Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of t...Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of these independent directors： Percentage within BDs, professional capacities, stimulation and work conditions. From the empirical results, we conclude that the more powerful of the independent directors, the better the accounting conservatism, and that their positive impact increases along with the improvement on corporate governance, meanwhile the work conditions plays the most important role, and then are the percentage within BDs and their professional capacities, the stimulation and personal reputation appear the least importance.展开更多
As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is ver...As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is very few. From the perspective of GEM of China, this article observes and studies the impact of corporate governance structure represented by board of directors and independent directors on audit fees. This article selects the data of 348 listed companies in the GEM of China in 2012, proves that there is a positive correlation between the number of meetings, independent directors＇ salaries and audit fees through the use of multiple linear regression model, and accordingly proposed suggestions that improve the corporate governance structure of the GEM of China.展开更多
The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.Ho...The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.However,whether reappointing these directors after a“cooling-off period”following mandatory rotation undermines the effectiveness of supervision remains an open question.We investigate whether independent directors can effectively monitor tunneling activities after their reappointment.We find that their monitoring is less effective during their reappointment term than in their first term,reflected in a significant increase in related-party transactions with controlling shareholders.A mechanism test reveals that independent directors’monitoring behavior is more passive during the reappointment term,as evidenced by less dissent and a lower likelihood of challenging proposals related to controlling shareholders.These effects are more pronounced when reappointed independent directors are less willing or able to supervise,or when the company’s internal and external governance environment is poor.Supervision also appears to be more effective if they are reappointed after a cooling-off period of more than three years.This paper extends research on the governance impact of reappointed independent directors and provides empirical evidence that can help to improve their post-term management practices.展开更多
In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the suc...In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the success or failure of these entities.Research by Balsmeier et al.(2022)indicates that the greater the independence of a listed company’s board of directors,the higher its innovation output(both in terms of quantity and quality of patents)^([1]).This finding suggests a strong correlation between the performance of a company and the independence of its board.The present study has selected listed companies on the A-share market of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2013 as the subjects of its research.A sample of 960 companies was initially obtained from the CSMAR database.Following a rigorous financial data screening,a final sample of 944 valid companies was retained for further analysis.展开更多
Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state...Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.展开更多
We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit e...We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.展开更多
We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when ...We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when companies violate information disclosure rules, the market punishes academic independent directors more severely than nonacademic independent directors for these violations. Furthermore, companies employing punished academic directors face greater declines in their stock price than companies employing punished nonacademic independent directors during a relatively short window before or after the punishment is announced. The punishment of academic independent directors influences the employment of other scholars in the same field and results in a negative overflow effect. This study provides evidence of the market's differential reactions to independent directors with different backgrounds; the findings reflect the double-edged sword of one individual's reputation on organizations.展开更多
In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of influence through personal relationships(Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role e...In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of influence through personal relationships(Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role expected by securities regulators? In this study we use the degree of precision and accuracy in corporate earnings forecasts as proxies for the quality of information disclosure by listed companies and examine the supervisory efficiency of independent directors with respect to information disclosure. Using data from 2007to 2009, we find that in the absence of ownership balance, independent directors have a significant positive effect on the accuracy of management forecasts.In addition, the personal backgrounds of independent directors have specific effects on management earnings forecasts. Directors with certified public accountant(CPA) expertise significantly improve the precision of management forecasts. However, directors with industrial expertise significantly reduce the precision of management forecasts. In other words, having directors with CPA expertise improves the independence of boards, but having independent directors with industrial expertise has the opposite effect.展开更多
Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that...Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said ‘‘no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.展开更多
Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2008–2019 period,we explore the impact of concurrent independent directors in the same industry(hereafter CIDSI)on accounting information comparability.We...Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2008–2019 period,we explore the impact of concurrent independent directors in the same industry(hereafter CIDSI)on accounting information comparability.We find that CIDSI can effectively promote accounting information comparability and that this effect is realized mainly through inhibiting earnings management.We also find that CIDSI can provide broader industry perception of the company’s board reports.Variations in concurrent companies and internal and external environments have significant moderating effects on the relationship between CIDSI and accounting information comparability.This relationship contributes to reducing audit fees and the possibility of receiving nonstandard unqualified audit opinions.Our findings have implications for companies by demonstrating the importance of recruiting independent directors.展开更多
We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we invest...We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.展开更多
We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other l...We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.展开更多
As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on dire...As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.展开更多
In 2013,the Chinese government implemented Rule No.18,which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directo...In 2013,the Chinese government implemented Rule No.18,which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms.The surprise implementation of Rule No.18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors(OIDs).The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance.We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory.The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance,as measured by Tobin's 0 and firm leverage.This also confirmed the importance of independent directors'political connection on firm performance,as discovered in prior research.However,this influence varied across OIDs'heterogeneity,external environment and firm ownership.The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.展开更多
The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the prop...The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.展开更多
This paper develops a hypothesis of the four factors from the cause of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of thoughts, culture, motive, opportunity and economic trade-off. Then tests whether independent directors...This paper develops a hypothesis of the four factors from the cause of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of thoughts, culture, motive, opportunity and economic trade-off. Then tests whether independent directors monitor and improve the quality of financial report on the basis of 1 170 firms in China by means of OLS regression. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis.展开更多
This study took small enterprises listed from 2010 to 2015 as the empirical object.The board size,CEO duality,and ratio of independent directors were independent variables.The return on total assets,return on sharehol...This study took small enterprises listed from 2010 to 2015 as the empirical object.The board size,CEO duality,and ratio of independent directors were independent variables.The return on total assets,return on shareholders’equity and earnings per share were taken as the dependent variables,and three hypotheses were tested with SPSS.It is found that the board size was positively correlated with firm performance,but was not significant.There was no significant correlation between the ratio of independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance.This study suggests that optimizing the leadership structure of the board of directors can help improve the firm performance of enterprises.展开更多
文摘Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of these independent directors： Percentage within BDs, professional capacities, stimulation and work conditions. From the empirical results, we conclude that the more powerful of the independent directors, the better the accounting conservatism, and that their positive impact increases along with the improvement on corporate governance, meanwhile the work conditions plays the most important role, and then are the percentage within BDs and their professional capacities, the stimulation and personal reputation appear the least importance.
文摘As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is very few. From the perspective of GEM of China, this article observes and studies the impact of corporate governance structure represented by board of directors and independent directors on audit fees. This article selects the data of 348 listed companies in the GEM of China in 2012, proves that there is a positive correlation between the number of meetings, independent directors＇ salaries and audit fees through the use of multiple linear regression model, and accordingly proposed suggestions that improve the corporate governance structure of the GEM of China.
基金financially supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(Grant No.23&ZD060)the National Natural Science Fund of China(Grant No.72472161)+1 种基金the Ministry of Education of China Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Fund(Grant No.22YJC630111)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(Grant No.202411103).
文摘The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.However,whether reappointing these directors after a“cooling-off period”following mandatory rotation undermines the effectiveness of supervision remains an open question.We investigate whether independent directors can effectively monitor tunneling activities after their reappointment.We find that their monitoring is less effective during their reappointment term than in their first term,reflected in a significant increase in related-party transactions with controlling shareholders.A mechanism test reveals that independent directors’monitoring behavior is more passive during the reappointment term,as evidenced by less dissent and a lower likelihood of challenging proposals related to controlling shareholders.These effects are more pronounced when reappointed independent directors are less willing or able to supervise,or when the company’s internal and external governance environment is poor.Supervision also appears to be more effective if they are reappointed after a cooling-off period of more than three years.This paper extends research on the governance impact of reappointed independent directors and provides empirical evidence that can help to improve their post-term management practices.
文摘In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the success or failure of these entities.Research by Balsmeier et al.(2022)indicates that the greater the independence of a listed company’s board of directors,the higher its innovation output(both in terms of quantity and quality of patents)^([1]).This finding suggests a strong correlation between the performance of a company and the independence of its board.The present study has selected listed companies on the A-share market of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2013 as the subjects of its research.A sample of 960 companies was initially obtained from the CSMAR database.Following a rigorous financial data screening,a final sample of 944 valid companies was retained for further analysis.
基金support of the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation(Grant No.2023A1515010802)the Guangdong Province Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme 2019 and the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC Grant No.72132010)。
文摘Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.
基金support from the National Social Science Fund of China(grant number:20BJY029).
文摘We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project Nos.7160219171502174)the Special Funds for the Fundamental Scientific Research of Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
文摘We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when companies violate information disclosure rules, the market punishes academic independent directors more severely than nonacademic independent directors for these violations. Furthermore, companies employing punished academic directors face greater declines in their stock price than companies employing punished nonacademic independent directors during a relatively short window before or after the punishment is announced. The punishment of academic independent directors influences the employment of other scholars in the same field and results in a negative overflow effect. This study provides evidence of the market's differential reactions to independent directors with different backgrounds; the findings reflect the double-edged sword of one individual's reputation on organizations.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project Number: 71102084)
文摘In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of influence through personal relationships(Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role expected by securities regulators? In this study we use the degree of precision and accuracy in corporate earnings forecasts as proxies for the quality of information disclosure by listed companies and examine the supervisory efficiency of independent directors with respect to information disclosure. Using data from 2007to 2009, we find that in the absence of ownership balance, independent directors have a significant positive effect on the accuracy of management forecasts.In addition, the personal backgrounds of independent directors have specific effects on management earnings forecasts. Directors with certified public accountant(CPA) expertise significantly improve the precision of management forecasts. However, directors with industrial expertise significantly reduce the precision of management forecasts. In other words, having directors with CPA expertise improves the independence of boards, but having independent directors with industrial expertise has the opposite effect.
基金financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Projects 71,372,206 and 71,672,152)the support of the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University(NCET-13–0963)
文摘Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said ‘‘no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.
基金the financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72272164,71872196)the National Social Science Foundation of China (21&ZD145, 19ZDA098)+1 种基金the Beijing Social Science Foundation (15JGC176)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang (LY19G020004)
文摘Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2008–2019 period,we explore the impact of concurrent independent directors in the same industry(hereafter CIDSI)on accounting information comparability.We find that CIDSI can effectively promote accounting information comparability and that this effect is realized mainly through inhibiting earnings management.We also find that CIDSI can provide broader industry perception of the company’s board reports.Variations in concurrent companies and internal and external environments have significant moderating effects on the relationship between CIDSI and accounting information comparability.This relationship contributes to reducing audit fees and the possibility of receiving nonstandard unqualified audit opinions.Our findings have implications for companies by demonstrating the importance of recruiting independent directors.
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos.71302105,71372041,and 71572100)MOE Project for Key Research Institutes of Humanities and Social Science (No.13JJD790019)MOE Foundation for Humanities and Social Science (No.13YJA790057)
文摘We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71572160)
文摘We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No. 71202126 71102124)+1 种基金the MOE (Ministry of Education in China)Youth Fund of Humanities and Social Sciences (Project No. 12YJC630021)
文摘As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
文摘In 2013,the Chinese government implemented Rule No.18,which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms.The surprise implementation of Rule No.18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors(OIDs).The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance.We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory.The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance,as measured by Tobin's 0 and firm leverage.This also confirmed the importance of independent directors'political connection on firm performance,as discovered in prior research.However,this influence varied across OIDs'heterogeneity,external environment and firm ownership.The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.
文摘The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.
文摘This paper develops a hypothesis of the four factors from the cause of fraudulent financial reporting in terms of thoughts, culture, motive, opportunity and economic trade-off. Then tests whether independent directors monitor and improve the quality of financial report on the basis of 1 170 firms in China by means of OLS regression. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis.
文摘This study took small enterprises listed from 2010 to 2015 as the empirical object.The board size,CEO duality,and ratio of independent directors were independent variables.The return on total assets,return on shareholders’equity and earnings per share were taken as the dependent variables,and three hypotheses were tested with SPSS.It is found that the board size was positively correlated with firm performance,but was not significant.There was no significant correlation between the ratio of independent directors and CEO duality on firm performance.This study suggests that optimizing the leadership structure of the board of directors can help improve the firm performance of enterprises.
