It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incen...It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.展开更多
针对动态联合火力分配(Dynamic Joint Fire Distribution,DJFD)问题的特性,以多机编队协同攻击地面机动目标为背景,分析了编队对地攻击目标分配问题的约束空间,即资源约束、转火约束、时间约束和空间约束,建立了联合考虑武器、传感器和...针对动态联合火力分配(Dynamic Joint Fire Distribution,DJFD)问题的特性,以多机编队协同攻击地面机动目标为背景,分析了编队对地攻击目标分配问题的约束空间,即资源约束、转火约束、时间约束和空间约束,建立了联合考虑武器、传感器和目标三者的动态武器目标分配(Dynamic Weapon-Target Assignment,DWTA)问题(称为DJFD问题)的数学模型。以分布式协同拍卖算法的思想为基础,设计了一种求解DJFD问题的anytime算法。仿真结果和统计分析数据证明,算法能求得具有很好优化效果的分配方案,是一种动态anytime算法,能在规定的时间、空间和资源的约束条件下,快速求得满足一定优化需求的分配方案。展开更多
In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted b...In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.展开更多
The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical fac...The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.展开更多
In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction ...In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction and improve the scalability of the cloud, which is divided into three layers： The user-layer receives requests from end-users, the auction-layer matches the requests with the cloud services provided by the Cloud Service Provider（CSP）, and the CSP-layer forms a coalition to improve serving ability to satisfy complex requirements of users.In fact, the aim of the coalition formation is to find suitable partners for a particular CSP. However, identifying a suitable combination of partners to form the coalition is an NP-hard problem. Hence, we propose approximation algorithms for the coalition formation. The Breadth Traversal Algorithm（BTA） and Revised Ant Colony Algorithm（RACA） are proposed to form a coalition when bidding for a single cloud service in the auction. The experimental results show that RACA outperforms the BTA in bid price. Other experiments were conducted to evaluate the impact of the communication cost on coalition formation and to assess the impact of iteration times for the optimal bidding price. In addition, the performance of the market model was compared to the existing CA-based model in terms of economic efficiency.展开更多
基金Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
文摘It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
文摘In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.
基金Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(72274102)。
文摘The land price in big cities draws much attention and discussion for its skyrocketing appreciation.Most researches are from the macro perspective due to data restriction.This paper aims to investigate the critical factors in the price formation process of a land auction,using the listing auction micro bidding-level data in Beijing from 2013 to 2018.We construct a model for the relationship between quitting price and land,bidder's characteristics,housing market conditions and competitive intensity(including private and public signals),then we use OLS for identification.We find that competitive intensity increases the quitting price by causing competition and interaction between bidders.More importantly,we find evidence of cheating behavior in the land market.Results show that bidders have higher quitting prices when they are in a joint venture,and when a central SOE developer or a top 10 developer exist in the joint venture.We also find different behavior of developers in the short run and long run.Our research contributes to the literature of land auctions by analyzing the price formation process and developers'behavior.We also provide supporting evidence for the government to make adjustments of the auction system and identify the cheating developers.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61070133, 61170201, and 61472344)the Collegiate Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (Grant No. 11KJD520011)+1 种基金Six talent peaks project in Jiangsu Province (No. 2011-DZXX-032)the Scientific Research Foundation of Graduate School of Jiangsu Province (No. CXZZ13 0901)
文摘In this paper, we present a novel, dynamic collaboration cloud platform in which a Combinatorial Auction（CA）-based market model enables the platform to run effectively. The platform can facilitate expense reduction and improve the scalability of the cloud, which is divided into three layers： The user-layer receives requests from end-users, the auction-layer matches the requests with the cloud services provided by the Cloud Service Provider（CSP）, and the CSP-layer forms a coalition to improve serving ability to satisfy complex requirements of users.In fact, the aim of the coalition formation is to find suitable partners for a particular CSP. However, identifying a suitable combination of partners to form the coalition is an NP-hard problem. Hence, we propose approximation algorithms for the coalition formation. The Breadth Traversal Algorithm（BTA） and Revised Ant Colony Algorithm（RACA） are proposed to form a coalition when bidding for a single cloud service in the auction. The experimental results show that RACA outperforms the BTA in bid price. Other experiments were conducted to evaluate the impact of the communication cost on coalition formation and to assess the impact of iteration times for the optimal bidding price. In addition, the performance of the market model was compared to the existing CA-based model in terms of economic efficiency.
