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A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences
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作者 Yao XIA Zhiqiu HUANG 《Frontiers of Information Technology & Electronic Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2021年第2期185-201,共17页
Service composition is an effective method of combining existing atomic services into a value-added service based on cost and quality of service(QoS).To meet the diverse needs of users and to offer pricing services ba... Service composition is an effective method of combining existing atomic services into a value-added service based on cost and quality of service(QoS).To meet the diverse needs of users and to offer pricing services based on QoS,we propose a service composition auction mechanism based on user preferences,which is strategy-proof and can be beneficial in selecting services based on user preferences and dynamically determining the price of services.We have proven that the proposed auction mechanism achieves desirable properties including truthfulness and individual rationality.Furthermore,we propose an auction algorithm to implement the auction mechanism,and carry out extensive experiments based on real data.The results verify that the proposed auction mechanism not only achieves desirable properties,but also helps users find a satisfactory service composition scheme. 展开更多
关键词 Combinatorial reverse auction Service composition User preference strategy-proof Dynamic pricing
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Approximation Randomized Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Obnoxious Facility Game withWeighted Agents
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作者 Lan Xiao Xiao-Zhi Zhang 《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》 EI CSCD 2016年第3期357-370,共14页
In this paper,we investigate the obnoxious facility location game with weighted agents.First,we design a randomized group strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 3Wmax 2Wmin when the weighted agents are loca... In this paper,we investigate the obnoxious facility location game with weighted agents.First,we design a randomized group strategy-proof mechanism with approximation ratio 3Wmax 2Wmin when the weighted agents are located on a line;then,on the cycle metric,we also discuss the strategy-proofness and the approximation ratios of a class of group strategy-proof deterministic mechanisms. 展开更多
关键词 Obnoxious facility game Weighted agents Approximation mechanisms design without money strategy-proof
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