Self-dealing refers to all kinds of transactions and operations diverting value from a company to corporate controllers. In order to tackle self-dealing, academics and regulators have emphasised the legal tools. Howev...Self-dealing refers to all kinds of transactions and operations diverting value from a company to corporate controllers. In order to tackle self-dealing, academics and regulators have emphasised the legal tools. However, there is a divergence between those supporting the existence of a benchmark model towards which to converge （convergence hypothesis） and those underscoring the importance of socio-economic factors on the efficacy of governance rules （path-dependency view）. The aim of this paper is to join in the convergence vs. path-dependency debate by focusing on the efficiency of mandatory rules and investigating their effectiveness. Considering the current market integration, the traditional cost-benefit analysis has been extended in order to embrace costs specifically associated to the issue of domestic rules in a global scenario. This analysis supports the convergence view and encourages at least a partial and gradual adjustment of national legislations towards the prevailing Anglo-Saxon model. In order to test this hypothesis, an examination of the self-dealing regulatory （on conflict of interests and self-dealing） adopted in some Western （Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom （UK）） and Eastern （Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland） European countries has been conducted.展开更多
Chinese listed firms are characterized by a great magnitude of long-duration accounts receivable from controlling shareholders and their affiliates,and they often do not make bad debt allowances.On many occasions,thes...Chinese listed firms are characterized by a great magnitude of long-duration accounts receivable from controlling shareholders and their affiliates,and they often do not make bad debt allowances.On many occasions,these receivables are never collected.We find that firms with a great magnitude of accounts receivable demonstrate a low level of future profitability and low stock returns.It does not appear that the low earnings persistence of these firms is responsible for their poor future performance as predicted by the accrual anomaly,because the firms also report low concurrent earnings.In the context of the Chinese stock market,we interpret the results as being consistent with self-dealing through trade credit by controlling shareholders.This study contributes to the self-dealing literature by identifying a more subtle channel of expropriation of minority shareholders in China.展开更多
文摘Self-dealing refers to all kinds of transactions and operations diverting value from a company to corporate controllers. In order to tackle self-dealing, academics and regulators have emphasised the legal tools. However, there is a divergence between those supporting the existence of a benchmark model towards which to converge （convergence hypothesis） and those underscoring the importance of socio-economic factors on the efficacy of governance rules （path-dependency view）. The aim of this paper is to join in the convergence vs. path-dependency debate by focusing on the efficiency of mandatory rules and investigating their effectiveness. Considering the current market integration, the traditional cost-benefit analysis has been extended in order to embrace costs specifically associated to the issue of domestic rules in a global scenario. This analysis supports the convergence view and encourages at least a partial and gradual adjustment of national legislations towards the prevailing Anglo-Saxon model. In order to test this hypothesis, an examination of the self-dealing regulatory （on conflict of interests and self-dealing） adopted in some Western （Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom （UK）） and Eastern （Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland） European countries has been conducted.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China for financial support(grant number 70972010)
文摘Chinese listed firms are characterized by a great magnitude of long-duration accounts receivable from controlling shareholders and their affiliates,and they often do not make bad debt allowances.On many occasions,these receivables are never collected.We find that firms with a great magnitude of accounts receivable demonstrate a low level of future profitability and low stock returns.It does not appear that the low earnings persistence of these firms is responsible for their poor future performance as predicted by the accrual anomaly,because the firms also report low concurrent earnings.In the context of the Chinese stock market,we interpret the results as being consistent with self-dealing through trade credit by controlling shareholders.This study contributes to the self-dealing literature by identifying a more subtle channel of expropriation of minority shareholders in China.
