In recent years,gig economy jobs-particularly those of food delivery and ride-hailing drivers-have rapidly emerged as a significant force in the labor market,reflecting the deep integration of China’s digital and rea...In recent years,gig economy jobs-particularly those of food delivery and ride-hailing drivers-have rapidly emerged as a significant force in the labor market,reflecting the deep integration of China’s digital and real economies.This paper examines how digital platforms that support the gig economy exercise directionality and dominance in labor matching,where the platform dictates which consumers workers serve,rather than allowing independent choice.While this platform-led matching may appear to limit consumer and worker autonomy,it actually arises from the platform’s central role in information flow and its technological capabilities,serving as a foundation for the platform’s ability to create large-scale employment through cross-side network effects.Using a theoretical model that integrates digital platforms,labor markets,and product markets,the paper explores how the efficiency of targeted matching affects employment creation.In the early stages of gig economy development,when targeted matching efficiency is low,improvements in assignment efficiency lead to a net increase in gig employment,worker income,and overall social welfare.However,in the later stages,as targeted matching efficiency improves,the potential for monopoly abuse by incumbent platforms may trigger a crowding-out effect,leading to unemployment,income inequality between platforms and workers,and higher commission fees.While fostering competition within platform markets offers benefits,policymakers should avoid excessively low entry barriers,as these can negatively impact incumbent platforms’decisions regarding labor,pricing,and technology investment.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(NSSFC)General Project“Research on the Mechanism of Monopoly Formation and Anti-Monopoly Regulation from the Perspective of Digital Economy”(Grant No.22BJY116)the Guangdong Provincial Natural Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars“Research on Carbon Trading Mechanisms under the Generalized Carbon Leakage Risk”(Grant No.2023B1515020068)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)Key Project“Research on the Theory,Mechanism and Model of State-Owned Capital Mergers and Acquisitions”(Grant No.72132010).
文摘In recent years,gig economy jobs-particularly those of food delivery and ride-hailing drivers-have rapidly emerged as a significant force in the labor market,reflecting the deep integration of China’s digital and real economies.This paper examines how digital platforms that support the gig economy exercise directionality and dominance in labor matching,where the platform dictates which consumers workers serve,rather than allowing independent choice.While this platform-led matching may appear to limit consumer and worker autonomy,it actually arises from the platform’s central role in information flow and its technological capabilities,serving as a foundation for the platform’s ability to create large-scale employment through cross-side network effects.Using a theoretical model that integrates digital platforms,labor markets,and product markets,the paper explores how the efficiency of targeted matching affects employment creation.In the early stages of gig economy development,when targeted matching efficiency is low,improvements in assignment efficiency lead to a net increase in gig employment,worker income,and overall social welfare.However,in the later stages,as targeted matching efficiency improves,the potential for monopoly abuse by incumbent platforms may trigger a crowding-out effect,leading to unemployment,income inequality between platforms and workers,and higher commission fees.While fostering competition within platform markets offers benefits,policymakers should avoid excessively low entry barriers,as these can negatively impact incumbent platforms’decisions regarding labor,pricing,and technology investment.
