The significant effect of social preference on strategic behavior has been convinced by recent research. Along this stream of research, we study firms’ altruistic incentives in supply chains since the selfish rationa...The significant effect of social preference on strategic behavior has been convinced by recent research. Along this stream of research, we study firms’ altruistic incentives in supply chains since the selfish rationality can’t deal with economic behaviors. We show that the performance of the supply chain in consideration of altruism is between those of scenarios under decentralization and under integration. We further shows that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find an egoistic retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with altruistic liability, to form a good chain.展开更多
This paper examines vertical outsourcing dynamics using three game-theoretic models:buyer’s independent production,buyer-led outsourcing,and supplier-led outsourcing.The analysis systematically evaluates how governme...This paper examines vertical outsourcing dynamics using three game-theoretic models:buyer’s independent production,buyer-led outsourcing,and supplier-led outsourcing.The analysis systematically evaluates how government policy support affects outsourcing decisions,pricing strategies,and profit distribution in supply chains.Key results indicate that:(1)policy interventions significantly alter competitive dynamics,with buyer support encouraging price reductions to expand market share while supplier support enhances production efficiency and pricing power;(2)allocation of control rights directly determines profit distribution advantages,allowing the dominant party to secure higher profits through favorable contractual terms;(3)different policy types generate asymmetric profit effects,as buyer-oriented policies directly increase its profits whereas supplier-focused measures indirectly boost overall profitability through enhanced market competitiveness.Using Stackelberg game frameworks supported by numerical simulations,this research clarifies the dynamic interrelationships among policy interventions,control structures,and supply chain coordination,offering theoretical insights for industrial policy design and corporate outsourcing optimization.展开更多
For multi-agent systems with competitive and collaborative relationships,signed graph can more intuitively express the characteristics of their interactive networks.In this paper,the bipartite consensus is investigate...For multi-agent systems with competitive and collaborative relationships,signed graph can more intuitively express the characteristics of their interactive networks.In this paper,the bipartite consensus is investigated for multi-agent systems with structurally balanced signed graph.In order to reduce actuation burden in dynamical network environment,the event-triggering strategy is applied to bipartite consensus protocol for the multi-agent systems.The triggered condition for each agent is designed by using its own information and transmitted information of its neighbors at sampling instant and make the number of triggers of the whole systems be reduced.Based on the distributed eventtriggered control,some sufficient conditions are derived to guarantee the leaderless and leader-following bipartite consensus.Finally,some numerical examples are shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results.展开更多
This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-pa...This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-party logistics company before logistics cooperation,or to its competitor after logistics cooperation with the client's service quality being in proportion to and no greater than the service provider's service quality.We find that when the service provider is a price taker,logistics cooperation is beneficial to both firms only when the service quality after logistics cooperation is moderate.Interestingly,under some circumstances,the client's profit increases even when its service quality decreases after logistics cooperation because logistics cooperation eases the price competition.We also find that all-win situations in which logistics cooperation increases the firms7 profit,consumer surplus and social welfare can be achieved.Finally,when the service price can be chosen by the service provider,we propose a negotiation process in which agreement on logistics cooperation can be reached;when the firm can invest in service quality,logistics cooperation may lower the equilibrium investment level.展开更多
In order to explore the evolution law of coopetition relationship among Mcommerce information service(MIS)subjects and further reveal the allocation mechanism of information resources,the research extends Lotka-Volter...In order to explore the evolution law of coopetition relationship among Mcommerce information service(MIS)subjects and further reveal the allocation mechanism of information resources,the research extends Lotka-Volterra model,builds the coopetition relationship model of MIS subjects and simulates their coopetition relationship by Python and MATLAB to obtain the evolution trend of information resources possession(IRP)of MIS subjects in the coopetition process.The results show that the mutualism cooperation pattern dominated by promoting effect can maximize the value of information resources.This paper has significant reference value for how to optimize the allocation of information resources among MIS subjects.展开更多
This paper proposes a framework to analyse the impact of online travel agency(OTA)when it steps into an original market of a traditional travel agency(TTA).Based on the multinomial logit choice model,the demand model ...This paper proposes a framework to analyse the impact of online travel agency(OTA)when it steps into an original market of a traditional travel agency(TTA).Based on the multinomial logit choice model,the demand model and the profit model are presented.Then,the demand squeeze,the total demand increase and the cooperation range of wholesale price are analysed.From the analysis,the results indicate that:(1)OTA can increase the demand of the whole market while it squeezes the demand of TTA;(2)The demand squeeze,total demand increase and the range of cooperation wholesale price are all positive with the perceived value from OTA and negative with the perceived value from TTA.(3)The more immature the market is the more necessary for TTA to cooperate with OTA.In addition,numerical example and sensitivity analysis of perceived value and price are presented to illustrate the demand squeeze,demand increase and cooperation range of wholesale price.展开更多
To be a necessity for life issue as well as an important engine to country＇s economy, electricity has private and public goods properties simultaneously, leading it difficult to balance economic profit and social res...To be a necessity for life issue as well as an important engine to country＇s economy, electricity has private and public goods properties simultaneously, leading it difficult to balance economic profit and social responsibility for a single state-owned cor- poration especially in large rural areas. In this paper, we suggest that occurrence of local company may provide us a new insight for this issue. Using objective programming model, we discuss different outcomes under competitive and cooperative situations. Our results suggest coopetitive relations among state company and local company would be a practical choice for achieving the economic profit and social duty simultaneously. Furthermore, tak- ing Sichuan province as a case, we investigate three types of coopetition relation between state company and local companies. Our findings suggest that coopetition strategy may lead to better solution to dealing with the conflicts between economic profit and social responsibility for both state-owned corporation and local electric power company.展开更多
文摘The significant effect of social preference on strategic behavior has been convinced by recent research. Along this stream of research, we study firms’ altruistic incentives in supply chains since the selfish rationality can’t deal with economic behaviors. We show that the performance of the supply chain in consideration of altruism is between those of scenarios under decentralization and under integration. We further shows that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find an egoistic retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with altruistic liability, to form a good chain.
基金supported by General Project of Philosophy and Social Science Planning of Zhejiang[25NDJC033YBM]Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences.
文摘This paper examines vertical outsourcing dynamics using three game-theoretic models:buyer’s independent production,buyer-led outsourcing,and supplier-led outsourcing.The analysis systematically evaluates how government policy support affects outsourcing decisions,pricing strategies,and profit distribution in supply chains.Key results indicate that:(1)policy interventions significantly alter competitive dynamics,with buyer support encouraging price reductions to expand market share while supplier support enhances production efficiency and pricing power;(2)allocation of control rights directly determines profit distribution advantages,allowing the dominant party to secure higher profits through favorable contractual terms;(3)different policy types generate asymmetric profit effects,as buyer-oriented policies directly increase its profits whereas supplier-focused measures indirectly boost overall profitability through enhanced market competitiveness.Using Stackelberg game frameworks supported by numerical simulations,this research clarifies the dynamic interrelationships among policy interventions,control structures,and supply chain coordination,offering theoretical insights for industrial policy design and corporate outsourcing optimization.
基金supported by the State Key Research Project under Grant No.2018YFD0400902the National Science Foundation under Grant No.61873112+1 种基金the Education Ministry and China Mobile Science Research Foundation under Grant No.MCM20170204Jiangsu Key Construction Laboratory of IoT Application Technology under Grant Nos.190449,190450。
文摘For multi-agent systems with competitive and collaborative relationships,signed graph can more intuitively express the characteristics of their interactive networks.In this paper,the bipartite consensus is investigated for multi-agent systems with structurally balanced signed graph.In order to reduce actuation burden in dynamical network environment,the event-triggering strategy is applied to bipartite consensus protocol for the multi-agent systems.The triggered condition for each agent is designed by using its own information and transmitted information of its neighbors at sampling instant and make the number of triggers of the whole systems be reduced.Based on the distributed eventtriggered control,some sufficient conditions are derived to guarantee the leaderless and leader-following bipartite consensus.Finally,some numerical examples are shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC:71801096,71731006,and 71925002)the Project funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under 2019M650202+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,SCUT(x2gs/D2191820)the Project supported by GDHVPS(2017).
文摘This paper studies the impact of logistics cooperation in two competing companies,one of which is equipped with a self-run logistics system while the other is not.The latter outsources logistics services to a third-party logistics company before logistics cooperation,or to its competitor after logistics cooperation with the client's service quality being in proportion to and no greater than the service provider's service quality.We find that when the service provider is a price taker,logistics cooperation is beneficial to both firms only when the service quality after logistics cooperation is moderate.Interestingly,under some circumstances,the client's profit increases even when its service quality decreases after logistics cooperation because logistics cooperation eases the price competition.We also find that all-win situations in which logistics cooperation increases the firms7 profit,consumer surplus and social welfare can be achieved.Finally,when the service price can be chosen by the service provider,we propose a negotiation process in which agreement on logistics cooperation can be reached;when the firm can invest in service quality,logistics cooperation may lower the equilibrium investment level.
基金The authors gratefully acknowledge the research support of National Social Science Fund Youth Project(CN)(No.19CTQ021).
文摘In order to explore the evolution law of coopetition relationship among Mcommerce information service(MIS)subjects and further reveal the allocation mechanism of information resources,the research extends Lotka-Volterra model,builds the coopetition relationship model of MIS subjects and simulates their coopetition relationship by Python and MATLAB to obtain the evolution trend of information resources possession(IRP)of MIS subjects in the coopetition process.The results show that the mutualism cooperation pattern dominated by promoting effect can maximize the value of information resources.This paper has significant reference value for how to optimize the allocation of information resources among MIS subjects.
基金High-Level Talents Project of Hainan Natural Science Foundation(No.2019RC037)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71761009,71461006,and 71461007)+1 种基金the Hainan Province Planning Program of Philosophy and Social Science(Nos.HNSK(YB)19-06 and HNSK(YB)19-11)Scientific Research Project Hainan Department of Education(Nos.HNKY2020ZD-6 and HNKY2019ZD-10).
文摘This paper proposes a framework to analyse the impact of online travel agency(OTA)when it steps into an original market of a traditional travel agency(TTA).Based on the multinomial logit choice model,the demand model and the profit model are presented.Then,the demand squeeze,the total demand increase and the cooperation range of wholesale price are analysed.From the analysis,the results indicate that:(1)OTA can increase the demand of the whole market while it squeezes the demand of TTA;(2)The demand squeeze,total demand increase and the range of cooperation wholesale price are all positive with the perceived value from OTA and negative with the perceived value from TTA.(3)The more immature the market is the more necessary for TTA to cooperate with OTA.In addition,numerical example and sensitivity analysis of perceived value and price are presented to illustrate the demand squeeze,demand increase and cooperation range of wholesale price.
文摘To be a necessity for life issue as well as an important engine to country＇s economy, electricity has private and public goods properties simultaneously, leading it difficult to balance economic profit and social responsibility for a single state-owned cor- poration especially in large rural areas. In this paper, we suggest that occurrence of local company may provide us a new insight for this issue. Using objective programming model, we discuss different outcomes under competitive and cooperative situations. Our results suggest coopetitive relations among state company and local company would be a practical choice for achieving the economic profit and social duty simultaneously. Furthermore, tak- ing Sichuan province as a case, we investigate three types of coopetition relation between state company and local companies. Our findings suggest that coopetition strategy may lead to better solution to dealing with the conflicts between economic profit and social responsibility for both state-owned corporation and local electric power company.
