In the section （ 351b-358a ） about akrasia （incontinence）, Socrates gives the strongest argument for his intellectual paradox： that no one is willing to do what he thinks to be bad. This marvellous accomplishment...In the section （ 351b-358a ） about akrasia （incontinence）, Socrates gives the strongest argument for his intellectual paradox： that no one is willing to do what he thinks to be bad. This marvellous accomplishment, nevertheless, is based on the hedonistic view that pleasure is good. It conflicts with our general conception of the historical Socrates and is incompatible with the Socrates emerging in other earlier dialogues of Plato. This paper will argue that Protagoras is not really forced or fooled into recognizing hedonism, but consciously advocates hedonism all the way. In fact, Socrates has positively, though incompletely, fought it back.展开更多
Both the Mohist canon and the works of Aristotle recognize that people sometimes fail to act according to virtues, roles and duties, what in a Western context is called akrasia or ''weakness of will," an ...Both the Mohist canon and the works of Aristotle recognize that people sometimes fail to act according to virtues, roles and duties, what in a Western context is called akrasia or ''weakness of will," an important topic in both Greek and contemporary philosophy. I argue that questions of akrasia are treated different in the early Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy. Greek accounts focus on issues of will and control, while some Chinese thinkers treat akrasia as a lack of a skill, and the failure to act in the right way is less lack of will than lack of skill. I begin with a brief account of the problem of akrasia as first presented by Plato in the "Protagoras" and Republic, and developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. I then turn to akrasia in an early Chinese context, focusing on a very different Mohist view of akrasia as lack of a skill. Finally, I contrast the "skill" the Mohists find lacking with a very different account of skill in the Zhuangzi.展开更多
文摘In the section （ 351b-358a ） about akrasia （incontinence）, Socrates gives the strongest argument for his intellectual paradox： that no one is willing to do what he thinks to be bad. This marvellous accomplishment, nevertheless, is based on the hedonistic view that pleasure is good. It conflicts with our general conception of the historical Socrates and is incompatible with the Socrates emerging in other earlier dialogues of Plato. This paper will argue that Protagoras is not really forced or fooled into recognizing hedonism, but consciously advocates hedonism all the way. In fact, Socrates has positively, though incompletely, fought it back.
文摘Both the Mohist canon and the works of Aristotle recognize that people sometimes fail to act according to virtues, roles and duties, what in a Western context is called akrasia or ''weakness of will," an important topic in both Greek and contemporary philosophy. I argue that questions of akrasia are treated different in the early Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy. Greek accounts focus on issues of will and control, while some Chinese thinkers treat akrasia as a lack of a skill, and the failure to act in the right way is less lack of will than lack of skill. I begin with a brief account of the problem of akrasia as first presented by Plato in the "Protagoras" and Republic, and developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. I then turn to akrasia in an early Chinese context, focusing on a very different Mohist view of akrasia as lack of a skill. Finally, I contrast the "skill" the Mohists find lacking with a very different account of skill in the Zhuangzi.
