We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished...We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.展开更多
Shame as a disciplinary weapon constituted a crucial part of premodern British penal regime.But in contrast to the substantial studies of capital punishment,shaming penalties remains relatively unexplored by historian...Shame as a disciplinary weapon constituted a crucial part of premodern British penal regime.But in contrast to the substantial studies of capital punishment,shaming penalties remains relatively unexplored by historians.This article fills this gap by exploring some of the very basic,but rather neglected questions about the nature,mechanism,and problems of shaming punishments in early modern Britain.It argues that the use of shame was not random;behind it was an often unspoken but shared idea that shaming punishments should direct at offences which were customarily deemed“shameful”.Shameful was not just a moral judgement;it represented a disapproving emotion towards the offender,and a moral emotion that the convict and audience were expected to have for the purposes of reformation and deterrence.However,from the eighteenth century,the growing infl iction of shame on offenders whose transgressions were not commonly deemed shameful degraded public shaming into a violent,chaotic,and counter-productive exercise unable to evoke or inculcate the moral sense of shame.These problems made shame a subject of debate among legal writers,who criticized the excessive use of shaming techniques,but continually recognized the importance of shame as a virtuous emotion and an important penal strategy.展开更多
Dear Editor,This letter is concerned with the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies in social dilemma situations.Stochastic punishment has been proposed,in which whether an individual acts as a punisher or n...Dear Editor,This letter is concerned with the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies in social dilemma situations.Stochastic punishment has been proposed,in which whether an individual acts as a punisher or not is stochastic and depends on its preference for punishment.Meanwhile,both the cost of punishment and whether a defector would be punished are also stochastic.In previous models,the cost of punishment is considered to be either constant or proportional to the number of individuals to be punished.Furthermore,the hypothesis that all defectors should be penalized is frequently adopted.Actually,some defectors may refrain from being punished due to the presence of noise or the limitation of the punishment cost,and the cost of punishment is also dependent on the number of punishers.Thus,we establish an analytic model of stochastic punishment for infinite and well-mixed populations,investigate the effects of stochastic punishment on the evolution of cooperation,and analyze how to support the evolution of cooperation effectively when the stochastic punishment is possible.The objective of this letter is to design a cooperation-promoting stochastic punishment that will allow the system to evolve to full cooperation.The replicator equations have been used to explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation under stochastic punishment,and the conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection have been specified.展开更多
The study investigated the effects of monetary rewards and punishments on the behavioral inhibition in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder(ADHD)tendencies.The present study adopted the signal stoppi...The study investigated the effects of monetary rewards and punishments on the behavioral inhibition in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder(ADHD)tendencies.The present study adopted the signal stopping task paradigm,with 66 children with ADHD tendencies as the research subjects.A mixed design of 2(reward and punishment type:reward,punishment)×2(stimulus type:monetary stimulus,social stimulus)was used.The analysis applied a between intervention group(with reward and punishment type variables)and within type of reward approach(by stimulus type as intra subject variables).The results showed that monetary punishment better promotes behavioral inhibition in children with an ADHD tendency than does reward.In addition,this study showed that monetary punishment and social rewards affected the speed–accuracy trade-off of inhibited behavior in children with an ADHD tendency.Thesefindings suggest that withdrawal of a material token resulted in more behavioural compliance in children with an ADHD tendency.展开更多
“Upholding Virtue and Exercising Caution in Punishment”(Ming De Shen Fa in Chinese pinyin)is one of the core governance philosophies in ancient Chinese politics.This principle was explicitly proposed by Zhou Gongdan...“Upholding Virtue and Exercising Caution in Punishment”(Ming De Shen Fa in Chinese pinyin)is one of the core governance philosophies in ancient Chinese politics.This principle was explicitly proposed by Zhou Gongdan,a renowned statesman of the early Zhou Dynasty,though its intellectual roots can be traced back to the Yao and Shun periods.Although this principle might not be fully recognized by the rulers of the exploiting class throughout history due to their own limitations,the political ideas and rich connotations behind it,especially as a mature governance concept formed by ancient Chinese politicians more than 4,000 years ago,undoubtedly is of high academic value and theoretical and practical significance.Objectively,this principle has also had a profound impact on the political and legal thinking,moral values,and promotion of social legal civilization in later generations.The analysis and discussion around this concept will play a positive role in the in-depth study of ancient China’s human rights concepts and the construction of contemporary Chinese discourse system of human rights.This article attempts to provide a preliminary summary,collation,analysis,and research from the perspective of political philosophy on the basic meaning,ideological context,and historical origin of social understanding of this concept,especially the human rights ideas contained therein.展开更多
Since the ＂five -punishment＂ system was established from the period of the slavery society of the Western Zhou Dynasty, corporal punishment has been always in existence as a tool used by the rulers to punish people ...Since the ＂five -punishment＂ system was established from the period of the slavery society of the Western Zhou Dynasty, corporal punishment has been always in existence as a tool used by the rulers to punish people in ancient China. Although corporal punishment was abolished in the punishment sentencing reform of Emperor Wen of Han, it was further developed and improved in the penalty system of the Sui and Tang dynasties. However, it was restored in the Song, Liao, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties, etc. From the studies of the corporal punishment change, the reform law of the penal system in ancient China can be found, and also the significance of ancient Chinese corporal punishment reform to the progress of criminal penalty can be sought. Meanwhile, it is of vital significance to knowing well the development of China＇s legal history and improving the current penal system.展开更多
An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between t...An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.展开更多
One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather...One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."展开更多
Seismic inversion is a highly ill-posed problem, due to many factors such as the limited seismic frequency bandwidth and inappropriate forward modeling. To obtain a unique solution, some smoothing constraints, e.g., t...Seismic inversion is a highly ill-posed problem, due to many factors such as the limited seismic frequency bandwidth and inappropriate forward modeling. To obtain a unique solution, some smoothing constraints, e.g., the Tikhonov regularization are usually applied. The Tikhonov method can maintain a global smooth solution, but cause a fuzzy structure edge. In this paper we use Huber-Markov random-field edge protection method in the procedure of inverting three parameters, P-velocity, S-velocity and density. The method can avoid blurring the structure edge and resist noise. For the parameter to be inverted, the Huber- Markov random-field constructs a neighborhood system, which further acts as the vertical and lateral constraints. We use a quadratic Huber edge penalty function within the layer to suppress noise and a linear one on the edges to avoid a fuzzy result. The effectiveness of our method is proved by inverting the synthetic data without and with noises. The relationship between the adopted constraints and the inversion results is analyzed as well.展开更多
In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters...In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.展开更多
People as third-party observers,without direct self-interest,may punish norm violators to maintain social norms.However,third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame(i.e.,v...People as third-party observers,without direct self-interest,may punish norm violators to maintain social norms.However,third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame(i.e.,verbally describe)a norm violation.We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon,which we call the“third-party framing effect”.In these experiments,participants observed an anonymous perpetrator deciding whether to keep her/his economic benefit while exposing a victim to a risk of physical pain(described as“harming others”in one condition and“not helping others”in the other condition),then they had a chance to punish that perpetrator at their own cost.Our results showed that the participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame,manifesting a framing effect.Self-reported anger toward perpetrators mediated the relationship between empathy toward victims and the framing effect.Meanwhile,activation of the insula mediated the relationship between mid-cingulate cortex activation and the framing effect;the functional connectivity between these regions significantly predicted the size of the framing effect.These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.展开更多
The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research s...The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.展开更多
Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold throu...Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold through Penalization Strategy Provided by Birgé-Massart;constructed different modulus maximum vertex neighborhood on different wavelet transform decomposition scales to influence the search process of modulus maximum point;obtained the appropriate modulus maximum points sequence on various wavelet decomposition scales;highlighted state feature information;finally usedMallat staggered projection to reconstruct signals.In order to validate the effectiveness of the algorithm,it was compared with four kinds of threshold noise suppression methods namely Rigrsure,Sqtwolog,Heursure,Minimaxi.The results show that this algorithm has a better signal to noise ratio and mean-square error.展开更多
In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of ...In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.展开更多
We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate ...We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.展开更多
Online gradient methods are widely used for training the weight of neural networks and for other engineering computations. In certain cases, the resulting weight may become very large, causing difficulties in the impl...Online gradient methods are widely used for training the weight of neural networks and for other engineering computations. In certain cases, the resulting weight may become very large, causing difficulties in the implementation of the network by electronic circuits. In this paper we introduce a punishing term into the error function of the training procedure to prevent this situation. The corresponding convergence of the iterative training procedure and the boundedness of the weight sequence are proved. A supporting numerical example is also provided.展开更多
Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal powe...Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71501149 and 71231007)the Soft Science Project of Hubei Province,China(Grant No.2017ADC122)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(Grant No.WUT:2017VI070)
文摘We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.
文摘Shame as a disciplinary weapon constituted a crucial part of premodern British penal regime.But in contrast to the substantial studies of capital punishment,shaming penalties remains relatively unexplored by historians.This article fills this gap by exploring some of the very basic,but rather neglected questions about the nature,mechanism,and problems of shaming punishments in early modern Britain.It argues that the use of shame was not random;behind it was an often unspoken but shared idea that shaming punishments should direct at offences which were customarily deemed“shameful”.Shameful was not just a moral judgement;it represented a disapproving emotion towards the offender,and a moral emotion that the convict and audience were expected to have for the purposes of reformation and deterrence.However,from the eighteenth century,the growing infl iction of shame on offenders whose transgressions were not commonly deemed shameful degraded public shaming into a violent,chaotic,and counter-productive exercise unable to evoke or inculcate the moral sense of shame.These problems made shame a subject of debate among legal writers,who criticized the excessive use of shaming techniques,but continually recognized the importance of shame as a virtuous emotion and an important penal strategy.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)(61903080)the Fun-damental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2232023D-26).
文摘Dear Editor,This letter is concerned with the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies in social dilemma situations.Stochastic punishment has been proposed,in which whether an individual acts as a punisher or not is stochastic and depends on its preference for punishment.Meanwhile,both the cost of punishment and whether a defector would be punished are also stochastic.In previous models,the cost of punishment is considered to be either constant or proportional to the number of individuals to be punished.Furthermore,the hypothesis that all defectors should be penalized is frequently adopted.Actually,some defectors may refrain from being punished due to the presence of noise or the limitation of the punishment cost,and the cost of punishment is also dependent on the number of punishers.Thus,we establish an analytic model of stochastic punishment for infinite and well-mixed populations,investigate the effects of stochastic punishment on the evolution of cooperation,and analyze how to support the evolution of cooperation effectively when the stochastic punishment is possible.The objective of this letter is to design a cooperation-promoting stochastic punishment that will allow the system to evolve to full cooperation.The replicator equations have been used to explore the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation under stochastic punishment,and the conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection have been specified.
基金supported by the National General Projects in 2020 of the 13th Five Year Plan of National Education Science in China:A Study on Attention Training Interventions for ADHD Children in Regular Classes from the Perspective of Educational Neuroscience(BHA200123).
文摘The study investigated the effects of monetary rewards and punishments on the behavioral inhibition in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder(ADHD)tendencies.The present study adopted the signal stopping task paradigm,with 66 children with ADHD tendencies as the research subjects.A mixed design of 2(reward and punishment type:reward,punishment)×2(stimulus type:monetary stimulus,social stimulus)was used.The analysis applied a between intervention group(with reward and punishment type variables)and within type of reward approach(by stimulus type as intra subject variables).The results showed that monetary punishment better promotes behavioral inhibition in children with an ADHD tendency than does reward.In addition,this study showed that monetary punishment and social rewards affected the speed–accuracy trade-off of inhibited behavior in children with an ADHD tendency.Thesefindings suggest that withdrawal of a material token resulted in more behavioural compliance in children with an ADHD tendency.
文摘“Upholding Virtue and Exercising Caution in Punishment”(Ming De Shen Fa in Chinese pinyin)is one of the core governance philosophies in ancient Chinese politics.This principle was explicitly proposed by Zhou Gongdan,a renowned statesman of the early Zhou Dynasty,though its intellectual roots can be traced back to the Yao and Shun periods.Although this principle might not be fully recognized by the rulers of the exploiting class throughout history due to their own limitations,the political ideas and rich connotations behind it,especially as a mature governance concept formed by ancient Chinese politicians more than 4,000 years ago,undoubtedly is of high academic value and theoretical and practical significance.Objectively,this principle has also had a profound impact on the political and legal thinking,moral values,and promotion of social legal civilization in later generations.The analysis and discussion around this concept will play a positive role in the in-depth study of ancient China’s human rights concepts and the construction of contemporary Chinese discourse system of human rights.This article attempts to provide a preliminary summary,collation,analysis,and research from the perspective of political philosophy on the basic meaning,ideological context,and historical origin of social understanding of this concept,especially the human rights ideas contained therein.
文摘Since the ＂five -punishment＂ system was established from the period of the slavery society of the Western Zhou Dynasty, corporal punishment has been always in existence as a tool used by the rulers to punish people in ancient China. Although corporal punishment was abolished in the punishment sentencing reform of Emperor Wen of Han, it was further developed and improved in the penalty system of the Sui and Tang dynasties. However, it was restored in the Song, Liao, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties, etc. From the studies of the corporal punishment change, the reform law of the penal system in ancient China can be found, and also the significance of ancient Chinese corporal punishment reform to the progress of criminal penalty can be sought. Meanwhile, it is of vital significance to knowing well the development of China＇s legal history and improving the current penal system.
文摘An informal survey revealed that graduate students presented with Shakespeare's works felt academically unfit and powerless.These student-teacher-text power relationships parallel the power relationships between the dominant patriarchy and female characters in'Othello'-Desdemona,Emilia,and Bianca.Both main characters contribute to the creation of the new or der.The writer wants to look briefly at a Shakespearean couple outside Othello as an attempt at alternative model for distributing power.
文摘One day Jack broke his mother's glass. When shesaw the broken glass, she cried, "Jack, your father isgoing to punish(惩罚)you." "I'm too upset(沮丧)to punish you now." said Jack'sfather."I'll do it after supper."
基金supported by the National Basic Research Program of China(973 Program)(No.2013CB228603)National Science and Technology major projects(No.2011ZX05024 and 2011ZX05010)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.41174119)
文摘Seismic inversion is a highly ill-posed problem, due to many factors such as the limited seismic frequency bandwidth and inappropriate forward modeling. To obtain a unique solution, some smoothing constraints, e.g., the Tikhonov regularization are usually applied. The Tikhonov method can maintain a global smooth solution, but cause a fuzzy structure edge. In this paper we use Huber-Markov random-field edge protection method in the procedure of inverting three parameters, P-velocity, S-velocity and density. The method can avoid blurring the structure edge and resist noise. For the parameter to be inverted, the Huber- Markov random-field constructs a neighborhood system, which further acts as the vertical and lateral constraints. We use a quadratic Huber edge penalty function within the layer to suppress noise and a linear one on the edges to avoid a fuzzy result. The effectiveness of our method is proved by inverting the synthetic data without and with noises. The relationship between the adopted constraints and the inversion results is analyzed as well.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 10672081）.
文摘In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(31871109,32071083,and 31900779)Shenzhen–Hong Kong Institute of Brain Science—Shenzhen Fundamental Research Institutions(2021SHIBS0003).
文摘People as third-party observers,without direct self-interest,may punish norm violators to maintain social norms.However,third-party judgment and the follow-up punishment might be susceptible to the way we frame(i.e.,verbally describe)a norm violation.We conducted a behavioral and a neuroimaging experiment to investigate the above phenomenon,which we call the“third-party framing effect”.In these experiments,participants observed an anonymous perpetrator deciding whether to keep her/his economic benefit while exposing a victim to a risk of physical pain(described as“harming others”in one condition and“not helping others”in the other condition),then they had a chance to punish that perpetrator at their own cost.Our results showed that the participants were more willing to execute third-party punishment under the harm frame compared to the help frame,manifesting a framing effect.Self-reported anger toward perpetrators mediated the relationship between empathy toward victims and the framing effect.Meanwhile,activation of the insula mediated the relationship between mid-cingulate cortex activation and the framing effect;the functional connectivity between these regions significantly predicted the size of the framing effect.These findings shed light on the psychological and neural mechanisms of the third-party framing effect.
基金Supported by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 program/2009AA043703)National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.91023045+1 种基金the Center for Asia Studies of Nankai University under Grant No.AS1005Tianjin City High School Science&Technology Fund Planning Project under Grant No.20100908
文摘The phenomena of cooperation in animal and human society are ubiquitous, but the selfish outcome that no player contributes to the public good will lead to the "tragedy of the commons". The recent research shows that high punishment can improve the cooperation of the population. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into spatial voluntary public goods games with every individual only knowing his own payoff in each round. Using the self-adjusting rules, we find that the different cost for punishment can lead to different effects on the voluntary public goods games. Especially, when the cost for punishment is decreased, a higher contribution region will appear in the case of low r value. It means even for the low r value, individuals can form the contributing groups in large quantities to produce a more efficient outcome than that in moderate r value. In addition, we also find the players' memory can have effects on the average outcome of the population.
基金partially supported by The National Natural Science Foundation of China(51275052)Natural Science Foundation of Beijing(3131002)+1 种基金The Key Project Supported by Introduction of Foreign Talents and Technologies of Beijing(B201101010)The major projects of the National Social Science Fund(12&ZD234)
文摘Flue gas generator set is a kind of large high-speed rotating machinery in petrochemical industry.This research focuses on noise reduction algorithms basis ontheBirgé-Massartthreshold.Obtained the threshold through Penalization Strategy Provided by Birgé-Massart;constructed different modulus maximum vertex neighborhood on different wavelet transform decomposition scales to influence the search process of modulus maximum point;obtained the appropriate modulus maximum points sequence on various wavelet decomposition scales;highlighted state feature information;finally usedMallat staggered projection to reconstruct signals.In order to validate the effectiveness of the algorithm,it was compared with four kinds of threshold noise suppression methods namely Rigrsure,Sqtwolog,Heursure,Minimaxi.The results show that this algorithm has a better signal to noise ratio and mean-square error.
文摘In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations （defective behavior） in a 2-person prisoner＇s dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection （uncooperative behavior） decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
基金Supported by National Nature Science Foundation under Grant No.60904063the Tianjin municipal Natural Science Foundation under Grant Nos.11JCYBJC06600,11ZCKF6X00900,11ZCKFGX00900
文摘We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.
文摘Online gradient methods are widely used for training the weight of neural networks and for other engineering computations. In certain cases, the resulting weight may become very large, causing difficulties in the implementation of the network by electronic circuits. In this paper we introduce a punishing term into the error function of the training procedure to prevent this situation. The corresponding convergence of the iterative training procedure and the boundedness of the weight sequence are proved. A supporting numerical example is also provided.
基金supported by Jilin Province Higher Education Teaching Reform Research Project in 2021(JLJY202186163419).
文摘Peak load and wind energy emission pressure rise more as wind energy penetration keeps growing,which affects the stabilization of the PS(power system).This paper suggests integrated optimal dispatching of thermal power generators and BESS(battery energy storage system)taking wind energy emission grading punishment and deep peak clipping into consideration.Firstly,in order to minimize wind abandonment,a hierarchical wind abandonment penalty strategy based on fuzzy control is designed and introduced,and the optimal grid-connected power of wind energy is determined as a result of minimizing the peak cutting cost of the system.Secondly,considering BESS and thermal power,the management approach of BESS-assisted virtual peak clipping of thermal power generators is aimed at reducing the degree of deep peak clipping of thermal power generators and optimizing the output of thermal power generators and the charging and discharging power of BESS.Finally,Give an example of how this strategy has been effective in reducing abandonment rates by 0.66% and 7.46% individually for different wind penetration programs,and the daily average can reduce the peak clipping power output of thermal power generators by 42.97 and 72.31 MWh and enhances the effect and economy of system peak clipping.
