Background:That Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia(CEECA)experienced a major mortality crisis in the 1990s is a well-established finding,with most analyses focusing on singular causes like alcohol-related dea...Background:That Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia(CEECA)experienced a major mortality crisis in the 1990s is a well-established finding,with most analyses focusing on singular causes like alcohol-related deaths.However,the utility of the integrated“deaths of despair”framework,which views alcohol,drug,and suicide deaths as a unified socio-economic phenomenon,remains under-explored in this context.Crucially,the long-term evolution of the composition of despair within the region remains a largely unexplored area of inquiry.Therefore,this study aims to analyze the long-term trends,changing composition,and regional heterogeneity of deaths from despair in the CEECA region from 1980 to 2021.Methods:Using 2021 Global Burden of Disease(GBD)data(1980–2021),we analyzed deaths of despair mortality trends in 29 CEECA countries.We employed Joinpoint regression to identify significant trend changes and conducted stratified analyses by cause,gender,and age group.Results:The CEECA deaths of despair crisis began as an alcohol and suicide driven phenomenon concentrated in middle-aged men(50–74 years)during the 1990s,with mortality rates for alcohol use disorders and self-harm surging annually by 30.35%(p=0.002)and 13.44%(p=0.001),respectively,between 1991 and 1994.It has since evolved,marked by a contrasting and emerging threat in the 21st century:a rising proportion of drug-related deaths among the younger(15–49 years)male cohort,where the share of drug use disorders increased from 6.9%in 2000 to 11.8%in 2008.Conclusion:The deaths of despair crisis in the CEECA region is not a past event but an ongoing,evolving phenomenon.Its changing nature demands a shift in public health focus from solely historical drivers to new,generation-specific threats,particularly the rise of drug-related despair among youth.展开更多
Recent liberal political science analysis has highlighted media, manipu- lation, and populist political trickery in the apparently sudden rise of the new Right in Europe and the USA. I suggest that a robust engagement...Recent liberal political science analysis has highlighted media, manipu- lation, and populist political trickery in the apparently sudden rise of the new Right in Europe and the USA. I suggest that a robust engagement with the actual social transformations over which liberalism has presided since 1989 is imperative. Anthropological work on class processes and the rise of neo-nationalist populism in Central and Eastern Europe has been strong in developing a more relational, pro- cessual, and embedded vision. In the current paper, I am looking at the phases and spaces of the rise of iUiberalism as a popular political sensibility in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, I am interested in its gradual upscaling to the level of the nation state and, through the ＂Visegrad bloc＂ to the EU. I argue that both the emergence and step-by-step upscaling of illiberal political sensibilities are explained by class relational processes and the regionally uneven Polanyi-type ＂counter- movements＂ against liberalizations that they brought forth.展开更多
基金supported by grants from the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF)under the Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology(grant number:RS-2023-00249082)Korea University(grant number:K2225791).
文摘Background:That Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia(CEECA)experienced a major mortality crisis in the 1990s is a well-established finding,with most analyses focusing on singular causes like alcohol-related deaths.However,the utility of the integrated“deaths of despair”framework,which views alcohol,drug,and suicide deaths as a unified socio-economic phenomenon,remains under-explored in this context.Crucially,the long-term evolution of the composition of despair within the region remains a largely unexplored area of inquiry.Therefore,this study aims to analyze the long-term trends,changing composition,and regional heterogeneity of deaths from despair in the CEECA region from 1980 to 2021.Methods:Using 2021 Global Burden of Disease(GBD)data(1980–2021),we analyzed deaths of despair mortality trends in 29 CEECA countries.We employed Joinpoint regression to identify significant trend changes and conducted stratified analyses by cause,gender,and age group.Results:The CEECA deaths of despair crisis began as an alcohol and suicide driven phenomenon concentrated in middle-aged men(50–74 years)during the 1990s,with mortality rates for alcohol use disorders and self-harm surging annually by 30.35%(p=0.002)and 13.44%(p=0.001),respectively,between 1991 and 1994.It has since evolved,marked by a contrasting and emerging threat in the 21st century:a rising proportion of drug-related deaths among the younger(15–49 years)male cohort,where the share of drug use disorders increased from 6.9%in 2000 to 11.8%in 2008.Conclusion:The deaths of despair crisis in the CEECA region is not a past event but an ongoing,evolving phenomenon.Its changing nature demands a shift in public health focus from solely historical drivers to new,generation-specific threats,particularly the rise of drug-related despair among youth.
文摘Recent liberal political science analysis has highlighted media, manipu- lation, and populist political trickery in the apparently sudden rise of the new Right in Europe and the USA. I suggest that a robust engagement with the actual social transformations over which liberalism has presided since 1989 is imperative. Anthropological work on class processes and the rise of neo-nationalist populism in Central and Eastern Europe has been strong in developing a more relational, pro- cessual, and embedded vision. In the current paper, I am looking at the phases and spaces of the rise of iUiberalism as a popular political sensibility in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, I am interested in its gradual upscaling to the level of the nation state and, through the ＂Visegrad bloc＂ to the EU. I argue that both the emergence and step-by-step upscaling of illiberal political sensibilities are explained by class relational processes and the regionally uneven Polanyi-type ＂counter- movements＂ against liberalizations that they brought forth.
