The rapid development of the Internet has accelerated the spread of rumors,posing challenges to social cohesion and stability.To address this,a multi-channel rumor propagation model incorporating individual game behav...The rapid development of the Internet has accelerated the spread of rumors,posing challenges to social cohesion and stability.To address this,a multi-channel rumor propagation model incorporating individual game behavior and time delay is proposed.It depicts individuals strategically choosing propagation channels in the rumor spread process,capturing real-world intricacies more faithfully.Specifically,the model allowing spreaders to choose between text and video information base channels.Strategy adoption hinges on benefits versus costs,with payoffs dictating strategy and the propagation process determining an individual's state.By theoretical analysis of the model,the propagation threshold and equilibrium points are obtained.Then the stability of the model is further demonstrated based on Routh-Hurwitz judgment and Descartes'Rule of Signs.Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the correctness of the theoretical results and the sensitivity of the model to key parameters.The outcomes reveal that increasing the propagation cost of spreaders can significantly curb the spread of rumors.In contrast to the classical ISR model,rumors spread faster and more widely in the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model in this paper,which is a feature more aligned with real-world scenarios.Finally,the validity and predictive ability of the model are verified by using real rumor propagation data sets,indicating that the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model has good practical application and predictive value.展开更多
Information asymmetry phenomenon and the differences between the main body's earning targets,which are existing in the building energy saving field,have made the game behaviors of its economic activities become in...Information asymmetry phenomenon and the differences between the main body's earning targets,which are existing in the building energy saving field,have made the game behaviors of its economic activities become inevitable.There are strategies choice between government departments and the developers,when the building energy saving work is carried out under the government control.Based on the players based assumptions,the path of player's behavior strategy choices is analyzed,expected revenue models are established and mixed Nash equilibrium is obtained in this paper.Based on the analysis results,the incentive strategy enlightenment could be concluded that it is particularly important to design the scientific incentive system for developers to develop energy-saving buildings reasonably and for the government to implement effective control;the role of informal system in encouraging developers to develop energy-saving buildings should not be ignored.展开更多
Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It ...Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It depicts a story of strong love and extreme hatred.This paper used the game theory to analyse the behaviors of Heathcliff in the Wuthering Heights.Some basic strategies and game models were used to illustrate the choices of the characters.This paper can be divided into four parts.The introduction is to introduce the novel,the description of the research approach and the definition of basic theories.It emphasizes on the introduction of basic strategies and some game models which would be used for the later analysis.The second part is to discuss the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality and analyses its causes.Heathcliff was very cruel in his revenge,but he also has a tender side in love,that is the manifestation of his dual personality.The formation of his dual personality dates back to his childhood suffering,the abnormal family environment,the pressure from long labor and finally his only love—Catherine's betrayal.The third part focuses on discussing how his dual personality affects Heathcliff's choices in the game plays with others.His tender personality affected Heathcliff's choice when facing Catherine's betrayal.He could not choose a grim strategy to totally break up with her,but choose a Tit for Tat and to combine with her after a revenge.His cruel personality made him harm other people indifferently which hide the foreshadowing for his death.The conclusion summarizes the arguments of this paper.This paper analyses from the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality,and then analyzes how his dual personality affected his choices in the game plays with others.展开更多
成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博...成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博弈论领域顶级期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》2018年第2期。论文研究成果初步解决了诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伊德·沙普利(Lloyd S. Shapley)提出的抽象市场博弈核非空的猜想。展开更多
The green retrofit of existing public buildings is a necessary choice to promote energy conservation,emission reduction,and sustainable development goals in the construction industry,and to advance the implementation ...The green retrofit of existing public buildings is a necessary choice to promote energy conservation,emission reduction,and sustainable development goals in the construction industry,and to advance the implementation of the national"carbon peaking and carbon neutrality"strategy.The effective governance of green retrofit projects for existing public buildings essentially involves a dynamic process of repeated strategic interactions among key stakeholders.From the perspective of project governance,this study clarifies the game-theoretic relationship between ESCO and owners under government guidance,and constructs an evolutionary game model involving the government,ESCO,and owners.The study explores the strategic choices of the core stakeholders in the green retrofit projects of existing public buildings.The aim is to lay a foundation for research on the decision-making coordination and implementation mechanisms between ESCO and owners,thus promoting the efficient and healthy development of green retrofit projects for existing public buildings.展开更多
The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect invo...The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior such as the violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility and the criticism from others for the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in it. The instruction condition for the evaluator of behavior in a dictator game was taken up as an experimental variable. Instruction condition 1 was to pay attention to the behavior of only a dictator. In instruction condition 2, the participant (evaluator) was required to review all players’ behavior and evaluate a dictator. It has been investigated whether allowing indirect actions (mediations) leads to reduced punishment as a function of the instruction condition. While the punishment to the indirectness did not get smaller for instruction condition 2, the punishment to the indirectness tended to get smaller only for instruction condition 1.展开更多
We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exp...We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.展开更多
This article provides new insights regarding driver behavior, techniques and adaptability. This study has been done because: 1) driving a vehicle is critical and one of the most common daily tasks;2) simulators are us...This article provides new insights regarding driver behavior, techniques and adaptability. This study has been done because: 1) driving a vehicle is critical and one of the most common daily tasks;2) simulators are used for the purpose of training and researching driver behavior and characteristics;3) the article addresses driver experience by involving new virtual reality technologies. A simulator has been used to assist novice drivers to learn how to drive in a very safe environment, and researching and collecting data for researchers has become easier due to this secure and user-friendly environment. The theoretical framework of this driving simulation has been designed by using the Unity3D game engine (5.4.f3 version) and was programmed with the C# programming language. To make the driving environment more realistic we, in addition, utilized the HTC Vive Virtual reality headset which is powered by Steamvr. We used Unity Game Engine to design our scenarios and maps because by doing this we are able to be more flexible with designing. In this study, we asked 10 people ranging from ages 19 - 37 to participate in this experiment. Four Japanese divers and six non-Japanese drivers engaged in this study, some of which do not have a driver’s license in Japan. A few Japanese drivers have a license and car, while others have a license but no car. In order to analyze the results of this experiment we are used MatlabR2016b to analyze the gathered data. The result of this research indicates that individual’s behavior and characteristics such as controlling the speed, remaining calm and relaxed when driving, driving at appropriate speeds depending on changes in road structures and etc. can affect their driving performance.展开更多
In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that h...In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that have passed since this famous naval battle which took place in late September 480 B.C. The suggested model describes very well the most effective strategic behavior between two participants during a battle (or in a war). Moreover, we compare the results of the Dynamical Systems analysis to Game Theory, considering this conflict as a “war game”.展开更多
We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the uncondit...We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.展开更多
We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain...We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain the same strategy at each iteration and may update according to updating rule at next iteration. The simulation results show that the introduction of strategy-homogeneity increases the cooperation in the evolutionary stable state. For any value of temptation to defect, the density of cooperators in equilibrium state increases firstly and then decreases as the level of strategy-homogeneity increases constantly, and there exists an appropriate level of strategy-homogeneity, maximizing the density of cooperators. The results may be favorable for comprehending cooperative behaviors in societies composed of connected groups with coherent strategy.展开更多
This work presents the complexity that emerges in a Bertrand duopoly between two companies in the Greek oil market, one of which is semi-public and the other is private. The game uses linear demand functions for diffe...This work presents the complexity that emerges in a Bertrand duopoly between two companies in the Greek oil market, one of which is semi-public and the other is private. The game uses linear demand functions for differentiated products from the existing literature and asymmetric cost functions that arose after approaches using the published financial reports of the two oil companies (Hellenic Petroleum and Motor Oil). The game is based on the assumption of homogeneous players who are characterized by bounded rationality and follow an adjustment mechanism. The players’ decisions for each time period are expressed by two difference equations. A dynamical analysis of the game’s discrete dynamical system is made by finding the equilibrium positions and studying their stability. Numerical simulations include bifurcation diagrams and strange attractors. Lyapunov numbers’ graphs and sensitivity analysis in initial conditions prove the algebraic results and reveal the complexity and chaotic behavior of the system focusing on the two parameters k<sub>1</sub> and k<sub>2</sub> (speed of adjustment for each player). The d-Backtest method is applied through which an attempt is made to control the chaos that appears outside the stability space in order to return to the locally asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium for the system.展开更多
基金partially supported by the Project for the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72174121, 71774111)the Program for Professor of Special Appointment (Eastern Scholar) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learningthe Project for the Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (21ZR1444100)
文摘The rapid development of the Internet has accelerated the spread of rumors,posing challenges to social cohesion and stability.To address this,a multi-channel rumor propagation model incorporating individual game behavior and time delay is proposed.It depicts individuals strategically choosing propagation channels in the rumor spread process,capturing real-world intricacies more faithfully.Specifically,the model allowing spreaders to choose between text and video information base channels.Strategy adoption hinges on benefits versus costs,with payoffs dictating strategy and the propagation process determining an individual's state.By theoretical analysis of the model,the propagation threshold and equilibrium points are obtained.Then the stability of the model is further demonstrated based on Routh-Hurwitz judgment and Descartes'Rule of Signs.Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the correctness of the theoretical results and the sensitivity of the model to key parameters.The outcomes reveal that increasing the propagation cost of spreaders can significantly curb the spread of rumors.In contrast to the classical ISR model,rumors spread faster and more widely in the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model in this paper,which is a feature more aligned with real-world scenarios.Finally,the validity and predictive ability of the model are verified by using real rumor propagation data sets,indicating that the improved multi-channel rumor propagation model has good practical application and predictive value.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71171141)
文摘Information asymmetry phenomenon and the differences between the main body's earning targets,which are existing in the building energy saving field,have made the game behaviors of its economic activities become inevitable.There are strategies choice between government departments and the developers,when the building energy saving work is carried out under the government control.Based on the players based assumptions,the path of player's behavior strategy choices is analyzed,expected revenue models are established and mixed Nash equilibrium is obtained in this paper.Based on the analysis results,the incentive strategy enlightenment could be concluded that it is particularly important to design the scientific incentive system for developers to develop energy-saving buildings reasonably and for the government to implement effective control;the role of informal system in encouraging developers to develop energy-saving buildings should not be ignored.
文摘Wuthering Heights was an extraordinary novel in the nineteenth century,for it is very different from other contemporary novels which are reconciled with the public opinion by presenting Victorian values and tastes.It depicts a story of strong love and extreme hatred.This paper used the game theory to analyse the behaviors of Heathcliff in the Wuthering Heights.Some basic strategies and game models were used to illustrate the choices of the characters.This paper can be divided into four parts.The introduction is to introduce the novel,the description of the research approach and the definition of basic theories.It emphasizes on the introduction of basic strategies and some game models which would be used for the later analysis.The second part is to discuss the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality and analyses its causes.Heathcliff was very cruel in his revenge,but he also has a tender side in love,that is the manifestation of his dual personality.The formation of his dual personality dates back to his childhood suffering,the abnormal family environment,the pressure from long labor and finally his only love—Catherine's betrayal.The third part focuses on discussing how his dual personality affects Heathcliff's choices in the game plays with others.His tender personality affected Heathcliff's choice when facing Catherine's betrayal.He could not choose a grim strategy to totally break up with her,but choose a Tit for Tat and to combine with her after a revenge.His cruel personality made him harm other people indifferently which hide the foreshadowing for his death.The conclusion summarizes the arguments of this paper.This paper analyses from the formation of Heathcliff's dual personality,and then analyzes how his dual personality affected his choices in the game plays with others.
文摘成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博弈论领域顶级期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》2018年第2期。论文研究成果初步解决了诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伊德·沙普利(Lloyd S. Shapley)提出的抽象市场博弈核非空的猜想。
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71872122)the Late-stage Subsidy Project of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Education Department of China(Grant No.20JHQ095).
文摘The green retrofit of existing public buildings is a necessary choice to promote energy conservation,emission reduction,and sustainable development goals in the construction industry,and to advance the implementation of the national"carbon peaking and carbon neutrality"strategy.The effective governance of green retrofit projects for existing public buildings essentially involves a dynamic process of repeated strategic interactions among key stakeholders.From the perspective of project governance,this study clarifies the game-theoretic relationship between ESCO and owners under government guidance,and constructs an evolutionary game model involving the government,ESCO,and owners.The study explores the strategic choices of the core stakeholders in the green retrofit projects of existing public buildings.The aim is to lay a foundation for research on the decision-making coordination and implementation mechanisms between ESCO and owners,thus promoting the efficient and healthy development of green retrofit projects for existing public buildings.
文摘The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior such as the violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility and the criticism from others for the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in it. The instruction condition for the evaluator of behavior in a dictator game was taken up as an experimental variable. Instruction condition 1 was to pay attention to the behavior of only a dictator. In instruction condition 2, the participant (evaluator) was required to review all players’ behavior and evaluate a dictator. It has been investigated whether allowing indirect actions (mediations) leads to reduced punishment as a function of the instruction condition. While the punishment to the indirectness did not get smaller for instruction condition 2, the punishment to the indirectness tended to get smaller only for instruction condition 1.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grand No. 10575055)K. C. Wong Magna Fund in Ningbo University
文摘We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.
文摘This article provides new insights regarding driver behavior, techniques and adaptability. This study has been done because: 1) driving a vehicle is critical and one of the most common daily tasks;2) simulators are used for the purpose of training and researching driver behavior and characteristics;3) the article addresses driver experience by involving new virtual reality technologies. A simulator has been used to assist novice drivers to learn how to drive in a very safe environment, and researching and collecting data for researchers has become easier due to this secure and user-friendly environment. The theoretical framework of this driving simulation has been designed by using the Unity3D game engine (5.4.f3 version) and was programmed with the C# programming language. To make the driving environment more realistic we, in addition, utilized the HTC Vive Virtual reality headset which is powered by Steamvr. We used Unity Game Engine to design our scenarios and maps because by doing this we are able to be more flexible with designing. In this study, we asked 10 people ranging from ages 19 - 37 to participate in this experiment. Four Japanese divers and six non-Japanese drivers engaged in this study, some of which do not have a driver’s license in Japan. A few Japanese drivers have a license and car, while others have a license but no car. In order to analyze the results of this experiment we are used MatlabR2016b to analyze the gathered data. The result of this research indicates that individual’s behavior and characteristics such as controlling the speed, remaining calm and relaxed when driving, driving at appropriate speeds depending on changes in road structures and etc. can affect their driving performance.
文摘In this paper, we present an innovative non–linear, discrete, dynamical system trying to model the historic battle of Salamis between Greeks and Persians. September 2020 marks the anniversary of the 2500 years that have passed since this famous naval battle which took place in late September 480 B.C. The suggested model describes very well the most effective strategic behavior between two participants during a battle (or in a war). Moreover, we compare the results of the Dynamical Systems analysis to Game Theory, considering this conflict as a “war game”.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.11175131 and 10875086)
文摘We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each＇agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance VT as well as the initial composition of agents faO. Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including VT, faO, and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 〈 r 〈 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems.
文摘We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain the same strategy at each iteration and may update according to updating rule at next iteration. The simulation results show that the introduction of strategy-homogeneity increases the cooperation in the evolutionary stable state. For any value of temptation to defect, the density of cooperators in equilibrium state increases firstly and then decreases as the level of strategy-homogeneity increases constantly, and there exists an appropriate level of strategy-homogeneity, maximizing the density of cooperators. The results may be favorable for comprehending cooperative behaviors in societies composed of connected groups with coherent strategy.
文摘This work presents the complexity that emerges in a Bertrand duopoly between two companies in the Greek oil market, one of which is semi-public and the other is private. The game uses linear demand functions for differentiated products from the existing literature and asymmetric cost functions that arose after approaches using the published financial reports of the two oil companies (Hellenic Petroleum and Motor Oil). The game is based on the assumption of homogeneous players who are characterized by bounded rationality and follow an adjustment mechanism. The players’ decisions for each time period are expressed by two difference equations. A dynamical analysis of the game’s discrete dynamical system is made by finding the equilibrium positions and studying their stability. Numerical simulations include bifurcation diagrams and strange attractors. Lyapunov numbers’ graphs and sensitivity analysis in initial conditions prove the algebraic results and reveal the complexity and chaotic behavior of the system focusing on the two parameters k<sub>1</sub> and k<sub>2</sub> (speed of adjustment for each player). The d-Backtest method is applied through which an attempt is made to control the chaos that appears outside the stability space in order to return to the locally asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium for the system.
