We select a machine learning model to identify audit opinion shopping and analyze the factors driving the model.To this end,we use six models,namely random forest,gradient boosting decision tree,random undersampling b...We select a machine learning model to identify audit opinion shopping and analyze the factors driving the model.To this end,we use six models,namely random forest,gradient boosting decision tree,random undersampling boosting,logistic regression(LR),support vector machine and multilayer perceptron.Among them,LR outperforms the other models.Using game theory,we classify 58 features potentially affecting opinion shopping into audit object,audit subject and audit environment categories.LR is used to obtain each category’s importance score.We find that audit object features play a crucial role in audit opinion shopping.We also validate and interpret important features.Finally,we use a model to predict audit collusion.Our paper extends the scope of machine learning to scientifically identify audit collusion risk and reveals important features of audit opinion shopping,which has implications for global audit practice.展开更多
We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit e...We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72372160)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities at the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(2722024BY016).
文摘We select a machine learning model to identify audit opinion shopping and analyze the factors driving the model.To this end,we use six models,namely random forest,gradient boosting decision tree,random undersampling boosting,logistic regression(LR),support vector machine and multilayer perceptron.Among them,LR outperforms the other models.Using game theory,we classify 58 features potentially affecting opinion shopping into audit object,audit subject and audit environment categories.LR is used to obtain each category’s importance score.We find that audit object features play a crucial role in audit opinion shopping.We also validate and interpret important features.Finally,we use a model to predict audit collusion.Our paper extends the scope of machine learning to scientifically identify audit collusion risk and reveals important features of audit opinion shopping,which has implications for global audit practice.
基金support from the National Social Science Fund of China(grant number:20BJY029).
文摘We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.
