According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, ...According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value(CFV) and levels of executive compensation.In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value(PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value(LCFV). Furthermore,we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.展开更多
This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 202...This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.展开更多
The objective of this study is to examine whether and how non-financial performances,specifically the awards achieved by the corporates,are associated with the distribution of the compensation of the managers and othe...The objective of this study is to examine whether and how non-financial performances,specifically the awards achieved by the corporates,are associated with the distribution of the compensation of the managers and other employees within the corporations.Through an investigation of the correlation between corporate awards and compensation,we find that corporate awards as collective honors raise managers’compensation but significantly reduce non-managerial compensation,thus widening the pay gap within the company.Our empirical evidence also shows that these correlations are more significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.In addition,our evidence reveals that although corporate awards increase the stickiness of managers’compensation but not that of other employees,the corporate awards can still stimulate better financial performance and market value by motivating both managers and other employees.Our empirical evidence implies that because only managers are responsible for and evaluated by comprehensive corporate performance,the issues of fairness and efficiency are not raised when the economic benefits provided by corporate awards are unequally shared.展开更多
基金supported by the Leading Academic Discipline Project from the Education Committee of Shanghai (Project No.J51701)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No.70902063)+2 种基金the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Project Nos.09YJC630157 and 12YJA790197)the Key Research and Innovation Project of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (11ZS86)the IAPHD Project of Nanjing University
文摘According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value(CFV) and levels of executive compensation.In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value(PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value(LCFV). Furthermore,we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.
文摘This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.
基金financial support from the Youth Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Approval No.71902161)the Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project(Approval No.18YJA630041)
文摘The objective of this study is to examine whether and how non-financial performances,specifically the awards achieved by the corporates,are associated with the distribution of the compensation of the managers and other employees within the corporations.Through an investigation of the correlation between corporate awards and compensation,we find that corporate awards as collective honors raise managers’compensation but significantly reduce non-managerial compensation,thus widening the pay gap within the company.Our empirical evidence also shows that these correlations are more significant in state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises.In addition,our evidence reveals that although corporate awards increase the stickiness of managers’compensation but not that of other employees,the corporate awards can still stimulate better financial performance and market value by motivating both managers and other employees.Our empirical evidence implies that because only managers are responsible for and evaluated by comprehensive corporate performance,the issues of fairness and efficiency are not raised when the economic benefits provided by corporate awards are unequally shared.
