The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds ma...The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.展开更多
Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of...Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of LMC and its extensions; there is not yet a theory that accounts for the mechanisms of more female-biased sex ratio. Here, we assume that LMC occurs at a destructed habitat that reduces the resource for production, and present a new extension for the LMC model. Consequently, our model shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS) for sex ratio depends on two parameters: the number of foundresses and the degree of habitat destruction. Moreover, the sex ratio decreases as the degree of habitat destruction increases, i.e., the proportion of female increases. These results generally agree with experimental data, and may provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition and a new theory support for conservation of some species.展开更多
Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this ...Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.展开更多
Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science.The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strate...Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science.The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness.These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction.However,the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems.With the Hawk–Dove model,we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio.The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors,the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners.The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal.The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation,and that pure cooperation strategy(i.e.,Nash equilibrium)does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems,which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems.The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction.A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved,and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible,and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61672408, U1405255, 61502368, 61602537, 61602357, 61672413, U1509214, U1135002)National High Technology Research and Development Program (863 Program) (Grant Nos. 2015AA016007, 2015AA017203)+5 种基金China Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project (Grant No.2016M592762)Shaanxi Science & Technology Coordination & Innovation Project (Grant No.2016TZC-G-6-3)Shaanxi Provincial Natural Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 2015JQ6227, 2016JM6005)China 111 Project (Grant No. B16037)Beijing Municipal Social Science Foundation(Grant No. 16XCC023)Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant Nos. JB150308, JB150309, JB161501, JBG161511)
文摘The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.
基金Funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.31600299)the Young Talent Fund of University Association for Science and Technology in Shaanxi Province,China(No.20160234)+1 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Shaanxi Provincial Department of Education(No.17JK0040)the Key Project of Baoji University of Arts and Sciences(No.ZK16050)
文摘Local mate competition(LMC) was firstly used to explain extra-ordinary female-biased sex ratios. However, some observations have found that the sex ratios of some species are more female-biased than the predictions of LMC and its extensions; there is not yet a theory that accounts for the mechanisms of more female-biased sex ratio. Here, we assume that LMC occurs at a destructed habitat that reduces the resource for production, and present a new extension for the LMC model. Consequently, our model shows that the evolutionarily stable strategy(ESS) for sex ratio depends on two parameters: the number of foundresses and the degree of habitat destruction. Moreover, the sex ratio decreases as the degree of habitat destruction increases, i.e., the proportion of female increases. These results generally agree with experimental data, and may provide a new basis for the evolution of female-biased sex ratios in local mate competition and a new theory support for conservation of some species.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72171172 and 62088101the Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology,China Major Project under Grant No.2021SHZDZX0100the Shanghai Municipal Commission of Science and Technology,China Project under Grant No.19511132101.
文摘Although the pick-up/drop-off(PUDO)strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking,there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method,despite its numerous benefits.Here,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory(EGT)model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system.The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications.Subsequently,an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios.The findings suggest that:firstly,providing subsidies to passengers and drivers,along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms,is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy.Then,the decision-making process is divided into three stages:initial stage,middle stage,and mature stage.PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and,in the mature stage,both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies;the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times,as well as the subsidies granted to passengers,are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers,drivers,and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy.Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.
基金supported by the National Basic Research Program of China(Grant No.2007CB411600)the National Natural Sci-ence Foundation of China(Grant Nos.30670272,30770500,10961027 and 10761010)+1 种基金the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation(Grant No.2009CD104)the State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolu-tion and the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
文摘Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science.The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness.These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction.However,the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems.With the Hawk–Dove model,we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio.The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors,the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners.The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal.The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation,and that pure cooperation strategy(i.e.,Nash equilibrium)does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems,which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems.The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction.A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved,and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible,and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.
