This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social...This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social and ecological interests.The model engages 3 key stakeholders:government,public welfare organizations,and national park operators,highlighting their complex interdependencies.Findings indicate that cooperative strategies among stakeholders are more likely when appropriate incentives and penalties are applied and decrease with higher associated costs.The study recommends that policymakers implement diversified funding mechanisms,clarify fiscal responsibilities,and promote coordinated efforts between central and local governments.Additionally,reducing operational costs and barriers for public welfare organizations and park operators can enhance cooperative behavior.This research provides valuable insights for optimizing funding mechanisms for national parks and offers an innovative tool for the study of social-ecological systems.展开更多
In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders： one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of ...In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders： one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of agents： Group 1 plays the majority game and Group 2 plays the minority game. In this paper, we investigate such a case that some traders in real financial markets could change their investment behaviours by assigning the evolutionary abilities to agents： if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will join the other group; and agents will repeat such an evolution at certain time intervals. Through the simulations, we obtain the following findings： （i） the volatilities of systems increase with the increase of the number of agents in Group 1 and the times of behavioural changes of all agents; （ii） the performances of agents in both groups and the stabilities of systems become better if all agents take more time to observe their new investment behaviours; （iii） there are two-phase zones of market and non-market and two-phase zones of evolution and non-evolution; （iv） parameter configurations located within the cross areas between the zones of markets and the zones of evolution are suited for simulating the financial markets.展开更多
With the development of market economy and the deepening of economic system reform, some of the Small and medium-sized（SME） enterprises have become the most dynamic economic growth point in the national economy. Nev...With the development of market economy and the deepening of economic system reform, some of the Small and medium-sized（SME） enterprises have become the most dynamic economic growth point in the national economy. Nevertheless, SMEs are facing a lot of problems in the market competition, such as technical backwardness, information lag, lack of talents, etc.. The healthy development of SMEs is very important, whereas, SMEs’ financing is a worldwide problem, and the result of financing game between banks and enterprises depends on a variety of decision-making factors. In this paper, from the point of view of bank, we analyze the diffi culties of external financing of SMEs, and establish a financing game model based on different risk categories, in order to better solve the problems that remain in the process of financing and promote the healthy and sustainable development of SMEs.展开更多
We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exp...We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.展开更多
The utility of public goods vary with the behaviors of stakeholders （players）, and it is appropriate to study effective supply and management of public goods with game modeling and analysis. The comparison effect is...The utility of public goods vary with the behaviors of stakeholders （players）, and it is appropriate to study effective supply and management of public goods with game modeling and analysis. The comparison effect is the key issue of public good provision both in theoretical analysis and in practice. One major contribution of the paper is the extension of Clarke-Groves mechanism, to achieve which strategic behavior analysis is applied through the analysis and the comparison effect among various stakeholders in different stages is created and highly emphasized. In the first section of this paper, the definition of integrated water resources management （IWRM）, the importance of stakeholder participation as well as some models and methods that have been applied are illustrated. Following this, the framework of analysis is elaborated, in which the scenario and aims are shown, and it is claimed that game theory is the main approach, which includes both cooperative games and non-cooperative games. To achieve the aims of the public project, five approaches from game theory are able to cover the entire process of the project, and the fourth approach on interest compensation mechanism is the highlight of the research. After this, the interest compensation mechanism is demonstrated in the model section, and is proved to be an incentive compatible mechanism that makes each stakeholder choose to behave in accordance with the interest of the entire project. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is applied and extended in establishing the model, and the utility change by the comparison among stakeholders （defined as the comparison effect） is involved. In the application section, a water project is analyzed in consideration of various stakeholders, and other possible applications are also indicated.展开更多
In recent years, the speed of urban development becomes faster and faster with expanding of land construction scale, and a lot of idle lands lead to serious land waste. This paper builds game model by carrying out a m...In recent years, the speed of urban development becomes faster and faster with expanding of land construction scale, and a lot of idle lands lead to serious land waste. This paper builds game model by carrying out a market allocation analysis and applying economic game theory to the analysis of current idle land problem; it gets six kinds of results through analyzing the game model of idle land market, and the final Nash equilibrium is(system innovation, publicly traded) through contrastive to help balance the game relationship between government and the user of idle land and raise some new scientific and rational institutions to serve as future references for effective usage of idle land.展开更多
In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil ...In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.展开更多
In real-life marketing, a common phenomenon is that the prices of current product will have been cut down even the new product has not gone into market yet. Thus, it is very important for merchant to set the strategy ...In real-life marketing, a common phenomenon is that the prices of current product will have been cut down even the new product has not gone into market yet. Thus, it is very important for merchant to set the strategy which can make the excepted revenue maximum. So, this paper constructs a three-stage stochastic dynamic pricing game model for analyzing the influence of the uncertainty of entry timing of the new products on pricing of products being sold. By analyzing of the pricing strategy, there are big differences in the predictions of new product going into market between merchant and customers;the merchant will adopt cutting price for promotion strategy to reduce negative influence of the new products on the demand of the products sold now. Otherwise, the merchant will adopt the strategy of maximizing current period’s profit.展开更多
A new chaos game representation of protein sequences based on the detailed hydrophobic-hydrophilic （HP） model has been proposed by Yu et al （Physica A 337（2004） 171）. A CGR-walk model is proposed based on the ne...A new chaos game representation of protein sequences based on the detailed hydrophobic-hydrophilic （HP） model has been proposed by Yu et al （Physica A 337（2004） 171）. A CGR-walk model is proposed based on the new CGR coordinates for the protein sequences from complete genomes in the present paper. The new CCR coordinates based on the detailed HP model are converted into a time series, and a long-memory ARFIMA（p, d, q） model is introduced into the protein sequence analysis. This model is applied to simulating real CCR-walk sequence data of twelve protein sequences. Remarkably long-range correlations are uncovered in the data and the results obtained from these models are reasonably consistent with those available from the ARFIMA（p, d, q） model.展开更多
Game player modeling is a paradigm of computational models to exploit players’behavior and experience using game and player analytics.Player modeling refers to descriptions of players based on frameworks of data deri...Game player modeling is a paradigm of computational models to exploit players’behavior and experience using game and player analytics.Player modeling refers to descriptions of players based on frameworks of data derived from the interaction of a player’s behavior within the game as well as the player’s experience with the game.Player behavior focuses on dynamic and static information gathered at the time of gameplay.Player experience concerns the association of the human player during gameplay,which is based on cognitive and affective physiological measurements collected from sensors mounted on the player’s body or in the player’s surroundings.In this paper,player experience modeling is studied based on the board puzzle game“Candy Crush Saga”using cognitive data of players accessed by physiological and peripheral devices.Long Short-Term Memory-based Deep Neural Network(LSTM-DNN)is used to predict players’effective states in terms of valence,arousal,dominance,and liking by employing the concept of transfer learning.Transfer learning focuses on gaining knowledge while solving one problem and using the same knowledge to solve different but related problems.The homogeneous transfer learning approach has not been implemented in the game domain before,and this novel study opens a new research area for the game industry where the main challenge is predicting the significance of innovative games for entertainment and players’engagement.Relevant not only from a player’s point of view,it is also a benchmark study for game developers who have been facing problems of“cold start”for innovative games that strengthen the game industrial economy.展开更多
The introduction of automated driving systems raised questions about how the human driver interacts with the automated system. Non-cooperative game theory is increasingly used for modelling and understanding such inte...The introduction of automated driving systems raised questions about how the human driver interacts with the automated system. Non-cooperative game theory is increasingly used for modelling and understanding such interaction, while its counterpart, cooperative game theory is rarely discussed for similar applications despite it may be potentially more suitable. This paper describes the modelling of a human driver’s steering interaction with an automated steering system using cooperative game theory. The distributed Model Predictive Control approach is adopted to derive the driver’s and the automated steering system’s strategies in a Pareto equilibrium sense, namely their cooperative Pareto steering strategies. Two separate numerical studies are carried out to study the influence of strategy parameters, and the influence of strategy types on the driver’s and the automated system’s steering performance. It is found that when a driver interacts with an automated steering system using a cooperative Pareto steering strategy, the driver can improve his/her performance in following a target path through increasing his/her effort in pursuing his/her own interest under the driver-automation cooperative control goal. It is also found that a driver’s adoption of cooperative Pareto steering strategy leads to a reinforcement in the driver’s steering angle control, compared to the driver’s adoption of non-cooperative Nash strategy. This in turn enables the vehicle to return from a lane-change maneuver to straight-line driving swifter.展开更多
Take Chinese yew cooperative organization for example,different game structures of forestry cooperation model were analyzed,the elative merit and applicable occasion was discussed combined with empirical investigation...Take Chinese yew cooperative organization for example,different game structures of forestry cooperation model were analyzed,the elative merit and applicable occasion was discussed combined with empirical investigation,and some suggestions were given also.The results showed that depending entirely on normal forest farmers cooperate spontaneously is difficult.Policies should be designed from the perspective of promoted village cadres and influential family salons to cooperation.When market factors become the main obstacle,it is necessary to introduce companies,relax constraints of forest management and build the right market atmosphere.According to unequal status of company and forest farmers,develop the cooperation model of " company + cooperation organization + farmers".In certain circumstances,especially there are several companies vicious competition,the intervention of association can play a coordinating role.展开更多
Arch dam deformation is comprehensively affected by water pressure,temperature,dam's structural behavior and material properties as well as other factors.Among them the water pressure and temperature are external ...Arch dam deformation is comprehensively affected by water pressure,temperature,dam's structural behavior and material properties as well as other factors.Among them the water pressure and temperature are external factors(source factors) that cause dam deformation,and dam's structural behavior and material properties are the internal factors of deformation(resistance factors).The dam deformation is the result of the mutual game playing between source factors and resistance factors.Therefore,resistance factors of structure and materials that reflect resistance character of arch dam structure are introduced into the traditional model,where structure factor is embodied by the flexibility coefficient of dam body and the maximum dam height,and material property is embodied by the elastic modulus of dam.On the basis of analyzing the correlation between dam deformation and resistance factors,the game model of safety monitoring for arch dam deformation is put forward.展开更多
In this paper, the main schemes of connection admission control (CAC) in ATM networks are briefly discussed especially the principle of dynamic bandwidth allocation. Then the fair share of the bandwidth among differen...In this paper, the main schemes of connection admission control (CAC) in ATM networks are briefly discussed especially the principle of dynamic bandwidth allocation. Then the fair share of the bandwidth among different traffic sources is analyzed based on cooperative game model. A CAC scheme is proposed using the genetic algorithm (GA) to optimize the bandwidth-delay-product formed utilization function that ensures the fair share and accuracy of accepting/rejecting the incoming calls. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme ensures fairness of the shared bandwidth to different traffic sources.展开更多
Virtual organization uses information technology to achieve a closer integration and better management of business relationships between internal and external parties. There are many emerging issues in virtual organiz...Virtual organization uses information technology to achieve a closer integration and better management of business relationships between internal and external parties. There are many emerging issues in virtual organization and one of them is knowl- edge sharing. Knowledge sharing that is the core of knowledge management plays a key role in virtual organization. However, game theoretic exploration about knowledge sharing mechanism based on virtual organization is seldom published, In this study, knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization enterprise is explored using game theories from two aspects based on the features of knowledge sharing in virtual organization enterprise. Fi- nally, the critical model of knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization also is presented based on the perspective of game analysis.展开更多
In this paper, the state-feedback Nash game based mixed H2/H∞ design^（[1, 2]）has been extended for output feedback case. The algorithm is applied to control bioreactor system with a Laguerre-Wavelet Network（LWN）^...In this paper, the state-feedback Nash game based mixed H2/H∞ design^（[1, 2]）has been extended for output feedback case. The algorithm is applied to control bioreactor system with a Laguerre-Wavelet Network（LWN）^（[3, 4]）model of the bioreactor.This is achieved by using the LWN model as a deviation model and by successively linearising the deviation model along the state trajectory. For reducing the approximation error and to improve the controller performance, symbolic derivation algorithm, viz.,automatic differentiation is employed. A cautionary note is also given on the fragility of the output feedback mixed H2/H∞ model predictive controller^（[4, 5]）due to its sensitivity to its own parametric changes.展开更多
This paper introduces a model-free reinforcement learning technique that is used to solve a class of dynamic games known as dynamic graphical games. The graphical game results from to make all the agents synchronize t...This paper introduces a model-free reinforcement learning technique that is used to solve a class of dynamic games known as dynamic graphical games. The graphical game results from to make all the agents synchronize to the state of a command multi-agent dynamical systems, where pinning control is used generator or a leader agent. Novel coupled Bellman equations and Hamiltonian functions are developed for the dynamic graphical games. The Hamiltonian mechanics are used to derive the necessary conditions for optimality. The solution for the dynamic graphical game is given in terms of the solution to a set of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations developed herein. Nash equilibrium solution for the graphical game is given in terms of the solution to the underlying coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. An online model-free policy iteration algorithm is developed to learn the Nash solution for the dynamic graphical game. This algorithm does not require any knowledge of the agents＇ dynamics. A proof of convergence for this multi-agent learning algorithm is given under mild assumption about the inter-connectivity properties of the graph. A gradient descent technique with critic network structures is used to implement the policy iteration algorithm to solve the graphical game online in real-time.展开更多
This paper is concerned with Hepato-Cellular Carcinoma (HCC) patients treated naturopathic agents. Patients treated with ≥4 agents survived significantly longer than patients treated with ≤3 agents. The great effect...This paper is concerned with Hepato-Cellular Carcinoma (HCC) patients treated naturopathic agents. Patients treated with ≥4 agents survived significantly longer than patients treated with ≤3 agents. The great effect is seen in patients treated with at least 4 agents that include Cordyceps sinensis. This greater certainty of patient survival without toxic side effects is significant benefit comparing with the conventional therapy. Treatment of HCC with a regimen of ≥4 agents prepared from natural products is associated with greater certainty of patient survival in a substantial portion of patients. The information dynamic model for certainty of patient survival is derived based on fluid mechanics, where a series of approximate solutions of the flow between two parallel flat walls, one of which is at rest, the other is suddenly accelerated from the rest to a constant velocity are used. The kinetic energy of certainty of patient survival decreases with increasing time, while the potential energy increases with increasing time. Total mechanical energy of patients treated with 4 or more agents is smaller than that treated with 3 or fewer agents. The kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 4 or more agents decreases (increases) more slower than the kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 3 or fewer agents.展开更多
The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability is very important to the safety of urban flood control. In this paper, the evaluation of consolidated index is used. Respectively, AHP and entropy method calcula...The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability is very important to the safety of urban flood control. In this paper, the evaluation of consolidated index is used. Respectively, AHP and entropy method calculate the subjective and objective weight of the evaluation indicators, and combine them by game theory. So we can obtain synthetic weight based on objective and subjective weights. The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability as target layer, a single variable multi-objective fuzzy optimization model is established. We use the model to evaluate flood-waterlogged vulnerability of 13 prefecture-level city in Hunan, and compare it with other evaluation method. The results show that the evaluation method has certain adaptability and reliability, and it＇ s helpfid to the construction planning of urban flood control.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(nos.52270174 and 71804013)
文摘This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social and ecological interests.The model engages 3 key stakeholders:government,public welfare organizations,and national park operators,highlighting their complex interdependencies.Findings indicate that cooperative strategies among stakeholders are more likely when appropriate incentives and penalties are applied and decrease with higher associated costs.The study recommends that policymakers implement diversified funding mechanisms,clarify fiscal responsibilities,and promote coordinated efforts between central and local governments.Additionally,reducing operational costs and barriers for public welfare organizations and park operators can enhance cooperative behavior.This research provides valuable insights for optimizing funding mechanisms for national parks and offers an innovative tool for the study of social-ecological systems.
基金Project supported by the Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars,State Education Ministry of China
文摘In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders： one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of agents： Group 1 plays the majority game and Group 2 plays the minority game. In this paper, we investigate such a case that some traders in real financial markets could change their investment behaviours by assigning the evolutionary abilities to agents： if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will join the other group; and agents will repeat such an evolution at certain time intervals. Through the simulations, we obtain the following findings： （i） the volatilities of systems increase with the increase of the number of agents in Group 1 and the times of behavioural changes of all agents; （ii） the performances of agents in both groups and the stabilities of systems become better if all agents take more time to observe their new investment behaviours; （iii） there are two-phase zones of market and non-market and two-phase zones of evolution and non-evolution; （iv） parameter configurations located within the cross areas between the zones of markets and the zones of evolution are suited for simulating the financial markets.
文摘With the development of market economy and the deepening of economic system reform, some of the Small and medium-sized（SME） enterprises have become the most dynamic economic growth point in the national economy. Nevertheless, SMEs are facing a lot of problems in the market competition, such as technical backwardness, information lag, lack of talents, etc.. The healthy development of SMEs is very important, whereas, SMEs’ financing is a worldwide problem, and the result of financing game between banks and enterprises depends on a variety of decision-making factors. In this paper, from the point of view of bank, we analyze the diffi culties of external financing of SMEs, and establish a financing game model based on different risk categories, in order to better solve the problems that remain in the process of financing and promote the healthy and sustainable development of SMEs.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grand No. 10575055)K. C. Wong Magna Fund in Ningbo University
文摘We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.
文摘The utility of public goods vary with the behaviors of stakeholders （players）, and it is appropriate to study effective supply and management of public goods with game modeling and analysis. The comparison effect is the key issue of public good provision both in theoretical analysis and in practice. One major contribution of the paper is the extension of Clarke-Groves mechanism, to achieve which strategic behavior analysis is applied through the analysis and the comparison effect among various stakeholders in different stages is created and highly emphasized. In the first section of this paper, the definition of integrated water resources management （IWRM）, the importance of stakeholder participation as well as some models and methods that have been applied are illustrated. Following this, the framework of analysis is elaborated, in which the scenario and aims are shown, and it is claimed that game theory is the main approach, which includes both cooperative games and non-cooperative games. To achieve the aims of the public project, five approaches from game theory are able to cover the entire process of the project, and the fourth approach on interest compensation mechanism is the highlight of the research. After this, the interest compensation mechanism is demonstrated in the model section, and is proved to be an incentive compatible mechanism that makes each stakeholder choose to behave in accordance with the interest of the entire project. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is applied and extended in establishing the model, and the utility change by the comparison among stakeholders （defined as the comparison effect） is involved. In the application section, a water project is analyzed in consideration of various stakeholders, and other possible applications are also indicated.
基金Supported by Chinese Tobacco Science and Technology Project(YATAS-KJ-040)
文摘In recent years, the speed of urban development becomes faster and faster with expanding of land construction scale, and a lot of idle lands lead to serious land waste. This paper builds game model by carrying out a market allocation analysis and applying economic game theory to the analysis of current idle land problem; it gets six kinds of results through analyzing the game model of idle land market, and the final Nash equilibrium is(system innovation, publicly traded) through contrastive to help balance the game relationship between government and the user of idle land and raise some new scientific and rational institutions to serve as future references for effective usage of idle land.
文摘In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.
文摘In real-life marketing, a common phenomenon is that the prices of current product will have been cut down even the new product has not gone into market yet. Thus, it is very important for merchant to set the strategy which can make the excepted revenue maximum. So, this paper constructs a three-stage stochastic dynamic pricing game model for analyzing the influence of the uncertainty of entry timing of the new products on pricing of products being sold. By analyzing of the pricing strategy, there are big differences in the predictions of new product going into market between merchant and customers;the merchant will adopt cutting price for promotion strategy to reduce negative influence of the new products on the demand of the products sold now. Otherwise, the merchant will adopt the strategy of maximizing current period’s profit.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No 60575038)the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangnan University, China (Grant No 20070365)the Program for Innovative Research Team of Jiangnan University, China
文摘A new chaos game representation of protein sequences based on the detailed hydrophobic-hydrophilic （HP） model has been proposed by Yu et al （Physica A 337（2004） 171）. A CGR-walk model is proposed based on the new CGR coordinates for the protein sequences from complete genomes in the present paper. The new CCR coordinates based on the detailed HP model are converted into a time series, and a long-memory ARFIMA（p, d, q） model is introduced into the protein sequence analysis. This model is applied to simulating real CCR-walk sequence data of twelve protein sequences. Remarkably long-range correlations are uncovered in the data and the results obtained from these models are reasonably consistent with those available from the ARFIMA（p, d, q） model.
基金This study was supported by the BK21 FOUR project(AI-driven Convergence Software Education Research Program)funded by the Ministry of Education,School of Computer Science and Engineering,Kyungpook National University,Korea(4199990214394).This work was also supported by the Institute of Information&communications Technology Planning&Evaluation(IITP)grant funded by the Korea Government(MSIT)under Grant 2017-0-00053(A Technology Development of Artificial Intelligence Doctors for Cardiovascular Disease).
文摘Game player modeling is a paradigm of computational models to exploit players’behavior and experience using game and player analytics.Player modeling refers to descriptions of players based on frameworks of data derived from the interaction of a player’s behavior within the game as well as the player’s experience with the game.Player behavior focuses on dynamic and static information gathered at the time of gameplay.Player experience concerns the association of the human player during gameplay,which is based on cognitive and affective physiological measurements collected from sensors mounted on the player’s body or in the player’s surroundings.In this paper,player experience modeling is studied based on the board puzzle game“Candy Crush Saga”using cognitive data of players accessed by physiological and peripheral devices.Long Short-Term Memory-based Deep Neural Network(LSTM-DNN)is used to predict players’effective states in terms of valence,arousal,dominance,and liking by employing the concept of transfer learning.Transfer learning focuses on gaining knowledge while solving one problem and using the same knowledge to solve different but related problems.The homogeneous transfer learning approach has not been implemented in the game domain before,and this novel study opens a new research area for the game industry where the main challenge is predicting the significance of innovative games for entertainment and players’engagement.Relevant not only from a player’s point of view,it is also a benchmark study for game developers who have been facing problems of“cold start”for innovative games that strengthen the game industrial economy.
文摘The introduction of automated driving systems raised questions about how the human driver interacts with the automated system. Non-cooperative game theory is increasingly used for modelling and understanding such interaction, while its counterpart, cooperative game theory is rarely discussed for similar applications despite it may be potentially more suitable. This paper describes the modelling of a human driver’s steering interaction with an automated steering system using cooperative game theory. The distributed Model Predictive Control approach is adopted to derive the driver’s and the automated steering system’s strategies in a Pareto equilibrium sense, namely their cooperative Pareto steering strategies. Two separate numerical studies are carried out to study the influence of strategy parameters, and the influence of strategy types on the driver’s and the automated system’s steering performance. It is found that when a driver interacts with an automated steering system using a cooperative Pareto steering strategy, the driver can improve his/her performance in following a target path through increasing his/her effort in pursuing his/her own interest under the driver-automation cooperative control goal. It is also found that a driver’s adoption of cooperative Pareto steering strategy leads to a reinforcement in the driver’s steering angle control, compared to the driver’s adoption of non-cooperative Nash strategy. This in turn enables the vehicle to return from a lane-change maneuver to straight-line driving swifter.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(61374055)Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province(BK20131381)+3 种基金China Postdoctoral Science Foundation funded project(2013M541663)Jiangsu Planned Projects for Postdoctoral Research Funds(1202015C)Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars,State Education Ministry(BJ213022)Scientific Research Foundation of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications(NY214075,XJKY14004)
基金Supported by the Youth Program of Humanities of Education Department(12YJCZH273,11YJCZH199)Humanity Planning Program of Education Department(12YJA790003)
文摘Take Chinese yew cooperative organization for example,different game structures of forestry cooperation model were analyzed,the elative merit and applicable occasion was discussed combined with empirical investigation,and some suggestions were given also.The results showed that depending entirely on normal forest farmers cooperate spontaneously is difficult.Policies should be designed from the perspective of promoted village cadres and influential family salons to cooperation.When market factors become the main obstacle,it is necessary to introduce companies,relax constraints of forest management and build the right market atmosphere.According to unequal status of company and forest farmers,develop the cooperation model of " company + cooperation organization + farmers".In certain circumstances,especially there are several companies vicious competition,the intervention of association can play a coordinating role.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.50809025,50539110,50539010,50539030)the National Science and Technology Supporting Plan (Grant Nos.20006BAC14B03,2008BAB29B06,2008BAB29B03)
文摘Arch dam deformation is comprehensively affected by water pressure,temperature,dam's structural behavior and material properties as well as other factors.Among them the water pressure and temperature are external factors(source factors) that cause dam deformation,and dam's structural behavior and material properties are the internal factors of deformation(resistance factors).The dam deformation is the result of the mutual game playing between source factors and resistance factors.Therefore,resistance factors of structure and materials that reflect resistance character of arch dam structure are introduced into the traditional model,where structure factor is embodied by the flexibility coefficient of dam body and the maximum dam height,and material property is embodied by the elastic modulus of dam.On the basis of analyzing the correlation between dam deformation and resistance factors,the game model of safety monitoring for arch dam deformation is put forward.
基金National Science Foundation of China,Grant No.69682010
文摘In this paper, the main schemes of connection admission control (CAC) in ATM networks are briefly discussed especially the principle of dynamic bandwidth allocation. Then the fair share of the bandwidth among different traffic sources is analyzed based on cooperative game model. A CAC scheme is proposed using the genetic algorithm (GA) to optimize the bandwidth-delay-product formed utilization function that ensures the fair share and accuracy of accepting/rejecting the incoming calls. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme ensures fairness of the shared bandwidth to different traffic sources.
基金Supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province(2012D135)
文摘Virtual organization uses information technology to achieve a closer integration and better management of business relationships between internal and external parties. There are many emerging issues in virtual organization and one of them is knowl- edge sharing. Knowledge sharing that is the core of knowledge management plays a key role in virtual organization. However, game theoretic exploration about knowledge sharing mechanism based on virtual organization is seldom published, In this study, knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization enterprise is explored using game theories from two aspects based on the features of knowledge sharing in virtual organization enterprise. Fi- nally, the critical model of knowledge sharing mechanism in virtual organization also is presented based on the perspective of game analysis.
文摘In this paper, the state-feedback Nash game based mixed H2/H∞ design^（[1, 2]）has been extended for output feedback case. The algorithm is applied to control bioreactor system with a Laguerre-Wavelet Network（LWN）^（[3, 4]）model of the bioreactor.This is achieved by using the LWN model as a deviation model and by successively linearising the deviation model along the state trajectory. For reducing the approximation error and to improve the controller performance, symbolic derivation algorithm, viz.,automatic differentiation is employed. A cautionary note is also given on the fragility of the output feedback mixed H2/H∞ model predictive controller^（[4, 5]）due to its sensitivity to its own parametric changes.
基金supported by the Deanship of Scientific Research at King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals Project(No.JF141002)the National Science Foundation(No.ECCS-1405173)+3 种基金the Office of Naval Research(Nos.N000141310562,N000141410718)the U.S. Army Research Office(No.W911NF-11-D-0001)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61120106011)the Project 111 from the Ministry of Education of China(No.B08015)
文摘This paper introduces a model-free reinforcement learning technique that is used to solve a class of dynamic games known as dynamic graphical games. The graphical game results from to make all the agents synchronize to the state of a command multi-agent dynamical systems, where pinning control is used generator or a leader agent. Novel coupled Bellman equations and Hamiltonian functions are developed for the dynamic graphical games. The Hamiltonian mechanics are used to derive the necessary conditions for optimality. The solution for the dynamic graphical game is given in terms of the solution to a set of coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations developed herein. Nash equilibrium solution for the graphical game is given in terms of the solution to the underlying coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. An online model-free policy iteration algorithm is developed to learn the Nash solution for the dynamic graphical game. This algorithm does not require any knowledge of the agents＇ dynamics. A proof of convergence for this multi-agent learning algorithm is given under mild assumption about the inter-connectivity properties of the graph. A gradient descent technique with critic network structures is used to implement the policy iteration algorithm to solve the graphical game online in real-time.
文摘This paper is concerned with Hepato-Cellular Carcinoma (HCC) patients treated naturopathic agents. Patients treated with ≥4 agents survived significantly longer than patients treated with ≤3 agents. The great effect is seen in patients treated with at least 4 agents that include Cordyceps sinensis. This greater certainty of patient survival without toxic side effects is significant benefit comparing with the conventional therapy. Treatment of HCC with a regimen of ≥4 agents prepared from natural products is associated with greater certainty of patient survival in a substantial portion of patients. The information dynamic model for certainty of patient survival is derived based on fluid mechanics, where a series of approximate solutions of the flow between two parallel flat walls, one of which is at rest, the other is suddenly accelerated from the rest to a constant velocity are used. The kinetic energy of certainty of patient survival decreases with increasing time, while the potential energy increases with increasing time. Total mechanical energy of patients treated with 4 or more agents is smaller than that treated with 3 or fewer agents. The kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 4 or more agents decreases (increases) more slower than the kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 3 or fewer agents.
文摘The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability is very important to the safety of urban flood control. In this paper, the evaluation of consolidated index is used. Respectively, AHP and entropy method calculate the subjective and objective weight of the evaluation indicators, and combine them by game theory. So we can obtain synthetic weight based on objective and subjective weights. The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability as target layer, a single variable multi-objective fuzzy optimization model is established. We use the model to evaluate flood-waterlogged vulnerability of 13 prefecture-level city in Hunan, and compare it with other evaluation method. The results show that the evaluation method has certain adaptability and reliability, and it＇ s helpfid to the construction planning of urban flood control.
