To uncover the decision-making mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of multiple stakeholders in highway noise pollution control,a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government,operators,and the public i...To uncover the decision-making mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of multiple stakeholders in highway noise pollution control,a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government,operators,and the public is constructed.The operation period is divided into different stages for differentiated analysis.A simulation analysis was performed on the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway to assess the impact of variations in critical elements on the system.The results indicate that the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway is currently in its early stage of development,with the corresponding strategies being active regulation,excessive emissions,and supervision.When the cost of the government’s active regulation decreases from 1×10^(5) to 5×10^(4) yuan,the system converges more rapidly toward the active regulation strategy.When the cost of the operator’s excessive emissions increases from 14.08×10^(6) to 20.00×10^(6) yuan,the system drives the operator toward the standardized emission strategy.In addition,when the cost of public supervision decreases from 15×10^(4) to 5×10^(4) yuan and the compensation paid by operators to the public increases from 1.288×10^(6) to 2.576×10^(6) yuan,the system converges more quickly toward the supervision strategy.The cost of the operator’s excessive emissions serves as the core decision variable for achieving the ideal equilibrium in the three-party game involving government active regulation,operator standardized emissions,and public supervision.展开更多
基金The Natural Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province(No.LH2023E011)Open Fund of National Key Laboratory of Green and Long-Life Road Engineering in Extreme Environment in Changsha University of Science and Technology(No.kfj230105).
文摘To uncover the decision-making mechanisms and evolutionary dynamics of multiple stakeholders in highway noise pollution control,a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government,operators,and the public is constructed.The operation period is divided into different stages for differentiated analysis.A simulation analysis was performed on the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway to assess the impact of variations in critical elements on the system.The results indicate that the Lituo sinking section of the Beijing-Hong Kong-Macao Highway is currently in its early stage of development,with the corresponding strategies being active regulation,excessive emissions,and supervision.When the cost of the government’s active regulation decreases from 1×10^(5) to 5×10^(4) yuan,the system converges more rapidly toward the active regulation strategy.When the cost of the operator’s excessive emissions increases from 14.08×10^(6) to 20.00×10^(6) yuan,the system drives the operator toward the standardized emission strategy.In addition,when the cost of public supervision decreases from 15×10^(4) to 5×10^(4) yuan and the compensation paid by operators to the public increases from 1.288×10^(6) to 2.576×10^(6) yuan,the system converges more quickly toward the supervision strategy.The cost of the operator’s excessive emissions serves as the core decision variable for achieving the ideal equilibrium in the three-party game involving government active regulation,operator standardized emissions,and public supervision.
