Most literature on market competition in the banking industry neglects to address strategic interaction among banks.This paper studies interaction among Chinese banks by dividing banks into two groups:dominant banks(t...Most literature on market competition in the banking industry neglects to address strategic interaction among banks.This paper studies interaction among Chinese banks by dividing banks into two groups:dominant banks(the"Big 5f,state-owned banks)and small-and medium-sized banks(joint-stock banks and large city commercial banks).We test an oligopolistic model with conjectural variation developed by Spiller and Favaro(1984).Using data from 2007 to 2016,we find that banking competition is not in the form of Stackelberg competition per se.Some strategic interactions exist between small-and medium-sized banks and the largest state-owned bank.We also study the effect of interest rate deregulation on oligopolies'strategic interactions.Our results show that interest rate deregulation stimulates banking competition by reducing collusiveness among the dominant state-owned banks and enhancing the market power of small and medium banks.展开更多
We study complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in a 4-dimensional sphere S4.We show that there is no complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in S4 with polynomial volume growth and the restrict...We study complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in a 4-dimensional sphere S4.We show that there is no complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in S4 with polynomial volume growth and the restriction of the mean curvature and GaussKronecker curvature.These results are partial answers to the conjecture of Alencar,do Carmo and Elbert when the ambient space is a 4-dimensional sphere.展开更多
In this paper,we design a new bidding algorithm by employing a deep reinforcement learning approach.Firms use the proposed algorithm to estimate conjectural variation of the other firms and then employ this variable t...In this paper,we design a new bidding algorithm by employing a deep reinforcement learning approach.Firms use the proposed algorithm to estimate conjectural variation of the other firms and then employ this variable to generate the optimal bidding strategy so as to pursue maximal profits.With this algorithm,electricity generation firms can improve the accuracy of conjectural variations of competitors by dynamically learning in an electricity market with incomplete information.Electricity market will reach an equilibrium point when electricity firms adopt the proposed bidding algorithm for a repeated game of power trading.The simulation examples illustrate the overall energy efficiency of power network will increase by 9.90%as the market clearing price decreasing when all companies use the algorithm.The simulation examples also show that the power demand elasticity has a positive effect on the convergence of learning process.展开更多
基金the Chinese Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.SK2020053).
文摘Most literature on market competition in the banking industry neglects to address strategic interaction among banks.This paper studies interaction among Chinese banks by dividing banks into two groups:dominant banks(the"Big 5f,state-owned banks)and small-and medium-sized banks(joint-stock banks and large city commercial banks).We test an oligopolistic model with conjectural variation developed by Spiller and Favaro(1984).Using data from 2007 to 2016,we find that banking competition is not in the form of Stackelberg competition per se.Some strategic interactions exist between small-and medium-sized banks and the largest state-owned bank.We also study the effect of interest rate deregulation on oligopolies'strategic interactions.Our results show that interest rate deregulation stimulates banking competition by reducing collusiveness among the dominant state-owned banks and enhancing the market power of small and medium banks.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.1147114511401514)Qing Lan Projects
文摘We study complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in a 4-dimensional sphere S4.We show that there is no complete noncompact 1-minimal stable hypersurfaces in S4 with polynomial volume growth and the restriction of the mean curvature and GaussKronecker curvature.These results are partial answers to the conjecture of Alencar,do Carmo and Elbert when the ambient space is a 4-dimensional sphere.
基金This work was supported by the National Science Foundation of China(Grant 2014CB249200)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant 61873162)the Shanghai Pujiang Program(Grant 18PJ1405500).
文摘In this paper,we design a new bidding algorithm by employing a deep reinforcement learning approach.Firms use the proposed algorithm to estimate conjectural variation of the other firms and then employ this variable to generate the optimal bidding strategy so as to pursue maximal profits.With this algorithm,electricity generation firms can improve the accuracy of conjectural variations of competitors by dynamically learning in an electricity market with incomplete information.Electricity market will reach an equilibrium point when electricity firms adopt the proposed bidding algorithm for a repeated game of power trading.The simulation examples illustrate the overall energy efficiency of power network will increase by 9.90%as the market clearing price decreasing when all companies use the algorithm.The simulation examples also show that the power demand elasticity has a positive effect on the convergence of learning process.
