To study an entity the entire jack-up performs as a total system with close interdependency and high level of integration of a myriad of subsystems supporting each individual function. All subsystems should be arrange...To study an entity the entire jack-up performs as a total system with close interdependency and high level of integration of a myriad of subsystems supporting each individual function. All subsystems should be arranged in regular geometric space with clear regional division according to their respective functions. The ＂building block＂ such as arrangement makes it feasible to apply modular design method while the integration and conflicts among subsystems offer an arena for game theoretic analysis. All the contradictions between subsystems should be resolved bye the designer. Here we present a game theoretic analysis methodology, which based on the basic principles of game theory, through the establishment of matrix-mode game models to describe and analyze engineering design tasks. By using this method the optimization process in various fields of expertise can be effectively coordinated and controlled, and the parallel design patterns can be achieved to some extent. Taking account of the impact of commercial or technical activities in platform＇s life cycle, time line is considered in the early stage of design process which provides more convenience for efficient upgrade and reconfiguration. Some second-hand three-legged jack-up upgrade design process is used as an example to illustrate the utility of the method.展开更多
为线性分离变化时间的系统的 H 混合评价问题在这份报纸被调查，在估计的信号是状态和输入的线性联合的地方。设计目的从骚乱要求最坏的精力获得到是的评价错误不到规定水平。混合评价问题的最佳的答案是僵绳点一二播放器零和微分游戏...为线性分离变化时间的系统的 H 混合评价问题在这份报纸被调查，在估计的信号是状态和输入的线性联合的地方。设计目的从骚乱要求最坏的精力获得到是的评价错误不到规定水平。混合评价问题的最佳的答案是僵绳点一二播放器零和微分游戏。根据微分比赛途径，为混合评价问题的必要、足够的可解决的条件以一个 Riccati 微分方程的答案被提供。而且，如果可解决的条件满足，一个可能的评估者被建议。评估者被印射矩阵的一个获得矩阵和产量描绘，在后者反映在未知输入和输出评价错误之间的内部关系的地方。最后，一个数字例子被提供说明建议途径。展开更多
The H∞ hybrid estimation problem for linear continuous time-varying systems is in-vestigated in this paper, where estimated signals are linear combination of state and input. Designobjective requires the worst-case e...The H∞ hybrid estimation problem for linear continuous time-varying systems is in-vestigated in this paper, where estimated signals are linear combination of state and input. Designobjective requires the worst-case energy gain from disturbance to estimation error be less than a pre-scribed level. Optimal solution of the hybrid estimation problem is the saddle point of a two-playerzero sum di?erential game. Based on the di?erential game approach, necessary and su?cient solvableconditions for the hybrid estimation problem are provided in terms of solutions to a Riccati di?e-rential equation. Moreover, one possible estimator is proposed if the solvable conditions are satisfied.The estimator is characterized by a gain matrix and an output mapping matrix that re?ects theinternal relations between the unknown input and output estimation error. Both state and unknowninputs estimation are realized by the proposed estimator. Thus, the results in this paper are alsocapable of dealing with fault diagnosis problems of linear time-varying systems. At last, a numericalexample is provided to illustrate the proposed approach.展开更多
The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-...The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.展开更多
In this paper, we investigate the influences of network delay on QoE (Quality of Experience) such as the operability of haptic interface device and the fairness between players for soft objects in a networked real-tim...In this paper, we investigate the influences of network delay on QoE (Quality of Experience) such as the operability of haptic interface device and the fairness between players for soft objects in a networked real-time game subjectively and objectively. We handle a networked balloon bursting game in which two players burst balloons (i.e., soft objects) in a 3D virtual space by using haptic interface devices, and the players compete for the number of burst balloons. As a result, we find that the operability depends on the network delay from the local terminal to the other terminal, and the fairness is mainly dependent on the difference in network delay between the players’ terminals. We confirm that there exists a trade-off relationship between the operability and the fairness. We also see that the contribution of the fairness is larger than that of the operability to the comprehensive quality (i.e., the weighted sum of the operability and fairness). Assessment results further show that the output timing of terminals should be adjusted to the terminal which has the latest output timing to maintain the fairness when the difference in network delay between the terminals is large. In this way, the comprehensive quality at each terminal can be maintained as high as possible.展开更多
There are a few studies that focus on solution methods for finding a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum games. We discuss the use of Karmarkar’s interior point method to solve the Nash equilibrium problems of a zero-sum ga...There are a few studies that focus on solution methods for finding a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum games. We discuss the use of Karmarkar’s interior point method to solve the Nash equilibrium problems of a zero-sum game, and prove that it is theoretically a polynomial time algorithm. We implement the Karmarkar method, and a preliminary computational result shows that it performs well for zero-sum games. We also mention an affine scaling method that would help us compute Nash equilibria of general zero-sum games effectively.展开更多
Game model of environmental protection at scenic spots is established in this paper in order to carry out analysis of the equilibrium between one-time game and infinitely repeated game, disclose the reasons why the en...Game model of environmental protection at scenic spots is established in this paper in order to carry out analysis of the equilibrium between one-time game and infinitely repeated game, disclose the reasons why the environment of scenic spots are destroyed, and propose the countermeasures to ensure the equilibrium of the game. The study also reveals that during the one-time game between tourists and tour operators, it is tour operators' dominant strategy not to control environmental pollution that leads to the destruction of environment at scenic spots. While, during the infinitely repeated game between tourists and tour operators, the realization of Pareto optimality equilibrium (The strategy of tourist is traveling, and the strategy of tour operators are controlling environmental pollution) is dependent upon the choice of players (tourists or operators) of triggering strategy (traveling or controlling environmental pollution). The supervision of the government upon operators can force them to control environmental pollution, which can consequently improve the efficiency of equilibrium in the game, and promote environmental protection at tourism scenic spots and sustainable development of tourism.展开更多
基金the Liaoning BaiQian Wan Talents Program(No.2007186-25)
文摘To study an entity the entire jack-up performs as a total system with close interdependency and high level of integration of a myriad of subsystems supporting each individual function. All subsystems should be arranged in regular geometric space with clear regional division according to their respective functions. The ＂building block＂ such as arrangement makes it feasible to apply modular design method while the integration and conflicts among subsystems offer an arena for game theoretic analysis. All the contradictions between subsystems should be resolved bye the designer. Here we present a game theoretic analysis methodology, which based on the basic principles of game theory, through the establishment of matrix-mode game models to describe and analyze engineering design tasks. By using this method the optimization process in various fields of expertise can be effectively coordinated and controlled, and the parallel design patterns can be achieved to some extent. Taking account of the impact of commercial or technical activities in platform＇s life cycle, time line is considered in the early stage of design process which provides more convenience for efficient upgrade and reconfiguration. Some second-hand three-legged jack-up upgrade design process is used as an example to illustrate the utility of the method.
基金Supported by NationalNatural Science Foundation of China （60774068, 60574050） and China Postdoctor Science Foundation （20070421064）
文摘为线性分离变化时间的系统的 H 混合评价问题在这份报纸被调查，在估计的信号是状态和输入的线性联合的地方。设计目的从骚乱要求最坏的精力获得到是的评价错误不到规定水平。混合评价问题的最佳的答案是僵绳点一二播放器零和微分游戏。根据微分比赛途径，为混合评价问题的必要、足够的可解决的条件以一个 Riccati 微分方程的答案被提供。而且，如果可解决的条件满足，一个可能的评估者被建议。评估者被印射矩阵的一个获得矩阵和产量描绘，在后者反映在未知输入和输出评价错误之间的内部关系的地方。最后，一个数字例子被提供说明建议途径。
文摘The H∞ hybrid estimation problem for linear continuous time-varying systems is in-vestigated in this paper, where estimated signals are linear combination of state and input. Designobjective requires the worst-case energy gain from disturbance to estimation error be less than a pre-scribed level. Optimal solution of the hybrid estimation problem is the saddle point of a two-playerzero sum di?erential game. Based on the di?erential game approach, necessary and su?cient solvableconditions for the hybrid estimation problem are provided in terms of solutions to a Riccati di?e-rential equation. Moreover, one possible estimator is proposed if the solvable conditions are satisfied.The estimator is characterized by a gain matrix and an output mapping matrix that re?ects theinternal relations between the unknown input and output estimation error. Both state and unknowninputs estimation are realized by the proposed estimator. Thus, the results in this paper are alsocapable of dealing with fault diagnosis problems of linear time-varying systems. At last, a numericalexample is provided to illustrate the proposed approach.
基金Supported by the Major National Science and Technology program (2011ZX03005-002)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60872041, 61072066, 60963023, 60970143)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000903001, JY10000901034)
文摘The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.
文摘In this paper, we investigate the influences of network delay on QoE (Quality of Experience) such as the operability of haptic interface device and the fairness between players for soft objects in a networked real-time game subjectively and objectively. We handle a networked balloon bursting game in which two players burst balloons (i.e., soft objects) in a 3D virtual space by using haptic interface devices, and the players compete for the number of burst balloons. As a result, we find that the operability depends on the network delay from the local terminal to the other terminal, and the fairness is mainly dependent on the difference in network delay between the players’ terminals. We confirm that there exists a trade-off relationship between the operability and the fairness. We also see that the contribution of the fairness is larger than that of the operability to the comprehensive quality (i.e., the weighted sum of the operability and fairness). Assessment results further show that the output timing of terminals should be adjusted to the terminal which has the latest output timing to maintain the fairness when the difference in network delay between the terminals is large. In this way, the comprehensive quality at each terminal can be maintained as high as possible.
文摘There are a few studies that focus on solution methods for finding a Nash equilibrium of zero-sum games. We discuss the use of Karmarkar’s interior point method to solve the Nash equilibrium problems of a zero-sum game, and prove that it is theoretically a polynomial time algorithm. We implement the Karmarkar method, and a preliminary computational result shows that it performs well for zero-sum games. We also mention an affine scaling method that would help us compute Nash equilibria of general zero-sum games effectively.
基金Supported by Scientific Research Initiation (Supporting) Funds of Northwest A&F University~~
文摘Game model of environmental protection at scenic spots is established in this paper in order to carry out analysis of the equilibrium between one-time game and infinitely repeated game, disclose the reasons why the environment of scenic spots are destroyed, and propose the countermeasures to ensure the equilibrium of the game. The study also reveals that during the one-time game between tourists and tour operators, it is tour operators' dominant strategy not to control environmental pollution that leads to the destruction of environment at scenic spots. While, during the infinitely repeated game between tourists and tour operators, the realization of Pareto optimality equilibrium (The strategy of tourist is traveling, and the strategy of tour operators are controlling environmental pollution) is dependent upon the choice of players (tourists or operators) of triggering strategy (traveling or controlling environmental pollution). The supervision of the government upon operators can force them to control environmental pollution, which can consequently improve the efficiency of equilibrium in the game, and promote environmental protection at tourism scenic spots and sustainable development of tourism.
