We study an assembly system where one assembler produces a final product to satisfy the price sensitive and uncertain demands. One unit of final product needs inputs from n complementary components each provided from ...We study an assembly system where one assembler produces a final product to satisfy the price sensitive and uncertain demands. One unit of final product needs inputs from n complementary components each provided from a distinct supplier. The assembler orders from the suppliers and their relationships are governed by price-only contracts. The assembler practices two alternative pricing schemes： a fixed pricing scheme by which she fixes a retail price in all market situations, and a responsive pricing scheme by which she adjusts retail prices after observing actual demand curves. We find that, when the assembler practices the two pricing schemes, the suppliers charge the same wholesale prices, channel profit is allocated among the firms according to the same proportions, and the relative performances of the system under decentralized decision makings with respect to those under centralized decision makings are the same. Furthermore, responsive pricing improves the assembler＇s absolute performance, and the gains pass over to the suppliers in terms of higher profits and to the customers in terms of enhanced product availability and lowered market price.展开更多
Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production system.The manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy,optimal for the whole system.This paper...Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production system.The manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy,optimal for the whole system.This paper suggests a discount mechanism by which companies can coordinate their ordering and pricing strategies throughout a supply chain model with a single manufacturer and single retailer.Also,the demand curve is iso-elastic price sensitive.Channel members have decided their selling price and order quantity jointly and independently to maximize the supply chain profit.A coordination mechanism is proposed based on quantity discounts to correlate pricing and ordering strategies simultaneously.The decentralized case is analyzed under the manufacturer-Stackelberg game approach.The result of numerical investigation shows that the suggested discount mechanism has improved the supply chain profit as well as each channel member’s profit in comparison with the centralized and decentralized decisions without discount.展开更多
文摘We study an assembly system where one assembler produces a final product to satisfy the price sensitive and uncertain demands. One unit of final product needs inputs from n complementary components each provided from a distinct supplier. The assembler orders from the suppliers and their relationships are governed by price-only contracts. The assembler practices two alternative pricing schemes： a fixed pricing scheme by which she fixes a retail price in all market situations, and a responsive pricing scheme by which she adjusts retail prices after observing actual demand curves. We find that, when the assembler practices the two pricing schemes, the suppliers charge the same wholesale prices, channel profit is allocated among the firms according to the same proportions, and the relative performances of the system under decentralized decision makings with respect to those under centralized decision makings are the same. Furthermore, responsive pricing improves the assembler＇s absolute performance, and the gains pass over to the suppliers in terms of higher profits and to the customers in terms of enhanced product availability and lowered market price.
文摘Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production system.The manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy,optimal for the whole system.This paper suggests a discount mechanism by which companies can coordinate their ordering and pricing strategies throughout a supply chain model with a single manufacturer and single retailer.Also,the demand curve is iso-elastic price sensitive.Channel members have decided their selling price and order quantity jointly and independently to maximize the supply chain profit.A coordination mechanism is proposed based on quantity discounts to correlate pricing and ordering strategies simultaneously.The decentralized case is analyzed under the manufacturer-Stackelberg game approach.The result of numerical investigation shows that the suggested discount mechanism has improved the supply chain profit as well as each channel member’s profit in comparison with the centralized and decentralized decisions without discount.
