Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend P...Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.展开更多
公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准...公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准与技术研究院(National Institute of Standards and Technology,NIST)发起了后量子密码(Post-quantum cryptography,PQC)算法标准全球征集竞赛。在参选的算法中,基于格的算法在安全性、公钥私钥尺寸和运算速度中达到了较好的权衡,因此是最有潜力的后量子加密算法体制。而CRYSTALS-KYBER作为基于格的密钥封装算法(Key encapsulation mechanism,KEM),通过了该全球征集竞赛的三轮遴选。对于后量子密码算法,算法的硬件实现效率是一个重要评价指标。因此,本文使用高层次综合工具(High-level synthesis,HLS),针对CRYSTALS-KYBER的三个主模块(密钥生成,密钥封装和密钥解封装),在不同参数集下探索了硬件设计的实现和优化空间。作为一种快速便捷的电路设计方法,HLS可以用来对不同算法的硬件实现进行高效和便捷的探索。本文利用该工具,对CRYSTALS-KYBER的软件代码进行了分析,并尝试不同的组合策略来优化HLS硬件实现结果,并最终获得了最优化的电路结构。同时,本文编写了tcl-perl协同脚本,以自动化地搜索最优优化策略,获得最优电路结构。实验结果表明,适度优化循环和时序约束可以大大提高HLS综合得到的KYBER电路性能。与已有的软件实现相比,本文具有明显的性能优势。与HLS实现工作相比,本文对Kyber-512的优化使得封装算法的性能提高了75%,解封装算法的性能提高了55.1%。与基准数据相比,密钥生成算法的性能提高了44.2%。对于CRYSTALS-KYBER的另外两个参数集(Kyber-768和Kyber-1024),本文也获得了类似的优化效果。展开更多
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(62472397)Innovation Program for Quantum Science and Technology(2021ZD0302902)。
文摘Recently,several PC oracle based side-channel attacks have been proposed against Kyber.However,most of them focus on unprotected implementations and masking is considered as a counter-measure.In this study,we extend PC oracle based side-channel attacks to the second-order scenario and successfully conduct key-recovery attacks on the first-order masked Kyber.Firstly,we analyze the potential joint information leakage.Inspired by the binary PC oracle based attack proposed by Qin et al.at Asiacrypt 2021,we identify the 1-bit leakage scenario in the masked Keccak implementation.Moreover,we modify the ciphertexts construction described by Tanaka et al.at CHES 2023,extending the leakage scenario from 1-bit to 32-bit.With the assistance of TVLA,we validate these leakages through experiments.Secondly,for these two scenarios,we construct a binary PC oracle based on t-test and a multiple-valued PC oracle based on neural networks.Furthermore,we conduct practical side-channel attacks on masked Kyber by utilizing our oracles,with the implementation running on an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller.The demonstrated attacks require a minimum of 15788 and 648 traces to fully recover the key of Kyber768 in the 1-bit leakage scenario and the 32-bit leakage scenario,respectively.Our analysis may also be extended to attack other post-quantum schemes that use the same masked hash function.Finally,we apply the shuffling strategy to the first-order masked imple-mentation of the Kyber and perform leakage tests.Experimental results show that the combination strategy of shuffling and masking can effectively resist our proposed attacks.
文摘公钥密码学对全球数字信息系统的安全起着至关重要的作用。然而,随着量子计算机研究的发展和Shor算法等的出现,公钥密码学的安全性受到了潜在的极大的威胁。因此,能够抵抗量子计算机攻击的密码算法开始受到密码学界的关注,美国国家标准与技术研究院(National Institute of Standards and Technology,NIST)发起了后量子密码(Post-quantum cryptography,PQC)算法标准全球征集竞赛。在参选的算法中,基于格的算法在安全性、公钥私钥尺寸和运算速度中达到了较好的权衡,因此是最有潜力的后量子加密算法体制。而CRYSTALS-KYBER作为基于格的密钥封装算法(Key encapsulation mechanism,KEM),通过了该全球征集竞赛的三轮遴选。对于后量子密码算法,算法的硬件实现效率是一个重要评价指标。因此,本文使用高层次综合工具(High-level synthesis,HLS),针对CRYSTALS-KYBER的三个主模块(密钥生成,密钥封装和密钥解封装),在不同参数集下探索了硬件设计的实现和优化空间。作为一种快速便捷的电路设计方法,HLS可以用来对不同算法的硬件实现进行高效和便捷的探索。本文利用该工具,对CRYSTALS-KYBER的软件代码进行了分析,并尝试不同的组合策略来优化HLS硬件实现结果,并最终获得了最优化的电路结构。同时,本文编写了tcl-perl协同脚本,以自动化地搜索最优优化策略,获得最优电路结构。实验结果表明,适度优化循环和时序约束可以大大提高HLS综合得到的KYBER电路性能。与已有的软件实现相比,本文具有明显的性能优势。与HLS实现工作相比,本文对Kyber-512的优化使得封装算法的性能提高了75%,解封装算法的性能提高了55.1%。与基准数据相比,密钥生成算法的性能提高了44.2%。对于CRYSTALS-KYBER的另外两个参数集(Kyber-768和Kyber-1024),本文也获得了类似的优化效果。
