Examining Chinese listed companies(2017–2021),we show that key audit matters(KAMs)disclosure exhibits a significant peer effect.We verify a rivalry-based theory of this effect.Audit firms with similar(vs.divergent)re...Examining Chinese listed companies(2017–2021),we show that key audit matters(KAMs)disclosure exhibits a significant peer effect.We verify a rivalry-based theory of this effect.Audit firms with similar(vs.divergent)resource endowments are more likely to mimic peers’KAMs disclosure,particularly when auditors face more intense competition and a more uncertain information environment.Material misstatement risks may dampen the peer effect for less economically significant clients and auditors with more industry specialists,suggesting that this effect reflects auditors’rational cost–benefit trade-off.Finally,the peer effect expands audit market share but reduces KAMs’communication value.Our findings enrich KAMs disclosure research and provide implications for enhancing audit report reforms and the communicative value of KAMs disclosure.展开更多
基金funded by the Shandong Provincial Natural Science Foundation(Grant No.ZR2022MG014)Shandong Social Science Planning Project(Grant No.23CGLJ19).Professional English language editing support provided by AsiaEdit(asiaedit.com).
文摘Examining Chinese listed companies(2017–2021),we show that key audit matters(KAMs)disclosure exhibits a significant peer effect.We verify a rivalry-based theory of this effect.Audit firms with similar(vs.divergent)resource endowments are more likely to mimic peers’KAMs disclosure,particularly when auditors face more intense competition and a more uncertain information environment.Material misstatement risks may dampen the peer effect for less economically significant clients and auditors with more industry specialists,suggesting that this effect reflects auditors’rational cost–benefit trade-off.Finally,the peer effect expands audit market share but reduces KAMs’communication value.Our findings enrich KAMs disclosure research and provide implications for enhancing audit report reforms and the communicative value of KAMs disclosure.
