Based on three major theories, the Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive could be influenced by economic performances, political relationships, and financial performances. However, there were some researchers ...Based on three major theories, the Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive could be influenced by economic performances, political relationships, and financial performances. However, there were some researchers focusing on these promotion mechanisms and then they got different outcomes. This paper achieves the goal for exploring the influence factors of officials＇ promotion by using OLS empirical test. From collecting the data of Chinese local officials and cities＇ economic conditions, we find that economic performances and political relationships can have a significant effect on officials＇ promotion, but financial performances cannot have this effect. And the experiences and lesson of this research have some reference for exploration of Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive.展开更多
In recent years,local government debt reduction and risk prevention have been the subjects of common concern to all parties.China's local government debt has different reasons in different historical periods,and t...In recent years,local government debt reduction and risk prevention have been the subjects of common concern to all parties.China's local government debt has different reasons in different historical periods,and the main line running through this is the development orientation of local governments.It is undeniable that local government debt has played an indelible role in China's rapid economic growth.However,due to historical restrictions,flood irrigation inevitably brought sediment all over the ground.Therefore,this paper intends to rethink the causes of local government debt from the perspective of the dual role of regional government and the main body of meso economics.展开更多
This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 202...This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.展开更多
This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences appr...This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.展开更多
This paper constructs a fixed effect model to study the impact of turnover of local government officials on local air quality,and the mechanism through which this effect takes place,using data from 282 prefecture-leve...This paper constructs a fixed effect model to study the impact of turnover of local government officials on local air quality,and the mechanism through which this effect takes place,using data from 282 prefecture-level cities in China from 2015 to 2019.This research shows that turnover of local government officials led to a decline in local air quality,mainly due to a“responsibility gap period.”It also found that the heterogeneity of officials and the difference in the implementation of political initiatives by cities affected the length of the“responsibility gap period”-the shorter it was,the lower the air pollution was during official turnover.Air pollution in China is still severe and the Chinese central government should therefore further reform the turnover system to improve local air quality during the turnover of key local officials by shortening the“responsibility gap period.”展开更多
文摘Based on three major theories, the Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive could be influenced by economic performances, political relationships, and financial performances. However, there were some researchers focusing on these promotion mechanisms and then they got different outcomes. This paper achieves the goal for exploring the influence factors of officials＇ promotion by using OLS empirical test. From collecting the data of Chinese local officials and cities＇ economic conditions, we find that economic performances and political relationships can have a significant effect on officials＇ promotion, but financial performances cannot have this effect. And the experiences and lesson of this research have some reference for exploration of Chinese local officials＇ promotion incentive.
文摘In recent years,local government debt reduction and risk prevention have been the subjects of common concern to all parties.China's local government debt has different reasons in different historical periods,and the main line running through this is the development orientation of local governments.It is undeniable that local government debt has played an indelible role in China's rapid economic growth.However,due to historical restrictions,flood irrigation inevitably brought sediment all over the ground.Therefore,this paper intends to rethink the causes of local government debt from the perspective of the dual role of regional government and the main body of meso economics.
文摘This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.
基金support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.72173085 and 71973094)support from a China Postdoctoral Science Foundation funded project(No.2023M743896).
文摘This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.
基金the State Key Project of the National Social Science Foundation of China(No.19AZD003).
文摘This paper constructs a fixed effect model to study the impact of turnover of local government officials on local air quality,and the mechanism through which this effect takes place,using data from 282 prefecture-level cities in China from 2015 to 2019.This research shows that turnover of local government officials led to a decline in local air quality,mainly due to a“responsibility gap period.”It also found that the heterogeneity of officials and the difference in the implementation of political initiatives by cities affected the length of the“responsibility gap period”-the shorter it was,the lower the air pollution was during official turnover.Air pollution in China is still severe and the Chinese central government should therefore further reform the turnover system to improve local air quality during the turnover of key local officials by shortening the“responsibility gap period.”
