to the transnational investment of enterprises.Based on the investment environment of 70 countries along the Belt and Road,this paper constructs a risk evaluation index system including five dimensions:political and legal,economic and financial,socio-cultural,investment environment,and bilateral relations.The Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation(CRITIC)method is used to determine weight,Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS)method is employed to evaluate the investment risks of each country.Furthermore,cluster analysis is used to classify the countries into low,medium,and high-risk levels.Finally,policy recommendations are proposed based on the characteristics of countries with different risk levels,providing decision-making references for sporting goods manufacturing enterprises in selecting suitable countries for investment,enhancing risk prevention capabilities,and improving investment success rates.
文摘With the promotion of the“Belt and Road Initiative”,Chinese sporting goods manufacturing enterprises are increasingly active in foreign investment in countries along the route,but due to regional differences,the investment risks they face are becoming increasingly complex.Based on CNKI and Web of Science databases,this paper systematically combines the theoretical framework and research progress of sporting goods manufacturing enterprises’outbound investment and its risk research,and focuses on analyzing the evolution,motivation,characteristics,and risk generation mechanism of enterprises’outbound investment mode.It further discusses the types and causes of investment risks,the evolution and application of risk assessment methods,and deeply analyzes the unique risk characteristics of sports manufacturing enterprises.On this basis,combined with the shortcomings of existing research,a future research direction is put forward,which provides a reference for follow-up theoretical research and practical operation.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62073267)。
文摘As a crucial process in the coordinated strikes of unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), weapon-target assignment is vital for optimizing the allocation of available weapons and effectively exploiting the capabilities of UAVs. Existing weapon-target assignment methods primarily focus on macro cluster constraints while neglecting individual strategy updates. This paper proposes a novel weapon-target assignment method for UAVs based on the multi-strategy threshold public goods game(PGG). By analyzing the concept mapping between weapon-target assignment for UAVs and multi-strategy threshold PGG, a weapon-target assignment model for UAVs based on the multi-strategy threshold PGG is established, which is adaptively complemented by the diverse cooperation-defection strategy library and the utility function based on the threshold mechanism. Additionally, a multi-chain Markov is formulated to quantitatively describe the stochastic evolutionary dynamics, whose evolutionary stable distribution is theoretically derived through the development of a strategy update rule based on preference-based aspiration dynamic. Numerical simulation results validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method, and the impacts of selection intensity, preference degree and threshold on the evolutionary stable distribution are analyzed. Comparative simulations show that the proposed method outperforms GWO, DE, and NSGA-II, achieving 17.18% higher expected utility than NSGA-II and reducing evolutionary stable times by 25% in large-scale scenario.
基金Project supported by the Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.
基金the Open Foundation of Key Lab-oratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province(Grant Nos.2020SE308 and 2020SE309).
文摘In the realm of public goods game,punishment,as a potent tool,stands out for fostering cooperation.While it effectively addresses the first-order free-rider problem,the associated costs can be substantial.Punishers incur expenses in imposing sanctions,while defectors face fines.Unfortunately,these monetary elements seemingly vanish into thin air,representing a loss to the system itself.However,by virtue of the redistribution of fines to cooperators and punishers,not only can we mitigate this loss,but the rewards for these cooperative individuals can be enhanced.Based upon this premise,this paper introduces a fine distribution mechanism to the traditional pool punishment model.Under identical parameter settings,by conducting a comparative experiment with the conventional punishment model,the paper aims to investigate the impact of fine distribution on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game.The experimental results clearly demonstrate that,in instances where the punishment cost is prohibitively high,the cooperative strategies of the traditional pool punishment model may completely collapse.However,the model enriched with fine distribution manages to sustain a considerable number of cooperative strategies,thus highlighting its effectiveness in promoting and preserving cooperation,even in the face of substantial punishment cost.
文摘Under the new normal of China’s economic development,bike-sharing,a new product of the“Internet+”era,opens the door to a novel lifestyle for the society,and is in the stage of rapid development.Nevertheless,with the explosive growth of the number of bicycles,some new problems gradually come out,such as disorderly parking,serious damage and waste of resources,which in turn restrict its further development.Based on the theory of public goods,this article studies the quasi-public goods attributes and problems of bike-sharing,as well as provides feasible measures for its long-term development,so as to realize the co-governance and sharing among enterprises,consumers and government.
文摘Since the Harris-Todaro model was proposed in 1970,it has played a crucial role in analyzing various environmental and trade issues in developing countries.This paper analyzes the effects of the amount of public intermediate goods provided by the government,the increase in the fixed wage rate in the urban sector,and the changes in the relative international prices of agricultural and manufacturing goods on labor employment,unemployment,and the economic welfare in the context of a small open economy.It also proposes relevant policies to reduce the unemployment rate while improving national welfare.
文摘Large goods transported in railway are kinds of special goods and they are very important in national construction. In order to transport safely, loading and reinforcing schemes must be made first. How to design a reasonable scheme will be affected by many factors. This paper presents the characteristic of the large goods, summarizes the process of designing a loading and reinforcing scheme of large good, then probes the factors of affecting the loading and reinforcing scheme and gives a detail analysis. It’s considered that those out-of-gauge and overweight degree of goods, center-of- gravity height of a loaded wagon, position of center-of-gravity of goods, type of wagon for using, reinforcement material and reinforcement method, transport expense and transport organization could affect a scheme in the aspects of safety, economy, rapidity and convenience. This conclusion will instruct and help to make a good scheme.
文摘The implementation of closed loop supply chain system is becoming essential for fashion leather products industry to ensure an economically sustainable business model and eco-friendly industrial practice as demanded by the environmental regulations, consumer awareness and the prevailing social consciousness. In this context, this research work addresses a closed loop supply chain network problem of fashion leather goods industry, with an objective of minimizing the total cost of the entire supply chain and also reducing the total waste from the end of life product returns. The research work commenced with a literature review on the reverse and closed loop supply chain network design problems of fashion and leather goods industry dealt in the past. Then, the identified CLSCND problem is solved using a mathematical model based on Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programme (MINLP) and then a suitable Hybrid Genetic Algorithm (HGA) developed for the CLSCND is implemented for obtaining optimum solution. Both the MINLP model and HGA are customized as per the CLSCND problem chosen and implemented for the industrial case of an Indian Fashion Leather Goods Industry. Finally, the solutions obtained for MINLP model in LINGO 15 and for HGA in VB.NET platform are compared and presented. The optimum solution obtained from the suitable HGA is illustrated as an optimum shipment pattern for the closed loop supply chain network design problem of the fashion leather goods industry case.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 10672081）.
文摘In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71501149 and 71231007)the Soft Science Project of Hubei Province,China(Grant No.2017ADC122)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(Grant No.WUT:2017VI070)
文摘We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 10672081)the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai University (Grant No. 2010-5)
文摘In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grants No.42271178 and 41801104).
文摘The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC)is contemplating expanding its list of environmental goods(EG)for trade liberalization to fight climate change.In support of doing so,this study proposes that a long list that retains controversies is better for carbon emission reduction than a short common list.This study examines four mechanisms of longer lists:enlarging market scales,enriching product mixes,enhancing product sophistication,and enriching trade patterns.Using China’s emerging EG trade during the 2001-2015 period as a case study,this study compares four EG lists with different EG.The results show that:(1)a longer list reduces carbon emissions from both imports and exports,making domestic regions with different advantages have better chances of improving carbon efficiencies.(2)Product sophistication reduces the emission gap between trading partners,regardless of the length of EG lists.(3)China’s EG exports contribute to carbon reduction in leading regions,while EG imports provide laggard regions with better chances of reducing carbon emissions.These findings provide three implications for future list-making:it is important to(1)seek a long and inclusive list rather than a short common list,(2)shift the focus from environmental end-use to the technological contents of products,and(3)balance the demand of laggard regions to import and the capacity of leading regions to export.
文摘The world today is facing turbulence and change,and global development is at a crossroads.At this critical juncture,President Xi Jinping put forth the Global Development Initiative(GDI)with the theme“implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda for more robust,greener and healthier global development”at the 76th General Assembly of the United Nations,which sheds light on the direction of global development.The GDI,proposed by China,has galvanized support from the international community as an international public goods to promote common development.Following the historical trends of human development,the GDI breaks through the limitations of the hegemonic stability theory and the free-riding curse to expand and innovate the theoretical perception of international public goods with the right approach to principles and interests.With a people-oriented approach and the basic principles of green and innovative development,the GDI both addresses urgent challenges and attaches importance to enhancing development capabilities and creating supporting conditions to offer a holistic solution to global challenges.Through the implementation of multiple pathways under international cooperation,the GDI will build a consensus on global development,increase the momentum of global development,and play an important role in creating a community with a shared future for mankind.
基金Supported by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 program/2009AA043703)National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.91023045+1 种基金the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai University under Grant No.AS1005Tianjin City High School Science&Technology Fund Planning Project under Grant No.20100908
文摘The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.
文摘The connotation of rural public goods is expounded.The rural public goods refer to the products and labors that satisfy the production and living of rural residents,economic growth and social progress.The rural public goods is characterized by non-excludability,non-competitiveness and indispensability of other general public goods.The supply situation of Chinese government to rural public goods is analyzed,as well as the demand situation of rural public goods,which includes farmers' demand on training,the assistance demand of rural weak groups,farmers' demand on comfortable living conditions and farmers' demand on "soft" public goods.The paths for innovating the supply mechanism of rural public goods are put forward,which cover perfecting the decision mechanism of public goods supply;scientifically distributing the supply responsibility of rural public goods;facilitating the reform of each supporting equipment and exploring the multiple capital collecting channels of rural public goods.
