This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks the...This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.展开更多
In view of the development problems of village banks,through introducing the concept of private relationship lending,the functions of soft information,the channels of village banks for collecting soft information,and ...In view of the development problems of village banks,through introducing the concept of private relationship lending,the functions of soft information,the channels of village banks for collecting soft information,and the private relationship lending of village banks under Chinese rural human environment of highlighting relationship while despising rationality are proved.According to the recognition standard of core competitive edge,it can be concluded that the core competitive edge of village banks is private relationship lending.In the first place,these kinds of small and medium-sized quarter banks have competitive advantages in launching private relationship lending;in the second place,the lending businesses of village banks based on soft information attracts small and medium clients;in the third place,the private relationship lending has realized the scale economy.Furthermore,the reasons why village banks can not display the core competitive edge have been analyzed:firstly,village banks have not found that private relationship lending is their core competitive edge;secondly,the internal motivation on establishing private relationship lending of village banks is insufficient;thirdly,village banks have not prepared well in developing private relationship lending;The relevant policies and countermeasures are put forward,including transforming idea and vigorously developing private relationship lending;intensifying training and improving the quality of personnel involved;strengthening supervision and avoiding the violation behaviors of personnel involved;emulating experiences and perfecting the private relationship lending mechanism of village banks.展开更多
This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines...This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines the decision-making process of bank loans and the information needs, and analyzes the scientificity and rationality of the existing interpretations. Based on the reasons of ＂small bank advantage＂, it discusses some issues to which banks and enterprises should pay attention in the relationship lending.展开更多
文摘This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.
基金Supported by National Social Science Foundation(10BJY057)2010 Program of the Eleventh-Five Plan of the Development of Philosophy and Social Science in Guangzhou(10Y49)
文摘In view of the development problems of village banks,through introducing the concept of private relationship lending,the functions of soft information,the channels of village banks for collecting soft information,and the private relationship lending of village banks under Chinese rural human environment of highlighting relationship while despising rationality are proved.According to the recognition standard of core competitive edge,it can be concluded that the core competitive edge of village banks is private relationship lending.In the first place,these kinds of small and medium-sized quarter banks have competitive advantages in launching private relationship lending;in the second place,the lending businesses of village banks based on soft information attracts small and medium clients;in the third place,the private relationship lending has realized the scale economy.Furthermore,the reasons why village banks can not display the core competitive edge have been analyzed:firstly,village banks have not found that private relationship lending is their core competitive edge;secondly,the internal motivation on establishing private relationship lending of village banks is insufficient;thirdly,village banks have not prepared well in developing private relationship lending;The relevant policies and countermeasures are put forward,including transforming idea and vigorously developing private relationship lending;intensifying training and improving the quality of personnel involved;strengthening supervision and avoiding the violation behaviors of personnel involved;emulating experiences and perfecting the private relationship lending mechanism of village banks.
文摘This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines the decision-making process of bank loans and the information needs, and analyzes the scientificity and rationality of the existing interpretations. Based on the reasons of ＂small bank advantage＂, it discusses some issues to which banks and enterprises should pay attention in the relationship lending.
