Plaintext-checking(PC)oracle-based key recovery attack stands out as one of the most critical threat targeting Kyber due to its high effciency and ease of implementation.In practical scenarios,however,the output of th...Plaintext-checking(PC)oracle-based key recovery attack stands out as one of the most critical threat targeting Kyber due to its high effciency and ease of implementation.In practical scenarios,however,the output of the oracle may suffer accuracy degradation when instantiating it through a side-channel trace distinguisher due to the environmental noise and the cross-device issue.While various deep learning-based approaches have been proposed to address the inaccuracy problem caused by the cross-device issue,they often suffer from complexity and limited interpretability.This work investigates realistic numerous side-channel attack(SCA)scenarios and focuses on the cross-device issue when implementing a reliable PC oracle in SCAs against Kyber.TtLR is proposed,it combines the ttest with a logistic regression model to implement a lightweight but effcient side-channel distinguisher against Kyber KEM.The proposed approach is validated through experiments on STM32F407G boards equipped with ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers,using the Kyber512 implementations from the pqm4 library.The results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves high PC oracle accuracy across different boards with low computational and memory overhead.This makes the proposed distinguisher practical for deployment on resource-constrained platforms such as the Raspberry Pi running a Linux system.展开更多
公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准...公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准与技术研究院(National Institute of Standards and Technology,NIST)发起了后量子密码(Post-quantum cryptography,PQC)算法标准全球征集竞赛。在参选的算法中,基于格的算法在安全性、公钥私钥尺寸和运算速度中达到了较好的权衡,因此是最有潜力的后量子加密算法体制。而CRYSTALS-KYBER作为基于格的密钥封装算法(Key encapsulation mechanism,KEM),通过了该全球征集竞赛的三轮遴选。对于后量子密码算法,算法的硬件实现效率是一个重要评价指标。因此,本文使用高层次综合工具(High-level synthesis,HLS),针对CRYSTALS-KYBER的三个主模块(密钥生成,密钥封装和密钥解封装),在不同参数集下探索了硬件设计的实现和优化空间。作为一种快速便捷的电路设计方法,HLS可以用来对不同算法的硬件实现进行高效和便捷的探索。本文利用该工具,对CRYSTALS-KYBER的软件代码进行了分析,并尝试不同的组合策略来优化HLS硬件实现结果,并最终获得了最优化的电路结构。同时,本文编写了tcl-perl协同脚本,以自动化地搜索最优优化策略,获得最优电路结构。实验结果表明,适度优化循环和时序约束可以大大提高HLS综合得到的KYBER电路性能。与已有的软件实现相比,本文具有明显的性能优势。与HLS实现工作相比,本文对Kyber-512的优化使得封装算法的性能提高了75%,解封装算法的性能提高了55.1%。与基准数据相比,密钥生成算法的性能提高了44.2%。对于CRYSTALS-KYBER的另外两个参数集(Kyber-768和Kyber-1024),本文也获得了类似的优化效果。展开更多
Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend P...Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62172374)。
文摘Plaintext-checking(PC)oracle-based key recovery attack stands out as one of the most critical threat targeting Kyber due to its high effciency and ease of implementation.In practical scenarios,however,the output of the oracle may suffer accuracy degradation when instantiating it through a side-channel trace distinguisher due to the environmental noise and the cross-device issue.While various deep learning-based approaches have been proposed to address the inaccuracy problem caused by the cross-device issue,they often suffer from complexity and limited interpretability.This work investigates realistic numerous side-channel attack(SCA)scenarios and focuses on the cross-device issue when implementing a reliable PC oracle in SCAs against Kyber.TtLR is proposed,it combines the ttest with a logistic regression model to implement a lightweight but effcient side-channel distinguisher against Kyber KEM.The proposed approach is validated through experiments on STM32F407G boards equipped with ARM Cortex-M4 microcontrollers,using the Kyber512 implementations from the pqm4 library.The results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves high PC oracle accuracy across different boards with low computational and memory overhead.This makes the proposed distinguisher practical for deployment on resource-constrained platforms such as the Raspberry Pi running a Linux system.
文摘公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准与技术研究院(National Institute of Standards and Technology,NIST)发起了后量子密码(Post-quantum cryptography,PQC)算法标准全球征集竞赛。在参选的算法中,基于格的算法在安全性、公钥私钥尺寸和运算速度中达到了较好的权衡,因此是最有潜力的后量子加密算法体制。而CRYSTALS-KYBER作为基于格的密钥封装算法(Key encapsulation mechanism,KEM),通过了该全球征集竞赛的三轮遴选。对于后量子密码算法,算法的硬件实现效率是一个重要评价指标。因此,本文使用高层次综合工具(High-level synthesis,HLS),针对CRYSTALS-KYBER的三个主模块(密钥生成,密钥封装和密钥解封装),在不同参数集下探索了硬件设计的实现和优化空间。作为一种快速便捷的电路设计方法,HLS可以用来对不同算法的硬件实现进行高效和便捷的探索。本文利用该工具,对CRYSTALS-KYBER的软件代码进行了分析,并尝试不同的组合策略来优化HLS硬件实现结果,并最终获得了最优化的电路结构。同时,本文编写了tcl-perl协同脚本,以自动化地搜索最优优化策略,获得最优电路结构。实验结果表明,适度优化循环和时序约束可以大大提高HLS综合得到的KYBER电路性能。与已有的软件实现相比,本文具有明显的性能优势。与HLS实现工作相比,本文对Kyber-512的优化使得封装算法的性能提高了75%,解封装算法的性能提高了55.1%。与基准数据相比,密钥生成算法的性能提高了44.2%。对于CRYSTALS-KYBER的另外两个参数集(Kyber-768和Kyber-1024),本文也获得了类似的优化效果。
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62472397)Innovation Program for Quantum Science and Technology(2021ZD0302902)。
文摘Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.
