The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier sharehol...The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier shareholding structure is that the company issues two classes of shares with different voting rights.It enables the concentration and stabilization of corporate control,which has a positive effect on the long-term development of the company and resistance to hostile takeovers.Against the background of the rapid development of the capital market and the continuous innovation of corporate governance structure,the two-tier shareholding structure has begun to be adopted by many enterprises.While this structure can improve the efficiency of corporate governance and promote corporate growth,it also raises a number of challenges.In particular,for small and medium-sized shareholders,their shareholdings may face the problem of limited or no voting rights,as well as the lack of an effective internal and external monitoring mechanism for the company.These issues may lead to the impairment of the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders.Currently,challenges in practice include inadequate laws and regulations,insufficient disclosure of information,and inadequate monitoring mechanisms.Therefore,exploring the path to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and analyzing their current situation has become an important area in the study of two-tier shareholding structures.This paper starts from the actual situation,analyzes the problems exposed in the operation process of two-tier shareholding structure,and then explores the practical and feasible methods to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders on this basis,with a view to putting forward valuable references for the development of China’s securities market.展开更多
“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive at...“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive attitude of the member states of the EU （European Union）, to become the most attractive for companies results in law reforms aiming at more flexible conflict between shareholders. Besides, the economic objective of avoiding a company＇s dissolution, the English, Dutch, and Belgian exit proceedings for the settlement of disputes between shareholders set up a social objective： protecting the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company. The paper consists of four chapters. The introduction lays out the necessity of buy-outs for shareholders of a private limited company. The first chapter describes the different facts justifying the buy-out of a shareholder on the basis of serious grounds. The second chapter presents the findings of a comparative research of the valuation of the shares transferred in an English, Dutch, and Belgian procedure. Finally, the conclusion summarises in which way the English, Dutch, and Belgian legal system protect the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company.展开更多
The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to ...The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to explore the association between customer satisfaction and shareholder value is included in the paper. The Bayesian models allow the flexibility of incorporating industry and firm factors in the context of the application to help explain variations of the regression coefficients. Results from the analysis indicate that the effect of customer satisfaction on shareholder value is not homogeneous over time. The proposed methodology provides a powerful tool to explore the relationship between two important business concepts.展开更多
Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholde...Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholder structure on the management of accounting results in enterprises. More specifically, its objective is to analyze the impact of shareholder structure on the adjustment of regulating discretionary accounting variables. A panel of enterprises is constituted over the periods 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Cameroon. The modeling of regulating discretionary accounting variables has been carried out according to the model of Jones (1991). The different results obtained show that the degree of concentration of the capital seems not to dissuade the management of result per long-term positions. Foreign ownership and state property stimulate management by regulating discretionary accounting variables.展开更多
In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇...In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇ age, education, land size, and duration of membership in the cooperative were investigated to have effect on the shareholder＇s performance and satisfaction. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers is the subject of research on the effects of performance and satisfaction of the cooperative shareholders. A field survey was conducted. This study has been applied to Cukobirlik, an agricultural sale cooperative in East Mediterranean of Turkey. The researchers collected data by random questionnaire method. The research data were collected from 155 cooperative shareholders. For the data, exploratory factor, correlation, and regression were analyzed. The results of this analysis show that there is a meaningful relationship between charismatic leaders and the performance and satisfaction of shareholders for these cooperatives. Another result, there is significant relation between land size of cooperative shareholders and the performance and satisfaction of cooperative shareholders.展开更多
The paper is devoted to the corporate governance intelligence system investigation as the part of the complex stakeholder-related approach to the corporate strategic intelligence system （CSIS）. The special attention...The paper is devoted to the corporate governance intelligence system investigation as the part of the complex stakeholder-related approach to the corporate strategic intelligence system （CSIS）. The special attention is given to the minority shareholders activism in the system of corporate governance. Some existing methods of abusing minority shareholders rights, made by joint-stock companies executives, are generalized. The recommendations for minority shareholder＇s rights protection are given. The necessity for the implementation of the stakeholders-oriented approach for the CSIS creation on the base of companies＇ security principles is substantiated.展开更多
Corporation reforming regards the building shareholder value as the first aim of financial management. As a new tool of strategy management, Business Performance Management （BPM） can rebuild shareholder value throug...Corporation reforming regards the building shareholder value as the first aim of financial management. As a new tool of strategy management, Business Performance Management （BPM） can rebuild shareholder value through greater transparency and enhanced compliance capabilities, and faster, more accurate reporting. The appliance of BPM in China must take more serious consideration.展开更多
Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyra...Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.展开更多
The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National St...The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National Stock Exchange （NSE） were used for 13 years for the period from 2002-03 to 2014-15. Findings indicated that FL is significantly related with SR. However, financial performance has an insignificant relationship with SR and did not moderate the relationship between FL and SR.展开更多
On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of East...On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of Eastern Air展开更多
In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority sha...In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders＇ rights and interests.In this paper, we studied the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and business performance of private enterprises based on the theory of ultimate controlling shareholders and made relevant conclusions and recommendations.展开更多
The separation of ownership and management of companies results in agency problems between shareholders and management to some extent.In Western countries,shareholders usually actively participate in the company’s ma...The separation of ownership and management of companies results in agency problems between shareholders and management to some extent.In Western countries,shareholders usually actively participate in the company’s management and monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance.At present,China’s securities market,as well as institutional investors are undergoing a rapid development,while problems of governance among listed companies in China have been negatively affecting the development of capital markets.Institutional investors have developed to form a certain scale.Moreover,national policies,as well as the split-share structure reform,further encourage the growth of institutional investors,and their active participation in corporate governance in order to better promote the development of capital markets.A great deal of research pertains to the effects of shareholder activism on corporate performance in Western countries.However,research on shareholder activism in China is scanty.Furthermore,chances are that in some specific Chinese regions and industries circumstances are unique,in which the well-established theories cannot be effectively applied.Therefore,this paper empirically analyzes the correlation between shareholder activism and corporate performance so as to examine how effective China’s institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies.This paper empirically tests the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance.In this paper,an unbalanced panel data set consisting of observation is constructed.Then,in order to insure validity of results,a series of preliminary tests are conducted.Furthermore,Panel data method and robustness check are performed for empirical analysis.Finally,the result of the empirical tests shows that there is a positive correlation between Chinese institutional shareholding ratio and corporate performance of listed companies.This indicates that shareholder activism can definitely promote the corporate governance and corporate performance in China.展开更多
When interviewed, Mr. Michele Perini, President of Fiera Milano SPA reveals that they will recommend Italian enterprises to attend Furniture World & Woodworking Machinery China, besides, as he regards, there shoul...When interviewed, Mr. Michele Perini, President of Fiera Milano SPA reveals that they will recommend Italian enterprises to attend Furniture World & Woodworking Machinery China, besides, as he regards, there should be some legal protection on intellectual property right for exhibition organizers.展开更多
The 31 Artidle of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China amended in 2005 providesthat,"After the establishment of a limited liability company,if the actual value of the capital contributions in non...The 31 Artidle of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China amended in 2005 providesthat,"After the establishment of a limited liability company,if the actual value of the capital contributions in non-monetary properties is found to be apparently lower than that provided for in the articles of association of the com-pany,the balance shall be supplemented by Shareholder who has offered them,and the other Shareholder of thecompany who have established the company shall bear joint liabilities."The article tells that the liability subject ofsupplementing the balance is the specific Shareholder of the defective capital contribution and is found after the es-tablishment of the company.展开更多
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the comp...Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.展开更多
Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are importan...Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.展开更多
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a samp...This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.展开更多
This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investo...This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from , we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show: (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings; (2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and (3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.展开更多
文摘The two-tier shareholding structure,which originated in the United States,has become popular around the world.Unlike the traditional model of“equal shares with equal rights”,the core feature of the two-tier shareholding structure is that the company issues two classes of shares with different voting rights.It enables the concentration and stabilization of corporate control,which has a positive effect on the long-term development of the company and resistance to hostile takeovers.Against the background of the rapid development of the capital market and the continuous innovation of corporate governance structure,the two-tier shareholding structure has begun to be adopted by many enterprises.While this structure can improve the efficiency of corporate governance and promote corporate growth,it also raises a number of challenges.In particular,for small and medium-sized shareholders,their shareholdings may face the problem of limited or no voting rights,as well as the lack of an effective internal and external monitoring mechanism for the company.These issues may lead to the impairment of the rights of small and medium-sized shareholders.Currently,challenges in practice include inadequate laws and regulations,insufficient disclosure of information,and inadequate monitoring mechanisms.Therefore,exploring the path to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and analyzing their current situation has become an important area in the study of two-tier shareholding structures.This paper starts from the actual situation,analyzes the problems exposed in the operation process of two-tier shareholding structure,and then explores the practical and feasible methods to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized shareholders on this basis,with a view to putting forward valuable references for the development of China’s securities market.
文摘“A limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own： Behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se”. The competitive attitude of the member states of the EU （European Union）, to become the most attractive for companies results in law reforms aiming at more flexible conflict between shareholders. Besides, the economic objective of avoiding a company＇s dissolution, the English, Dutch, and Belgian exit proceedings for the settlement of disputes between shareholders set up a social objective： protecting the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company. The paper consists of four chapters. The introduction lays out the necessity of buy-outs for shareholders of a private limited company. The first chapter describes the different facts justifying the buy-out of a shareholder on the basis of serious grounds. The second chapter presents the findings of a comparative research of the valuation of the shares transferred in an English, Dutch, and Belgian procedure. Finally, the conclusion summarises in which way the English, Dutch, and Belgian legal system protect the interests of the minority shareholder of a private limited company.
文摘The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to explore the association between customer satisfaction and shareholder value is included in the paper. The Bayesian models allow the flexibility of incorporating industry and firm factors in the context of the application to help explain variations of the regression coefficients. Results from the analysis indicate that the effect of customer satisfaction on shareholder value is not homogeneous over time. The proposed methodology provides a powerful tool to explore the relationship between two important business concepts.
文摘Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholder structure on the management of accounting results in enterprises. More specifically, its objective is to analyze the impact of shareholder structure on the adjustment of regulating discretionary accounting variables. A panel of enterprises is constituted over the periods 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Cameroon. The modeling of regulating discretionary accounting variables has been carried out according to the model of Jones (1991). The different results obtained show that the degree of concentration of the capital seems not to dissuade the management of result per long-term positions. Foreign ownership and state property stimulate management by regulating discretionary accounting variables.
文摘In this study, the cooperative shareholders＇ performance and satisfaction were investigated as antecedent. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers has been identified as antecedent. In addition, shareholders＇ age, education, land size, and duration of membership in the cooperative were investigated to have effect on the shareholder＇s performance and satisfaction. Charismatic leadership of cooperative managers is the subject of research on the effects of performance and satisfaction of the cooperative shareholders. A field survey was conducted. This study has been applied to Cukobirlik, an agricultural sale cooperative in East Mediterranean of Turkey. The researchers collected data by random questionnaire method. The research data were collected from 155 cooperative shareholders. For the data, exploratory factor, correlation, and regression were analyzed. The results of this analysis show that there is a meaningful relationship between charismatic leaders and the performance and satisfaction of shareholders for these cooperatives. Another result, there is significant relation between land size of cooperative shareholders and the performance and satisfaction of cooperative shareholders.
文摘The paper is devoted to the corporate governance intelligence system investigation as the part of the complex stakeholder-related approach to the corporate strategic intelligence system （CSIS）. The special attention is given to the minority shareholders activism in the system of corporate governance. Some existing methods of abusing minority shareholders rights, made by joint-stock companies executives, are generalized. The recommendations for minority shareholder＇s rights protection are given. The necessity for the implementation of the stakeholders-oriented approach for the CSIS creation on the base of companies＇ security principles is substantiated.
文摘Corporation reforming regards the building shareholder value as the first aim of financial management. As a new tool of strategy management, Business Performance Management （BPM） can rebuild shareholder value through greater transparency and enhanced compliance capabilities, and faster, more accurate reporting. The appliance of BPM in China must take more serious consideration.
基金Phased results of fund project： ＂Study on the Ultimate Shareholder＇s Control and Deprivation in Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 71072072） ＂Study on Ultimate Control Rights of China＇s Listed Companies from the Perspective of Social Capital,＂ sponsored by Graduate Innovation Fund of Capital University of Economics and Business （Grant No.CUEB2010507）.
文摘Based on the epistemology and methodology of organizational routine evolution, this paper presents a systematic analysis on how ultimate shareholders control listed companies by means of equity control chain in a pyramid structure and social capital control chain hidden in social networks. First, this paper examines the internal logic of ultimate shareholders＇ double control chain and designs an iterative model for dynamic evolution intent proceeding from ultimate shareholders ＇degree of intent for social capital control. Finally, with the case study of Inner Mongolia Caoyuan Xingfa Co., Ltd., this paper reveals the process and mechanism of ultimate shareholders＇ creation of double control chain.
文摘The study examines the moderating effects of financial performance on the relationship between financial leverage （FL） and shareholders return （SR）. Panel data of pharmaceutical companies listed in the National Stock Exchange （NSE） were used for 13 years for the period from 2002-03 to 2014-15. Findings indicated that FL is significantly related with SR. However, financial performance has an insignificant relationship with SR and did not moderate the relationship between FL and SR.
文摘On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of Eastern Air
文摘In China, major shareholders of private listed enterprise could control its production and operation by virtue of few resources which makes it possible for ultimate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders＇ rights and interests.In this paper, we studied the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and business performance of private enterprises based on the theory of ultimate controlling shareholders and made relevant conclusions and recommendations.
文摘The separation of ownership and management of companies results in agency problems between shareholders and management to some extent.In Western countries,shareholders usually actively participate in the company’s management and monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance.At present,China’s securities market,as well as institutional investors are undergoing a rapid development,while problems of governance among listed companies in China have been negatively affecting the development of capital markets.Institutional investors have developed to form a certain scale.Moreover,national policies,as well as the split-share structure reform,further encourage the growth of institutional investors,and their active participation in corporate governance in order to better promote the development of capital markets.A great deal of research pertains to the effects of shareholder activism on corporate performance in Western countries.However,research on shareholder activism in China is scanty.Furthermore,chances are that in some specific Chinese regions and industries circumstances are unique,in which the well-established theories cannot be effectively applied.Therefore,this paper empirically analyzes the correlation between shareholder activism and corporate performance so as to examine how effective China’s institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies.This paper empirically tests the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance.In this paper,an unbalanced panel data set consisting of observation is constructed.Then,in order to insure validity of results,a series of preliminary tests are conducted.Furthermore,Panel data method and robustness check are performed for empirical analysis.Finally,the result of the empirical tests shows that there is a positive correlation between Chinese institutional shareholding ratio and corporate performance of listed companies.This indicates that shareholder activism can definitely promote the corporate governance and corporate performance in China.
文摘When interviewed, Mr. Michele Perini, President of Fiera Milano SPA reveals that they will recommend Italian enterprises to attend Furniture World & Woodworking Machinery China, besides, as he regards, there should be some legal protection on intellectual property right for exhibition organizers.
文摘The 31 Artidle of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China amended in 2005 providesthat,"After the establishment of a limited liability company,if the actual value of the capital contributions in non-monetary properties is found to be apparently lower than that provided for in the articles of association of the com-pany,the balance shall be supplemented by Shareholder who has offered them,and the other Shareholder of thecompany who have established the company shall bear joint liabilities."The article tells that the liability subject ofsupplementing the balance is the specific Shareholder of the defective capital contribution and is found after the es-tablishment of the company.
文摘Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders.However,multiple large shareholders may collude,thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company.This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment(CEPI).We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI.Specifically,external supervision and a company’s ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI.In addition,after participating in SOEs,non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
基金the financial support of the Deloitte Professorship
文摘Large shareholders are a potentially very important element of firms' corporate governance system. Whereas analytical research is typically vague on who these large shareholders are, in practice there are important variations in the types of large owners(and the different types of large owners could play very different governance roles). After briefly reviewing the standard agency cost arguments, in this article I emphasize the heterogeneity of concentrated ownership and in particular focus on the roles of families, institutions, governments, and employee ownership. I also discuss the role of large shareholders in private(i.e., unlisted) firms, where ownership tends to be more concentrated than in publicly traded firms. Finally, I briefly discuss variations in ownership structures across selected countries.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.70972060,71102013 and 71272008)National Accounting Leader(Reserve)Personnel Training Plan(Academic Class)+3 种基金Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China(Nos.11JJD790008,13YJC790041 and 14JJD630005)Innovation Program of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission(Nos.11ZS186 and 14ZS157)the "Shu Guang" project supported by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission and Shanghai Education Development Foundation(No.10SG54)the "211" Key Project of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
文摘This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer(CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) during the 1999–2007 period and find that there is a significant decline in investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement, relative to other periods, and that this decline becomes less significant under stronger shareholder supervision. Our research furthers understanding of the significance of SOE incentive and monitoring mechanisms.
基金the financial support of the Fondation HEC (Project F0802)the INTACCT program (European Union, Contract No. MRTN-CT-2006-035850)
文摘This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from minority shareholders and profit from private benefits of control. However, this agency conflict has been rarely studied, as the most commonly assumed agency conflict occurs between managers and shareholders. Using an audit fee model derived from , we study the impact of the nature of controlling shareholders on audit fees in French listed firms. Our results show: (1) a negative relationship between audit fees and government shareholdings; (2) a positive relationship between audit fees and institutional shareholdings; and (3) no relationship between audit fees and family shareholdings. These results illustrate the mixed effects of the nature of ownership on audit fees.
