Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always cre...Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.展开更多
Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivate...Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.展开更多
This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mu...This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.展开更多
With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains sin...With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.展开更多
This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to ...With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.展开更多
The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder c...The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.展开更多
In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For ea...In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.展开更多
The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping i...The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.展开更多
Low-carbon hydrogen is expected to play a key role in realizing net-zero and sustainable development plans.Nonetheless,there is a gap between the cost of producing low-carbon hydrogen and its potential users’willingn...Low-carbon hydrogen is expected to play a key role in realizing net-zero and sustainable development plans.Nonetheless,there is a gap between the cost of producing low-carbon hydrogen and its potential users’willingness to pay for such hydrogen.To implement support for the development of the industry,we propose using low-carbon hydrogen long-term agreements allocated through auction mechanisms.The objectives are 2-fold:(i)matching supply and demand volumes considering the time horizon and geographical delivery point specification and(ii)allocating the subsidy.This perspective article innovates by proposing a reference price indexed to liquid to natural-gas prices,which is the main product that low-carbon hydrogen aims to substitute.The premium and the production cost are defined through a double-sided auction.This aims to minimize the public policy funds required to incentivize the low-carbon hydrogen market while facilitating long-term agreements and mitigating price risks that may hinder investment.展开更多
The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical fac...The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.展开更多
To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method ...To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.展开更多
Reserve price auctions are one of hot research issues in traditional auction theory. Here we study the starting price in an online auction, the counterpart of the public reserve price in a traditional auction. By cons...Reserve price auctions are one of hot research issues in traditional auction theory. Here we study the starting price in an online auction, the counterpart of the public reserve price in a traditional auction. By considering three features of eBay-like online auctions： stochastic entry of bidders （subject to Poisson process）, insertion fee proportional to the starting price, and time discount, we have analyzed the properties of extremum points of the starting price for maximizing the seller＇s expected revenue, and found that, under certain conditions, the optimal starting price should be at the lowest Mlowable level, which is contrary to the results from the classic auction theory and finds its optimality in reality. We have also developed a general extended model of multistage auctions and carried out analysis on its properties. At last, some directions for further research are also put forward.展开更多
The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a block...The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.展开更多
In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects a...In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer's valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one,and the true value of k is sellers' private information.The authors identify three factors which affect sellers' revelation strategies: The market's competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers,buyers' prior information about the second object,and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k.The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller,but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller,respectively.展开更多
In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders' values may change over stages ...In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders' values may change over stages and the common priors are sequentially adjusted by the remaining bidders. It is shown that the declining price sequence can be explained by the adjustment of common priors between auctions. The adjustment of common priors is characterized by stochastic orders. Sufficient and necessary conditions for a supermartingale price sequence are derived.展开更多
A homogenous multi-unit auction model is studied in two conditions： One is that the bidders face budget constraints and another is that the bidders do not face budget constraints. Two equilibrium bidding strategies o...A homogenous multi-unit auction model is studied in two conditions： One is that the bidders face budget constraints and another is that the bidders do not face budget constraints. Two equilibrium bidding strategies of each bidder are presented in these two conditions. By comparing them, the authors show that the equilibrium unit price bid in the presence of budget constraints will be less than that in the absence of budget constraints. The difference between the two equilibrium bids leads to the reduced revenue of the seller. And this difference will decrease as the number of the bidders increases.展开更多
In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically se...In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. On the basis of garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements： 1） protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties; 2） the number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction; 3） the computational requirements for participating parties are very low： only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary. Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t ＋ 1 parties, and Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction. a more randomness efficient protocol for （t ＋ 1）^2 parties展开更多
Based On the online reverse auction formalism in Priceline.com, In this paper,the use of online reverse auctions in airline companies revenue management is highlighted.This research examines the process of online reve...Based On the online reverse auction formalism in Priceline.com, In this paper,the use of online reverse auctions in airline companies revenue management is highlighted.This research examines the process of online reverse auctions in detail, point out the potential benefits of online reverse auctions. At last we examines how the online reverse auction mechanism design for optimal allocation.展开更多
With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No.2020YFB1005500)the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No.BK20202001)+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.XJSJ23040)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No.2021K596C)。
文摘Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.
文摘Winner determination is one of the main challenges in combinatorial auctions. However, not much work has been done to solve this problem in the case of reverse auctions using evolutionary techniques. This has motivated us to propose an improvement of a genetic algorithm based method, we have previously proposed, to address two important issues in the context of combinatorial reverse auctions: determining the winner(s) in a reasonable processing time, and reducing the procurement cost. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed method in practice, we conduct several experiments on combinatorial reverse auctions instances. The results we report in this paper clearly demonstrate the efficiency of our new method in terms of processing time and procurement cost.
文摘This paper deals with the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell an item Of high-tech. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives that are not mutually consistent. However, if the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. In addition, if he wants to sell his high-tech to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
文摘With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices extend gains since Oct. 2009.
基金The work has been supported by Chinese NSF grants 90103033NKBBSFG199803060
文摘This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
文摘With the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things(IoT),the data value is more significant in both academia and industry.Trading can achieve maximal data value and prepare data for smart city services.Due to data's unique characteristics,such as dispersion,heterogeneity and distributed storage,an unbiased platform is necessary for the data trading market with rational trading entities.Meanwhile,there are multiple buyers and sellers in a practical data trading market,and this makes it challenging to maximize social welfare.To solve these problems,this paper proposes a Social-Welfare-Oriented Many-to-Many Trading Mechanism(SOMTM),which integrates three entities,a trading process and an algorithm named Many-to-Many Trading Algorithm(MMTA).Based on the market scale,market dominated-side and market fixed-side,simulations verify the convergency,economic properties and efficiency of SOMTM.
基金Supported bythe National Natural Science Foundationof China (90104035)
文摘The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471037)211 Project Foundation of Shanghai University (8011040506)
文摘In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.
文摘The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.
文摘Low-carbon hydrogen is expected to play a key role in realizing net-zero and sustainable development plans.Nonetheless,there is a gap between the cost of producing low-carbon hydrogen and its potential users’willingness to pay for such hydrogen.To implement support for the development of the industry,we propose using low-carbon hydrogen long-term agreements allocated through auction mechanisms.The objectives are 2-fold:(i)matching supply and demand volumes considering the time horizon and geographical delivery point specification and(ii)allocating the subsidy.This perspective article innovates by proposing a reference price indexed to liquid to natural-gas prices,which is the main product that low-carbon hydrogen aims to substitute.The premium and the production cost are defined through a double-sided auction.This aims to minimize the public policy funds required to incentivize the low-carbon hydrogen market while facilitating long-term agreements and mitigating price risks that may hinder investment.
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(72274102)。
文摘The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.
基金supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of China under Grant No. 200159National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70571014
文摘To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of Chinathe Strategic Research Grant of City Cniversity of Hong Kong(Grant No.7001719).
文摘Reserve price auctions are one of hot research issues in traditional auction theory. Here we study the starting price in an online auction, the counterpart of the public reserve price in a traditional auction. By considering three features of eBay-like online auctions： stochastic entry of bidders （subject to Poisson process）, insertion fee proportional to the starting price, and time discount, we have analyzed the properties of extremum points of the starting price for maximizing the seller＇s expected revenue, and found that, under certain conditions, the optimal starting price should be at the lowest Mlowable level, which is contrary to the results from the classic auction theory and finds its optimality in reality. We have also developed a general extended model of multistage auctions and carried out analysis on its properties. At last, some directions for further research are also put forward.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273310)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province of China(LY22F030006,LZ24F030009)
文摘The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61273206 and 71471069
文摘In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer's valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one,and the true value of k is sellers' private information.The authors identify three factors which affect sellers' revelation strategies: The market's competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers,buyers' prior information about the second object,and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k.The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller,but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller,respectively.
基金supported by Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project(YETP0964)the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71171053 and 71473282+1 种基金211 Projects FoundationProjects from School of Economics at Central University of Finance and Economics
文摘In sequential auctions the phenomenon of declining prices is often observed, which in theory can be represented by a supermartingale. This paper employs the perspective that bidders' values may change over stages and the common priors are sequentially adjusted by the remaining bidders. It is shown that the declining price sequence can be explained by the adjustment of common priors between auctions. The adjustment of common priors is characterized by stochastic orders. Sufficient and necessary conditions for a supermartingale price sequence are derived.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.70771041the Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars from State Education Ministry
文摘A homogenous multi-unit auction model is studied in two conditions： One is that the bidders face budget constraints and another is that the bidders do not face budget constraints. Two equilibrium bidding strategies of each bidder are presented in these two conditions. By comparing them, the authors show that the equilibrium unit price bid in the presence of budget constraints will be less than that in the absence of budget constraints. The difference between the two equilibrium bids leads to the reduced revenue of the seller. And this difference will decrease as the number of the bidders increases.
文摘In most of the auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one might be interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. On the basis of garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements： 1） protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties; 2） the number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction; 3） the computational requirements for participating parties are very low： only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary. Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t ＋ 1 parties, and Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction. a more randomness efficient protocol for （t ＋ 1）^2 parties
文摘Based On the online reverse auction formalism in Priceline.com, In this paper,the use of online reverse auctions in airline companies revenue management is highlighted.This research examines the process of online reverse auctions in detail, point out the potential benefits of online reverse auctions. At last we examines how the online reverse auction mechanism design for optimal allocation.
文摘With manufacturing slowly recovering amid improving economic conditions, cotton demand has increased prompting more orders among mills. However, with a deficient supply of cotton in the market, prices
