We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exp...We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.展开更多
To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise p...To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise parties.The impacts of different incentive levels and revenue distribution ratios on the strategic choices and evolutionary trends of both government and enterprise were analyzed.It was found that when the government chose a strategy of weak authorization and strong regulation,enterprises showed a higher tendency to actively participate in public data sharing.In addition,when the revenue distribution ratio between government and enterprise was 3:7,the game evolution of both parties tended to be stable,reaching a balanced state that is beneficial and sustainable for both parties.展开更多
This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social...This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social and ecological interests.The model engages 3 key stakeholders:government,public welfare organizations,and national park operators,highlighting their complex interdependencies.Findings indicate that cooperative strategies among stakeholders are more likely when appropriate incentives and penalties are applied and decrease with higher associated costs.The study recommends that policymakers implement diversified funding mechanisms,clarify fiscal responsibilities,and promote coordinated efforts between central and local governments.Additionally,reducing operational costs and barriers for public welfare organizations and park operators can enhance cooperative behavior.This research provides valuable insights for optimizing funding mechanisms for national parks and offers an innovative tool for the study of social-ecological systems.展开更多
Data is a key factor of production in the so-called"digital economy"era.Thus,it is important to promote government data opening and sharing to advance the high-quality development of a digital economy.The ar...Data is a key factor of production in the so-called"digital economy"era.Thus,it is important to promote government data opening and sharing to advance the high-quality development of a digital economy.The article first constructs an evolutionary game model of government data opening and sharing(with local governments and enterprises as game participants)by combining realistic scenarios and evolutionary game models.Then,it discusses the evolutionary stabilization strategies under different scenarios in a categorical manner.Finally,it uses MATLAB to conduct numerical simulations to verify the accuracy of the model and analyze the key influencing factors.Several results were obtained.(1)the optimal evolutionary path to promote government data opening and sharing is for enterprises to choose to"use data"and for local governments to choose the"positive sharing"strategy,and the enterprises'decision is the internal driver.(2)The value of data assets provided by local governments when applying the"positive sharing"strategy,the cost of data used by enterprises,and the data value conversion rate of enterprises are the key factors influencing the decisions of both parties.To promote open sharing and exploitation of government data,enterprises should enhance their independent innovation capabilities,while governments should enhance the value of data assets and continuously optimize their business environments.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grand No. 10575055)K. C. Wong Magna Fund in Ningbo University
文摘We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72272140,72334006,72192843)。
文摘To address the issue of revenue distribution between government departments and enterprises in the operation of public data authorization,an evolutionary game model was constructed for both government and enterprise parties.The impacts of different incentive levels and revenue distribution ratios on the strategic choices and evolutionary trends of both government and enterprise were analyzed.It was found that when the government chose a strategy of weak authorization and strong regulation,enterprises showed a higher tendency to actively participate in public data sharing.In addition,when the revenue distribution ratio between government and enterprise was 3:7,the game evolution of both parties tended to be stable,reaching a balanced state that is beneficial and sustainable for both parties.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(nos.52270174 and 71804013)
文摘This study presents a novel tripartite evolutionary game model within a social-ecological system framework to address the challenge of securing sustainable operational funding for national parks while balancing social and ecological interests.The model engages 3 key stakeholders:government,public welfare organizations,and national park operators,highlighting their complex interdependencies.Findings indicate that cooperative strategies among stakeholders are more likely when appropriate incentives and penalties are applied and decrease with higher associated costs.The study recommends that policymakers implement diversified funding mechanisms,clarify fiscal responsibilities,and promote coordinated efforts between central and local governments.Additionally,reducing operational costs and barriers for public welfare organizations and park operators can enhance cooperative behavior.This research provides valuable insights for optimizing funding mechanisms for national parks and offers an innovative tool for the study of social-ecological systems.
基金the Major Programs of the National Social Science Foundation of China(No.19ZDA348).
文摘Data is a key factor of production in the so-called"digital economy"era.Thus,it is important to promote government data opening and sharing to advance the high-quality development of a digital economy.The article first constructs an evolutionary game model of government data opening and sharing(with local governments and enterprises as game participants)by combining realistic scenarios and evolutionary game models.Then,it discusses the evolutionary stabilization strategies under different scenarios in a categorical manner.Finally,it uses MATLAB to conduct numerical simulations to verify the accuracy of the model and analyze the key influencing factors.Several results were obtained.(1)the optimal evolutionary path to promote government data opening and sharing is for enterprises to choose to"use data"and for local governments to choose the"positive sharing"strategy,and the enterprises'decision is the internal driver.(2)The value of data assets provided by local governments when applying the"positive sharing"strategy,the cost of data used by enterprises,and the data value conversion rate of enterprises are the key factors influencing the decisions of both parties.To promote open sharing and exploitation of government data,enterprises should enhance their independent innovation capabilities,while governments should enhance the value of data assets and continuously optimize their business environments.
