This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation(RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of R...This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation(RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque's(2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation,various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.展开更多
This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,...This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Science Foundation (08CJY2009)the National Nature Science Foundation of China (70602011)
文摘This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation(RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque's(2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation,various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.
文摘This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.
