In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the...In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained.展开更多
This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective vi...This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective view toward random interval wealth. Some techniques are proposed to transfer a complex programming involving interval numbers into a simple non-linear programming. Under the existence of the optimal strategy, relations between the optimal strategy and assets' prices are discussed. Some properties of the maximal utility function with respect to the endowment are given.展开更多
This paper is concerned with nonzero-sum discrete-time stochastic games in Borel state and action spaces under the expected discounted payoff criterion.The payoff function can be unbounded.The transition probability i...This paper is concerned with nonzero-sum discrete-time stochastic games in Borel state and action spaces under the expected discounted payoff criterion.The payoff function can be unbounded.The transition probability is a convex combination of finite probability measures that are dominated by a probability measure on the state space and depend on the state variable.Under suitable conditions,the authors establish the existence of stationary almost Markov ε-equilibria and give an approximation method via some stochastic games with bounded payoffs.Finally,a production game is introduced to illustrate the applications of the main result,which generalizes the bounded payoff case.展开更多
This paper studies a class of strategic games,where players often collaborate with other players to form a group when making decisions,and the payoff functions of players in such games are presented as vector function...This paper studies a class of strategic games,where players often collaborate with other players to form a group when making decisions,and the payoff functions of players in such games are presented as vector functions.First,using the semi-tensor product(STP)method,it is proved that a finite game with vector payoffs is potential if and only if its potential equation has solution.By adding a suitable weight vector to the vector payoffs of each player,a finite game with vector payoffs that is not potential can be converted into a potential game.Second,as a natural generalization,the authors consider the verification problem of the group-based potential games with vector payoffs.By solving a linear potential equation,a simple formula is obtained to calculate the corresponding potential function.Finally,some examples are presented and discussed in detail to illustrate the theoretical results.展开更多
We study the effect of decoherence on quantum Monty Hall problem under the influence of amplitude damping, depolarizing, and dephasing channels. It is shown that under the effect of decoherence, there is a Nash equili...We study the effect of decoherence on quantum Monty Hall problem under the influence of amplitude damping, depolarizing, and dephasing channels. It is shown that under the effect of decoherence, there is a Nash equilibrium of the game in case of depolarizing channel for Alice＇s quantum strategy. Whereas in case of dephasing noise, the game is not influenced by the quantum channel. For amplitude damping channel, Bob＇s payoffs are found symmetrical about a decoherence of 50% and the maximum occurs at this value of decoherence for his classical strategy. However, it is worth-mentioning that in case of depolarizing channel, Bob＇s classical strategy remains always dominant against any choice of Alice＇s strategy.展开更多
We study the behavior of cooperative multiplayer quantum games [Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, and K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A 327 （2004） 98; A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 （2007） 111] in the...We study the behavior of cooperative multiplayer quantum games [Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, and K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A 327 （2004） 98; A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 （2007） 111] in the presence of decoherence using different quantum channels such as amplitude damping, depolarizing and phase damping. It is seen that the outcomes of the games for the two damping channels with maximum values of decoherence reduce to same value. However, in comparison to phase damping channel, the payoffs of cooperators are strongly damped under the influence amplitude damping channel for the lower values of decoherence parameter. In the case of depolarizing channel, the game is a no-payoff game irrespective of the degree of entanglement in the initial state for the larger values of decoherence parameter. The deeoherenee gets the cooperators worse off.展开更多
Mitigating the heat stress via a derivative policy is a vital financial option for agricultural producers and other business sectors to strategically adapt to the climate change scenario. This study has provided an ap...Mitigating the heat stress via a derivative policy is a vital financial option for agricultural producers and other business sectors to strategically adapt to the climate change scenario. This study has provided an approach to identifying heat stress events and pricing the heat stress weather derivative due to persistent days of high surface air temperature （SAT）. Cooling degree days （CDD） are used as the weather index for trade. In this study, a call-option model was used as an example for calculating the price of the index. Two heat stress indices were developed to describe the severity and physical impact of heat waves. The daily Global Historical Climatology Network （GHCN-D） SAT data from 1901 to 2007 from the southern California, USA, were used. A major California heat wave that occurred 20-25 October 1965 was studied. The derivative price was calculated based on the call-option model for both long-term station data and the interpolated grid point data at a regular 0.1~ x0.1~ latitude-longitude grid. The resulting comparison indicates that （a） the interpolated data can be used as reliable proxy to price the CDD and （b） a normal distribution model cannot always be used to reliably calculate the CDD price. In conclusion, the data, models, and procedures described in this study have potential application in hedging agricultural and other risks.展开更多
A novel method for decision making with fuzzy probability assessments and fuzzy payoff is presented. The consistency of the fuzzy probability assessment is considered. A fuzzy aggregate algorithm is used to indicate t...A novel method for decision making with fuzzy probability assessments and fuzzy payoff is presented. The consistency of the fuzzy probability assessment is considered. A fuzzy aggregate algorithm is used to indicate the fuzzy expected payoff of alternatives. The level sets of each fuzzy expected payoff are then obtained by solving linear programming models. Based on a defuzzification function associated with the level sets of fuzzy number and a numerical integration formula (Newton-Cotes formula), an effective approach to rank the fuzzy expected payoff of alternatives is also developed to determine the best alternative. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the proposed method.展开更多
We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes t...We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.展开更多
In this paper, we consider multiobjective two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs and vector fuzzy payoffs. We translate such games into the corresponding multiobjective programming problems and introduce the pe...In this paper, we consider multiobjective two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs and vector fuzzy payoffs. We translate such games into the corresponding multiobjective programming problems and introduce the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution concept by assuming that a player supposes the opponent adopts the most disadvantage strategy for the self. It is shown that any pessimistic Pareto optimal solution can be obtained on the basis of linear programming techniques even if the membership functions for the objective functions are nonlinear. Moreover, we propose interactive algorithms based on the bisection method to obtain a pessimistic compromise solution from among the set of all pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions. In order to show the efficiency of the proposed method, we illustrate interactive processes of an application to a vegetable shipment problem.展开更多
In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of ...In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of von Neumann and Morgenstern to change ordinal values into cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy process. We suggest using Saaty’s pairwise comparison with combined strategies as criteria for players involved in a repetitive game. We present and illustrate a methodology for moving from ordinal payoffs to cardinal payoffs. We summarize the impact on how the solutions are achieved.展开更多
In the situation of inadequate vaccines and rapid mutation of virulent strains, alternative health interventions play a crucial role in the containment of emerging epidemics. This study elucidates the critical aspects...In the situation of inadequate vaccines and rapid mutation of virulent strains, alternative health interventions play a crucial role in the containment of emerging epidemics. This study elucidates the critical aspects of health interventions to control epidemic resurgence. Besides, human behavioral response to epidemics plays an instrumental role in bringing the success of control efforts. The appearance of multi-strain epidemics has become a global health concern that requires special attention. Here, we introduce a novel mean-field epidemic game approach to predict the evolutionary dynamics of flu-like epidemics having multiple disease strains. Our model illustrates the importance of multiple provisions alongside their timely execution for better disease attenuation. In addition to vaccination, we introduce self-protection as a potential alternative that yields safeguard against either strain. Both these imperfect provisions render better efficacy against primary (resident) strain than secondary (mutant) to contain epidemic transmission. The simulation-backed model analysis further sheds some light on the crucial impacts of control interventions to limit the invasion of virulent strains from qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. It explicates how vaccination and self-protection complement each other as per situation demands. Our full-fledged theoretical approach further illustrates the dynamic trade-off between the cost and efficacy of a certain intervention. We confirm that the disease dies out when the basic reproduction number of individual strains is less than one and becomes endemic if it is greater than one. Finally, the model addresses the evolutionary consequences when mutation takes place from primary to secondary strain. Some impressive facts while employing dual provisions have been reinforced using a game-theoretic framework.展开更多
In this paper, we first introduce the notion and model of generalized minimax regret equilibria with scalar set payoffs. After that, we study its general stability theorem under the conditions that the existence theor...In this paper, we first introduce the notion and model of generalized minimax regret equilibria with scalar set payoffs. After that, we study its general stability theorem under the conditions that the existence theorem of generalized minimax regret equilibrium point with scalar set payoffs holds. In other words, when the scalar set payoffs functions and feasible constraint mappings are slightly disturbed, by using Fort theorem and continuity results of set-valued mapping optimal value functions, we obtain a general stability theorem for generalized minimax regret equilibria with scalar set payoffs. At the same time, an example is given to illustrate our result.展开更多
This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effe...This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effective to find at least one Nash Equilibrium （N.E） for two-person bimatrix games. Therefore, the analytic method for two-person bimatrix games is adapted to interval bimatrix games.展开更多
As one of the major methods for the simulation of option pricing,Monte Carlo method assumes random fluctuations in the distribution of asset prices.Under certain uncertainties process,different evolution paths could b...As one of the major methods for the simulation of option pricing,Monte Carlo method assumes random fluctuations in the distribution of asset prices.Under certain uncertainties process,different evolution paths could be simulated so as to finally yield the expectation value of the asset price,which requires a lot of simulations to ensure the accuracy based on huge and expensive calculations.In order to solve the above computational problem,quantum Monte Carlo(QMC)has been established and applied in the relevant systems such as European call options.In this work,both MC and QM methods are adopted to simulate European call options.Based on the preparation of quantum states in QMC algorithm and the construction of quantum circuits by simulating a quantum hardware environment on a traditional computer,the amplitude estimation(AE)algorithm is found to play a secondary role in accelerating the pricing of European options.More importantly,the payoff function and the time required for the simulation in QMC method show some improvements than those in MC method.展开更多
In this study,we aim to examine the dynamics of diseases by employing both voluntary and forced control strategies backed by evolutionary game theory(EGT).The impact of quarantine is investigated through our suggested...In this study,we aim to examine the dynamics of diseases by employing both voluntary and forced control strategies backed by evolutionary game theory(EGT).The impact of quarantine is investigated through our suggested framework provided that a partial adoption of voluntary vaccination is observed at the earlier stage.The combined and individual effect of dual preventive provisions are visualized through SEIR-type epidemic model.Additionally,the effect of coercive control policies’efficacy on individual vaccination decision is illustrated through the lens of EGT.We also consider the cost associated with vaccination and quarantine.The numerical simulations shown in our work emphasize how important it is to put quarantine rules in place to stop the spread of infection.These restrictions imposed by the government can be relieving,especially during times when a sizable section of the populace is reluctant to get vaccinated because of its ineffectiveness or excessive cost.We also show when and under what circumstances one policy works better than the other.How these policies’compliance rates should be calculated is therefore becomes a focal point of discussion.We support this claim by producing phase diagrams for three different evolutionary outcomes throughout our investigation and changing the two crucially important pick-up rate parameters,one connected with the quarantine policy and the other is related to the isolation policy,in various directions.We then additionally examine the efficacy and cost associated with different policy adaption.This model effectively high-lights the importance of dual provisional safety in understanding public health issues by using the mean-field approximation technique,which aligns with the well-known imitation protocol known as individual-based risk assessment dynamics.展开更多
This paper concerns two-person zero-sum games for a class of average-payoff continuous-time Markov processes in Polish spaces.The underlying processes are determined by transition rates that are allowed to be unbounde...This paper concerns two-person zero-sum games for a class of average-payoff continuous-time Markov processes in Polish spaces.The underlying processes are determined by transition rates that are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds.We use two optimality inequalities to replace the so-called optimality equation in the previous literature.Under more general conditions,these optimality inequalities yield the existence of the value of the game and of a pair of optimal stationary strategies.Under some additional conditions we further establish the optimality equation itself.Finally,we use several examples to illustrate our results,and also to show the difference between the conditions in this paper and those in the literature.In particular,one of these examples shows that our approach is more general than all of the existing ones because it allows nonergodic Markov processes.展开更多
By introducing state payoff vector to every state node on the connected graph in this paper,dynamic game is researched on finite graphs.The concept of simple strategy about games on graph defined by Berge is introduce...By introducing state payoff vector to every state node on the connected graph in this paper,dynamic game is researched on finite graphs.The concept of simple strategy about games on graph defined by Berge is introduced to prove the existence theorem of absolute equilibrium about games on the connected graph with state payoff vector.The complete algorithm and an example in the three-dimensional connected mesh-like graph are given in this paper.展开更多
This paper attempts to study two-person nonzero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by transition rates,with an expected average criterion.The transition rates are allowed to be unbounde...This paper attempts to study two-person nonzero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by transition rates,with an expected average criterion.The transition rates are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff functions may be unbounded from above and from below.We give suitable conditions under which the existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured.More precisely,using the socalled "vanishing discount" approach,a Nash equilibrium for the average criterion is obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the discounted criterion as the discount factors tend to zero.Our results are illustrated with a birth-and-death game.展开更多
文摘In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained.
基金Supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central University(10D10909)
文摘This article discusses the problem of utility maximization in a market with random-interval payoffs without short-selling prohibition. A novel expected utility model is given to measure an investor's subjective view toward random interval wealth. Some techniques are proposed to transfer a complex programming involving interval numbers into a simple non-linear programming. Under the existence of the optimal strategy, relations between the optimal strategy and assets' prices are discussed. Some properties of the maximal utility function with respect to the endowment are given.
基金supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant No.2022YFA1004600the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.11931018+1 种基金the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation under Grant No.2021A1515010057the Guangdong Province Key Laboratory of Computational Science at the Sun Yat-sen University under Grant No.2020B1212060032。
文摘This paper is concerned with nonzero-sum discrete-time stochastic games in Borel state and action spaces under the expected discounted payoff criterion.The payoff function can be unbounded.The transition probability is a convex combination of finite probability measures that are dominated by a probability measure on the state space and depend on the state variable.Under suitable conditions,the authors establish the existence of stationary almost Markov ε-equilibria and give an approximation method via some stochastic games with bounded payoffs.Finally,a production game is introduced to illustrate the applications of the main result,which generalizes the bounded payoff case.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61903236,62073202,and 61803240Shandong Provincial National Science Foundation under Grant No.ZR2018BF021China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant No.2017M622262。
文摘This paper studies a class of strategic games,where players often collaborate with other players to form a group when making decisions,and the payoff functions of players in such games are presented as vector functions.First,using the semi-tensor product(STP)method,it is proved that a finite game with vector payoffs is potential if and only if its potential equation has solution.By adding a suitable weight vector to the vector payoffs of each player,a finite game with vector payoffs that is not potential can be converted into a potential game.Second,as a natural generalization,the authors consider the verification problem of the group-based potential games with vector payoffs.By solving a linear potential equation,a simple formula is obtained to calculate the corresponding potential function.Finally,some examples are presented and discussed in detail to illustrate the theoretical results.
文摘We study the effect of decoherence on quantum Monty Hall problem under the influence of amplitude damping, depolarizing, and dephasing channels. It is shown that under the effect of decoherence, there is a Nash equilibrium of the game in case of depolarizing channel for Alice＇s quantum strategy. Whereas in case of dephasing noise, the game is not influenced by the quantum channel. For amplitude damping channel, Bob＇s payoffs are found symmetrical about a decoherence of 50% and the maximum occurs at this value of decoherence for his classical strategy. However, it is worth-mentioning that in case of depolarizing channel, Bob＇s classical strategy remains always dominant against any choice of Alice＇s strategy.
基金partial financial support under the National Scholarship Program for Pakistan
文摘We study the behavior of cooperative multiplayer quantum games [Q. Chen, Y. Wang, J.T. Liu, and K.L. Wang, Phys. Lett. A 327 （2004） 98; A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Quantum Inf. Comput. 7 （2007） 111] in the presence of decoherence using different quantum channels such as amplitude damping, depolarizing and phase damping. It is seen that the outcomes of the games for the two damping channels with maximum values of decoherence reduce to same value. However, in comparison to phase damping channel, the payoffs of cooperators are strongly damped under the influence amplitude damping channel for the lower values of decoherence parameter. In the case of depolarizing channel, the game is a no-payoff game irrespective of the degree of entanglement in the initial state for the larger values of decoherence parameter. The deeoherenee gets the cooperators worse off.
基金supportedin part by the US National Science Foundation (GrantNos. AGS-1015926 and AGS-1015957)supported in part by a U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAAGrantNo. EL133E09SE4048)
文摘Mitigating the heat stress via a derivative policy is a vital financial option for agricultural producers and other business sectors to strategically adapt to the climate change scenario. This study has provided an approach to identifying heat stress events and pricing the heat stress weather derivative due to persistent days of high surface air temperature （SAT）. Cooling degree days （CDD） are used as the weather index for trade. In this study, a call-option model was used as an example for calculating the price of the index. Two heat stress indices were developed to describe the severity and physical impact of heat waves. The daily Global Historical Climatology Network （GHCN-D） SAT data from 1901 to 2007 from the southern California, USA, were used. A major California heat wave that occurred 20-25 October 1965 was studied. The derivative price was calculated based on the call-option model for both long-term station data and the interpolated grid point data at a regular 0.1~ x0.1~ latitude-longitude grid. The resulting comparison indicates that （a） the interpolated data can be used as reliable proxy to price the CDD and （b） a normal distribution model cannot always be used to reliably calculate the CDD price. In conclusion, the data, models, and procedures described in this study have potential application in hedging agricultural and other risks.
文摘A novel method for decision making with fuzzy probability assessments and fuzzy payoff is presented. The consistency of the fuzzy probability assessment is considered. A fuzzy aggregate algorithm is used to indicate the fuzzy expected payoff of alternatives. The level sets of each fuzzy expected payoff are then obtained by solving linear programming models. Based on a defuzzification function associated with the level sets of fuzzy number and a numerical integration formula (Newton-Cotes formula), an effective approach to rank the fuzzy expected payoff of alternatives is also developed to determine the best alternative. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the proposed method.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.70671079,60674050,60736022 and 60528007)the National Basic Research Program of China (Grant No.2002CB312200)+1 种基金the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (Grant No.2006AA04Z258)11-5 Project (Grant No.A2120061303)
文摘We study the effect of accumulative payoff on the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma on a square lattice. We introduce a decaying factor for the accumulative payoff, which characterizes the extent that the historical payoff is accumulated. It is shown that for fixed values of the temptation to defect, the density of cooperators increases with the value of the decaying factor. This indicates that the more the historical payoff is involved, the more favourable cooperators become. In the critical region where the cooperator density converges to zero, cooperators vanish according to a power-law-like behaviour. The associated exponents agree approximately with the two-dimensional directed percolation and depend weakly on the value of the decaying factor.
文摘In this paper, we consider multiobjective two-person zero-sum games with vector payoffs and vector fuzzy payoffs. We translate such games into the corresponding multiobjective programming problems and introduce the pessimistic Pareto optimal solution concept by assuming that a player supposes the opponent adopts the most disadvantage strategy for the self. It is shown that any pessimistic Pareto optimal solution can be obtained on the basis of linear programming techniques even if the membership functions for the objective functions are nonlinear. Moreover, we propose interactive algorithms based on the bisection method to obtain a pessimistic compromise solution from among the set of all pessimistic Pareto optimal solutions. In order to show the efficiency of the proposed method, we illustrate interactive processes of an application to a vegetable shipment problem.
文摘In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of von Neumann and Morgenstern to change ordinal values into cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy process. We suggest using Saaty’s pairwise comparison with combined strategies as criteria for players involved in a repetitive game. We present and illustrate a methodology for moving from ordinal payoffs to cardinal payoffs. We summarize the impact on how the solutions are achieved.
文摘In the situation of inadequate vaccines and rapid mutation of virulent strains, alternative health interventions play a crucial role in the containment of emerging epidemics. This study elucidates the critical aspects of health interventions to control epidemic resurgence. Besides, human behavioral response to epidemics plays an instrumental role in bringing the success of control efforts. The appearance of multi-strain epidemics has become a global health concern that requires special attention. Here, we introduce a novel mean-field epidemic game approach to predict the evolutionary dynamics of flu-like epidemics having multiple disease strains. Our model illustrates the importance of multiple provisions alongside their timely execution for better disease attenuation. In addition to vaccination, we introduce self-protection as a potential alternative that yields safeguard against either strain. Both these imperfect provisions render better efficacy against primary (resident) strain than secondary (mutant) to contain epidemic transmission. The simulation-backed model analysis further sheds some light on the crucial impacts of control interventions to limit the invasion of virulent strains from qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. It explicates how vaccination and self-protection complement each other as per situation demands. Our full-fledged theoretical approach further illustrates the dynamic trade-off between the cost and efficacy of a certain intervention. We confirm that the disease dies out when the basic reproduction number of individual strains is less than one and becomes endemic if it is greater than one. Finally, the model addresses the evolutionary consequences when mutation takes place from primary to secondary strain. Some impressive facts while employing dual provisions have been reinforced using a game-theoretic framework.
文摘In this paper, we first introduce the notion and model of generalized minimax regret equilibria with scalar set payoffs. After that, we study its general stability theorem under the conditions that the existence theorem of generalized minimax regret equilibrium point with scalar set payoffs holds. In other words, when the scalar set payoffs functions and feasible constraint mappings are slightly disturbed, by using Fort theorem and continuity results of set-valued mapping optimal value functions, we obtain a general stability theorem for generalized minimax regret equilibria with scalar set payoffs. At the same time, an example is given to illustrate our result.
文摘This paper deals with rnxn two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effective to find at least one Nash Equilibrium （N.E） for two-person bimatrix games. Therefore, the analytic method for two-person bimatrix games is adapted to interval bimatrix games.
基金This work was financially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China Granted No.11764028。
文摘As one of the major methods for the simulation of option pricing,Monte Carlo method assumes random fluctuations in the distribution of asset prices.Under certain uncertainties process,different evolution paths could be simulated so as to finally yield the expectation value of the asset price,which requires a lot of simulations to ensure the accuracy based on huge and expensive calculations.In order to solve the above computational problem,quantum Monte Carlo(QMC)has been established and applied in the relevant systems such as European call options.In this work,both MC and QM methods are adopted to simulate European call options.Based on the preparation of quantum states in QMC algorithm and the construction of quantum circuits by simulating a quantum hardware environment on a traditional computer,the amplitude estimation(AE)algorithm is found to play a secondary role in accelerating the pricing of European options.More importantly,the payoff function and the time required for the simulation in QMC method show some improvements than those in MC method.
基金supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from JSPS,Japan,KAKENHI(Grant No.JP 23H03499)awarded to Professor Tanimoto.
文摘In this study,we aim to examine the dynamics of diseases by employing both voluntary and forced control strategies backed by evolutionary game theory(EGT).The impact of quarantine is investigated through our suggested framework provided that a partial adoption of voluntary vaccination is observed at the earlier stage.The combined and individual effect of dual preventive provisions are visualized through SEIR-type epidemic model.Additionally,the effect of coercive control policies’efficacy on individual vaccination decision is illustrated through the lens of EGT.We also consider the cost associated with vaccination and quarantine.The numerical simulations shown in our work emphasize how important it is to put quarantine rules in place to stop the spread of infection.These restrictions imposed by the government can be relieving,especially during times when a sizable section of the populace is reluctant to get vaccinated because of its ineffectiveness or excessive cost.We also show when and under what circumstances one policy works better than the other.How these policies’compliance rates should be calculated is therefore becomes a focal point of discussion.We support this claim by producing phase diagrams for three different evolutionary outcomes throughout our investigation and changing the two crucially important pick-up rate parameters,one connected with the quarantine policy and the other is related to the isolation policy,in various directions.We then additionally examine the efficacy and cost associated with different policy adaption.This model effectively high-lights the importance of dual provisional safety in understanding public health issues by using the mean-field approximation technique,which aligns with the well-known imitation protocol known as individual-based risk assessment dynamics.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation and GDUPS (2010)supported by CONACyT Grant 104001
文摘This paper concerns two-person zero-sum games for a class of average-payoff continuous-time Markov processes in Polish spaces.The underlying processes are determined by transition rates that are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds.We use two optimality inequalities to replace the so-called optimality equation in the previous literature.Under more general conditions,these optimality inequalities yield the existence of the value of the game and of a pair of optimal stationary strategies.Under some additional conditions we further establish the optimality equation itself.Finally,we use several examples to illustrate our results,and also to show the difference between the conditions in this paper and those in the literature.In particular,one of these examples shows that our approach is more general than all of the existing ones because it allows nonergodic Markov processes.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos.70571040,70871064)the International (Regional) Joint Research Program of China (Grant Nos.70711120204,71011120107)the Innovation Project of Graduate Education in Shandong Province,China (Grant No.SDYC08045)
文摘By introducing state payoff vector to every state node on the connected graph in this paper,dynamic game is researched on finite graphs.The concept of simple strategy about games on graph defined by Berge is introduced to prove the existence theorem of absolute equilibrium about games on the connected graph with state payoff vector.The complete algorithm and an example in the three-dimensional connected mesh-like graph are given in this paper.
基金supported by National Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars of China (Grant No. 10925107)Guangdong Province Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme (2011)
文摘This paper attempts to study two-person nonzero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by transition rates,with an expected average criterion.The transition rates are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff functions may be unbounded from above and from below.We give suitable conditions under which the existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured.More precisely,using the socalled "vanishing discount" approach,a Nash equilibrium for the average criterion is obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the discounted criterion as the discount factors tend to zero.Our results are illustrated with a birth-and-death game.
