To explore the impact of partial centralization on supply chain performance,this study constructs a two-period game model of a closed-loop supply chain involving a manufacturer and an online retail platform participat...To explore the impact of partial centralization on supply chain performance,this study constructs a two-period game model of a closed-loop supply chain involving a manufacturer and an online retail platform participating in the trade-in strategy.Through mathematical modeling and numerical simulation methods,the optimal decisions were analyzed under conditions where the manufacturer partially owns the retail platform’s partial equity.This study finds that partial centralization yields the highest profits,followed by full centralization,with decentralized decisions yielding the lowest profits.Moderate centralization enhances overall profits by optimizing incentive mechanisms,whereas excessive ownership concentration reduces the flexibility of the retail platform,leading to a decline in profits.Additionally,product durability and trade-in subsidy significantly influence supply chain profitability:high-durability products reduce renewal frequency,while trade-in subsidy effectively stimulates consumer demand and increase overall profits.This study provides theoretical support and practical guidance for companies implementing the trade-in strategy.展开更多
Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Na...Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game,and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands,profits,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated.It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers.When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program,it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer.However,when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer,it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough.Furthermore,with the increase in transaction cost,it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers,which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program.The impacts of related parameters on the demands,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.展开更多
文摘To explore the impact of partial centralization on supply chain performance,this study constructs a two-period game model of a closed-loop supply chain involving a manufacturer and an online retail platform participating in the trade-in strategy.Through mathematical modeling and numerical simulation methods,the optimal decisions were analyzed under conditions where the manufacturer partially owns the retail platform’s partial equity.This study finds that partial centralization yields the highest profits,followed by full centralization,with decentralized decisions yielding the lowest profits.Moderate centralization enhances overall profits by optimizing incentive mechanisms,whereas excessive ownership concentration reduces the flexibility of the retail platform,leading to a decline in profits.Additionally,product durability and trade-in subsidy significantly influence supply chain profitability:high-durability products reduce renewal frequency,while trade-in subsidy effectively stimulates consumer demand and increase overall profits.This study provides theoretical support and practical guidance for companies implementing the trade-in strategy.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71871058,71531010)
文摘Considering the existence of the secondhand market and the implementation of trade-in program,the competition models between two manufacturers who produce the same products at various qualities are developed by the Nash game,and the impacts of the trade-in program from the perspectives of the demands,profits,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are investigated.It finds that the trade-in program has different impacts when it is implemented by different manufacturers.When the low-quality manufacturer implements the program,it is always beneficial to himself and consumers but harmful to the high-quality manufacturer.However,when the program is implemented by the high-quality manufacturer,it can be beneficial to the low-quality manufacturer as well as to the implementer but harmful to consumers if the transaction cost of the consumer selling the used product in the secondhand market is low enough.Furthermore,with the increase in transaction cost,it also becomes harmful to the low-quality manufacturer and beneficial to consumers,which is the same as in the case that the low-quality manufacturer implements the trade-in program.The impacts of related parameters on the demands,marginal profits of manufacturers and the net costs of consumers are also analyzed.
