Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always cre...Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.展开更多
The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a block...The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.展开更多
The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This pa...The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This paper proposes an innovative approach to managing cloud resources through the integration of a genetic algorithm(GA)with a“double auction”method.This approach seeks to enhance security and efficiency by aligning buyers and sellers within an intelligent market framework.It guarantees equitable pricing while utilizing resources efficiently and optimizing advantages for all stakeholders.The GA functions as an intelligent search mechanism that identifies optimal combinations of bids from users and suppliers,addressing issues arising from the intricacies of cloud systems.Analyses proved that our method surpasses previous strategies,particularly in terms of price accuracy,speed,and the capacity to manage large-scale activities,critical factors for real-time cybersecurity systems,such as IDS.Our research integrates artificial intelligence-inspired evolutionary algorithms with market-driven methods to develop intelligent resource management systems that are secure,scalable,and adaptable to evolving risks,such as process innovation.展开更多
This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to ...With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.展开更多
The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder c...The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.展开更多
In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For ea...In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.展开更多
Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivate...Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.展开更多
The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping i...The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.展开更多
This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mu...This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.展开更多
With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains sin...With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.展开更多
This paper addresses a multi-agent scheduling problem with uniform parallel machines owned by a resource agent and competing jobs with dynamic arrival times that belong to different consumer agents.All agents are self...This paper addresses a multi-agent scheduling problem with uniform parallel machines owned by a resource agent and competing jobs with dynamic arrival times that belong to different consumer agents.All agents are self-interested and rational with the aim of maximizing their own objectives,resulting in intense resource competition among consumer agents and strategic behaviors of unwillingness to disclose private information.Within the context,a centralized scheduling approach is unfeasible,and a decentralized approach is considered to deal with the targeted problem.This study aims to generate a stable and collaborative solution with high social welfare while simultaneously accommodating consumer agents’preferences under incomplete information.For this purpose,a dynamic iterative auction-based approach based on a decentralized decision-making procedure is developed.In the proposed approach,a dynamic auction procedure is established for dynamic jobs participating in a realtime auction,and a straightforward and easy-to-implement bidding strategy without price is presented to reduce the complexity of bid determination.In addition,an adaptive Hungarian algorithm is applied to solve the winner determination problem efficiently.A theoretical analysis is conducted to prove that the proposed approach is individually rational and that the myopic bidding strategy is a weakly dominant strategy for consumer agents submitting bids.Extensive computational experiments demonstrate that the developed approach achieves high-quality solutions and exhibits considerable stability on largescale problems with numerous consumer agents and jobs.A further multi-agent scheduling problem considering multiple resource agents will be studied in future work.展开更多
With the arrival of the 5G era,wireless communication technologies and services are rapidly exhausting the limited spectrum resources.Spectrum auctions came into being,which can effectively utilize spectrum resources....With the arrival of the 5G era,wireless communication technologies and services are rapidly exhausting the limited spectrum resources.Spectrum auctions came into being,which can effectively utilize spectrum resources.Because of the complexity of the electronic spectrum auction network environment,the security of spectrum auction can not be guaranteed.Most scholars focus on researching the security of the single-sided auctions,while ignoring the practical scenario of a secure double spectrum auction where participants are composed of multiple sellers and buyers.Researchers begin to design the secure double spectrum auction mechanisms,in which two semi-honest agents are introduced to finish the spectrum auction rules.But these two agents may collude with each other or be bribed by buyers and sellers,which may create security risks,therefore,a secure double spectrum auction is proposed in this paper.Unlike traditional secure double spectrum auctions,the spectrum auction server with Software Guard Extensions(SGX)component is used in this paper,which is an Ethereum blockchain platform that performs spectrum auctions.A secure double spectrum protocol is also designed,using SGX technology and cryptographic tools such as Paillier cryptosystem,stealth address technology and one-time ring signatures to well protect the private information of spectrum auctions.In addition,the smart contracts provided by the Ethereum blockchain platform are executed to assist offline verification,and to verify important spectrum auction information to ensure the fairness and impartiality of spectrum auctions.Finally,security analysis and performance evaluation of our protocol are discussed.展开更多
The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integra...The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.展开更多
In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely...In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.展开更多
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No.2020YFB1005500)the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No.BK20202001)+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.XJSJ23040)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No.2021K596C)。
文摘Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273310)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province of China(LY22F030006,LZ24F030009)
文摘The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.
文摘The complexity of cloud environments challenges secure resource management,especially for intrusion detection systems(IDS).Existing strategies struggle to balance efficiency,cost fairness,and threat resilience.This paper proposes an innovative approach to managing cloud resources through the integration of a genetic algorithm(GA)with a“double auction”method.This approach seeks to enhance security and efficiency by aligning buyers and sellers within an intelligent market framework.It guarantees equitable pricing while utilizing resources efficiently and optimizing advantages for all stakeholders.The GA functions as an intelligent search mechanism that identifies optimal combinations of bids from users and suppliers,addressing issues arising from the intricacies of cloud systems.Analyses proved that our method surpasses previous strategies,particularly in terms of price accuracy,speed,and the capacity to manage large-scale activities,critical factors for real-time cybersecurity systems,such as IDS.Our research integrates artificial intelligence-inspired evolutionary algorithms with market-driven methods to develop intelligent resource management systems that are secure,scalable,and adaptable to evolving risks,such as process innovation.
基金The work has been supported by Chinese NSF grants 90103033NKBBSFG199803060
文摘This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
文摘With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.
基金Supported bythe National Natural Science Foundationof China (90104035)
文摘The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471037)211 Project Foundation of Shanghai University (8011040506)
文摘In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.
文摘Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.
文摘The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.
文摘This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
文摘With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(51975482)the China Scholarship Council.
文摘This paper addresses a multi-agent scheduling problem with uniform parallel machines owned by a resource agent and competing jobs with dynamic arrival times that belong to different consumer agents.All agents are self-interested and rational with the aim of maximizing their own objectives,resulting in intense resource competition among consumer agents and strategic behaviors of unwillingness to disclose private information.Within the context,a centralized scheduling approach is unfeasible,and a decentralized approach is considered to deal with the targeted problem.This study aims to generate a stable and collaborative solution with high social welfare while simultaneously accommodating consumer agents’preferences under incomplete information.For this purpose,a dynamic iterative auction-based approach based on a decentralized decision-making procedure is developed.In the proposed approach,a dynamic auction procedure is established for dynamic jobs participating in a realtime auction,and a straightforward and easy-to-implement bidding strategy without price is presented to reduce the complexity of bid determination.In addition,an adaptive Hungarian algorithm is applied to solve the winner determination problem efficiently.A theoretical analysis is conducted to prove that the proposed approach is individually rational and that the myopic bidding strategy is a weakly dominant strategy for consumer agents submitting bids.Extensive computational experiments demonstrate that the developed approach achieves high-quality solutions and exhibits considerable stability on largescale problems with numerous consumer agents and jobs.A further multi-agent scheduling problem considering multiple resource agents will be studied in future work.
基金supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF)grant funded by the Korea government.(MSIT)(2021R1A2B5B02087169)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.62072092,62072093+4 种基金U1708262)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M653568)the Key Research and Development Project of Hebei Province(No.20310702D)the Natural Science Foundation of Hebei Province(No.F2020501013)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.N2023020)。
文摘With the arrival of the 5G era,wireless communication technologies and services are rapidly exhausting the limited spectrum resources.Spectrum auctions came into being,which can effectively utilize spectrum resources.Because of the complexity of the electronic spectrum auction network environment,the security of spectrum auction can not be guaranteed.Most scholars focus on researching the security of the single-sided auctions,while ignoring the practical scenario of a secure double spectrum auction where participants are composed of multiple sellers and buyers.Researchers begin to design the secure double spectrum auction mechanisms,in which two semi-honest agents are introduced to finish the spectrum auction rules.But these two agents may collude with each other or be bribed by buyers and sellers,which may create security risks,therefore,a secure double spectrum auction is proposed in this paper.Unlike traditional secure double spectrum auctions,the spectrum auction server with Software Guard Extensions(SGX)component is used in this paper,which is an Ethereum blockchain platform that performs spectrum auctions.A secure double spectrum protocol is also designed,using SGX technology and cryptographic tools such as Paillier cryptosystem,stealth address technology and one-time ring signatures to well protect the private information of spectrum auctions.In addition,the smart contracts provided by the Ethereum blockchain platform are executed to assist offline verification,and to verify important spectrum auction information to ensure the fairness and impartiality of spectrum auctions.Finally,security analysis and performance evaluation of our protocol are discussed.
基金Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China("863"Program)(20060AA12A105)the Chinese Airspace Management Commission Researching Program(GKG200802006)~~
文摘The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.
基金partially supported by the Science and Technology Development Fund,Macao SAR (0050/2020/A1)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62103411, 72171230)。
文摘In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.
