Equity structure constitutes a crucial component of corporate internal governance.A scientifically and reasonably structured equity system aids in enhancing the level and efficiency of corporate governance.Through emp...Equity structure constitutes a crucial component of corporate internal governance.A scientifically and reasonably structured equity system aids in enhancing the level and efficiency of corporate governance.Through empirical analysis of data spanning from 2013 to 2022,the study aims to verify the influence mechanism of equity structure on corporate performance.The results indicate that enhancing equity concentration and balance positively impacts corporate performance,with this effect persisting over time.Consequently,optimizing the degree of equity concentration,shareholder types,and the board of directors’structure can assist enterprises in maximizing long-term value.展开更多
In this paper,it is first briefly described the basic situation and current policies of state owned enterprise reform in China.Then the major issues in the reform process are identified,the possible solutions in term...In this paper,it is first briefly described the basic situation and current policies of state owned enterprise reform in China.Then the major issues in the reform process are identified,the possible solutions in terms of reengineering stock equity structure and state share circulation are discussed,and finally some suggestions are made for the further state owned enterprise reform.Basing on the theory on the modern corporation system,relevant experiences of market economy nations and the practice of Chinese enterprise system reform.The approaches to determine the proportion of state share in the future corporations are proposed.Since the public ownership is not ideologically appropriate,the establishment of social security fund and mutual fund investment companies are suggested as new and acceptable pattern of public ownership.It is believed that these companies will be the major institutional shareholders in the future corporations.Their stock equity structure would mainly consist of institutional shareholders,which will be both consistent with international norms of modern corporations and with socialist public ownership with Chinese characteristics.展开更多
In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China,we divide state-owned enterprises(SOEs)into four categories according to their equity structure,namely abso...In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China,we divide state-owned enterprises(SOEs)into four categories according to their equity structure,namely absolute hold-ing firms,relative holding firms,major impact firms and equity participation firms,to examine the current situation and effectiveness of differentiated gov-ernance for executive compensation.We report four main findings.First,exec-utive compensation levels,compensation gaps and equity incentives increase as government control decreases,indicating the emergence of differentiated gov-ernance of executive compensation in SOEs.Second,the driving force behind differentiated compensation is the government’s willingness to intervene in SOEs.The government’s ability to intervene in SOEs is not diminished by reduced equity control,and the government may even compensate for such a reduction by appointing excess executives.Third,differentiated governance of compensation is more prominent in local and competitive SOEs,while equity incentives lag significantly behind salary levels and salary gap incen-tives.Fourth,differentiated governance of compensation levels and gaps are effective in reducing agency problems and enhancing innovation in SOEs;how-ever,the impact of equity incentives is limited.These findings enrich the liter-ature on the differentiated governance of SOEs and facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of executive incentive and compensation con-tracts in Chinese SOEs.展开更多
文摘Equity structure constitutes a crucial component of corporate internal governance.A scientifically and reasonably structured equity system aids in enhancing the level and efficiency of corporate governance.Through empirical analysis of data spanning from 2013 to 2022,the study aims to verify the influence mechanism of equity structure on corporate performance.The results indicate that enhancing equity concentration and balance positively impacts corporate performance,with this effect persisting over time.Consequently,optimizing the degree of equity concentration,shareholder types,and the board of directors’structure can assist enterprises in maximizing long-term value.
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.79770 0 63)
文摘In this paper,it is first briefly described the basic situation and current policies of state owned enterprise reform in China.Then the major issues in the reform process are identified,the possible solutions in terms of reengineering stock equity structure and state share circulation are discussed,and finally some suggestions are made for the further state owned enterprise reform.Basing on the theory on the modern corporation system,relevant experiences of market economy nations and the practice of Chinese enterprise system reform.The approaches to determine the proportion of state share in the future corporations are proposed.Since the public ownership is not ideologically appropriate,the establishment of social security fund and mutual fund investment companies are suggested as new and acceptable pattern of public ownership.It is believed that these companies will be the major institutional shareholders in the future corporations.Their stock equity structure would mainly consist of institutional shareholders,which will be both consistent with international norms of modern corporations and with socialist public ownership with Chinese characteristics.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project Nos.72372168,72002223,71902191,72132010)in addition to financial support from the Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province(Project No.2022A1515011098).
文摘In the context of differentiated governance and the deepening market-oriented reform of compensation in China,we divide state-owned enterprises(SOEs)into four categories according to their equity structure,namely absolute hold-ing firms,relative holding firms,major impact firms and equity participation firms,to examine the current situation and effectiveness of differentiated gov-ernance for executive compensation.We report four main findings.First,exec-utive compensation levels,compensation gaps and equity incentives increase as government control decreases,indicating the emergence of differentiated gov-ernance of executive compensation in SOEs.Second,the driving force behind differentiated compensation is the government’s willingness to intervene in SOEs.The government’s ability to intervene in SOEs is not diminished by reduced equity control,and the government may even compensate for such a reduction by appointing excess executives.Third,differentiated governance of compensation is more prominent in local and competitive SOEs,while equity incentives lag significantly behind salary levels and salary gap incen-tives.Fourth,differentiated governance of compensation levels and gaps are effective in reducing agency problems and enhancing innovation in SOEs;how-ever,the impact of equity incentives is limited.These findings enrich the liter-ature on the differentiated governance of SOEs and facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of executive incentive and compensation con-tracts in Chinese SOEs.
