Fueled by the booming online games,there is an increasing demand for monitoring online games in various settings.One of the application scenarios is the monitor of computer games in school computer labs,for which an i...Fueled by the booming online games,there is an increasing demand for monitoring online games in various settings.One of the application scenarios is the monitor of computer games in school computer labs,for which an intelligent game recognition method is required.In this paper,a method to identify game processes in accordance with private working sets(i.e.,the amount of memory occupied by a process but cannot be shared among other processes)is introduced.Results of the W test showed that the memory sizes occupied by the legitimate processes(e.g.,the processes of common native windows applications)and game processes followed normal distribution.Using the T-test,a significant difference was identified between the legitimate processes and C/S-based computer games,in terms of the means and variances of their private working sets.Subsequently,we derived the density functions of the private working sets of the considered game processes and those of the legitimate processes.Given the private working set of a process and the derived probability density functions,the probability that the process is a legitimate process and the probability that the process is a game process can be determined.After comparing the two probabilities,we can easily determine whether the process is a game process or not.As revealed from the test results,the recognition accuracy of this method for C/S-based computer games was approximately 90%.展开更多
One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the envir...One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.展开更多
By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumu...By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.展开更多
[Objective] The aim was to discuss he produce and elimination rules of particles in Beijing during early 2008 Olympic Games. [Method] Based on the analysis of particulate matter online observation data and meteorologi...[Objective] The aim was to discuss he produce and elimination rules of particles in Beijing during early 2008 Olympic Games. [Method] Based on the analysis of particulate matter online observation data and meteorological data during the corresponding period in Chinese environmental science college, Hysplit Back trace model and Numerical weather prediction graphs, and combined with the different analytical methods on meteorological flow fields, a typical process of particles in Beijing during early 2008 Olympic Games was studied. [Result] The results indicated that during the ascent stage of PM2.5 concentration, the PM showed gradually aging phenomena; the process controlled by large scale synoptic system mainly. And the weak wind and the high humidity were not in favor of dispersion; the prolonged southerly air mass to bring the pollutant of Hebei, Taijin and Shandong to Beijing; mixing height and temperature curve took the importance role to the pollution. [Conclusion] The study provided theoretical basis for the discussion on factors influencing the production and elimination of particles in the air pollution process.展开更多
The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions.Th...The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions.Then these results were applied to nonzero-sum differential games with random jumps to get the explicit form of the open-loop Nash equilibrium point by the solution of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations.展开更多
The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward- backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions. ...The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward- backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions. Then these results were applied to nonzero-sum differential games with random jumps to get the explicit form of the open-loop Nash equilibrium point by the solution of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations.展开更多
Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic ex...Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic expression is formulated for the networked evolutionary games with finite memories, based on which the behavior of the corresponding evolutionary game is analyzed. Secondly, under a proper assumption, the existence of Nash equilibrium of the given networked evolutionary games is proved and a free-type strategy sequence is designed for the convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an illustrative example is worked out to support the obtained new results.展开更多
In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of ...In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of von Neumann and Morgenstern to change ordinal values into cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy process. We suggest using Saaty’s pairwise comparison with combined strategies as criteria for players involved in a repetitive game. We present and illustrate a methodology for moving from ordinal payoffs to cardinal payoffs. We summarize the impact on how the solutions are achieved.展开更多
In the case of on-line action role-playing game, the combat strategies can be divided into three distinct classes, Strategy of Motion(SM), Strategy of Attacking Occasion (SAO) and Strategy of Using Skill (SUS). In thi...In the case of on-line action role-playing game, the combat strategies can be divided into three distinct classes, Strategy of Motion(SM), Strategy of Attacking Occasion (SAO) and Strategy of Using Skill (SUS). In this paper, we analyze such strategies of a basic game model in which the combat is modeled by the discrete competitive Markov decision process. By introducing the chase model and the combat assistant technology, we identify the optimal SM and the optimal SAO, successfully. Also, we propose an evolutionary framework, including integration with competitive coevolution and cooperative coevolution, to search the optimal SUS pair which is regarded as the Nash equilibrium point of the strategy space. Moreover, some experiments are made to demonstrate that the proposed framework has the ability to find the optimal SUS pair. Furthermore, from the results, it is shown that using cooperative coevolutionary algorithm is much more efficient than using simple evolutionary algorithm.展开更多
基金This work is funded in part by the National Nature Science Foundation of China(File Nos.61872451 and 61872452)in part by the Science and Technology Development Fund,Macao SAR(File Nos.0098/2018/A3 and 0076/2019/A2).Li Feng is the corresponding author.
文摘Fueled by the booming online games,there is an increasing demand for monitoring online games in various settings.One of the application scenarios is the monitor of computer games in school computer labs,for which an intelligent game recognition method is required.In this paper,a method to identify game processes in accordance with private working sets(i.e.,the amount of memory occupied by a process but cannot be shared among other processes)is introduced.Results of the W test showed that the memory sizes occupied by the legitimate processes(e.g.,the processes of common native windows applications)and game processes followed normal distribution.Using the T-test,a significant difference was identified between the legitimate processes and C/S-based computer games,in terms of the means and variances of their private working sets.Subsequently,we derived the density functions of the private working sets of the considered game processes and those of the legitimate processes.Given the private working set of a process and the derived probability density functions,the probability that the process is a legitimate process and the probability that the process is a game process can be determined.After comparing the two probabilities,we can easily determine whether the process is a game process or not.As revealed from the test results,the recognition accuracy of this method for C/S-based computer games was approximately 90%.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171,71871173,and 71832010)
文摘One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71071119)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘By using a generalized fitness-dependent Moran process, an evolutionary model for symmetric 2 × 2 games in a well-mixed population with a finite size is investigated. In the model, the individuals＇ payoff accumulating from games is mapped into fitness using an exponent function. Both selection strength β and mutation rate ε are considered. The process is an ergodic birth-death process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we give the analysis results for which strategy will be favoured when s is small enough. The results depend on not only the payoff matrix of the game, but also on the population size. Especially, we prove that natural selection favours the strategy which is risk-dominant when the population size is large enough. For arbitrary β and ε values, the ＇Hawk-Dove＇ game and the ＇Coordinate＇ game are used to illustrate our model. We give the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the games and compare the results with those of the replicator dynamics in the infinite population. The results are determined by simulation experiments.
基金Supported by Central Public Welfare Research Institutes of BasicResearch Operations Special Fund (2008KYYW01)
文摘[Objective] The aim was to discuss he produce and elimination rules of particles in Beijing during early 2008 Olympic Games. [Method] Based on the analysis of particulate matter online observation data and meteorological data during the corresponding period in Chinese environmental science college, Hysplit Back trace model and Numerical weather prediction graphs, and combined with the different analytical methods on meteorological flow fields, a typical process of particles in Beijing during early 2008 Olympic Games was studied. [Result] The results indicated that during the ascent stage of PM2.5 concentration, the PM showed gradually aging phenomena; the process controlled by large scale synoptic system mainly. And the weak wind and the high humidity were not in favor of dispersion; the prolonged southerly air mass to bring the pollutant of Hebei, Taijin and Shandong to Beijing; mixing height and temperature curve took the importance role to the pollution. [Conclusion] The study provided theoretical basis for the discussion on factors influencing the production and elimination of particles in the air pollution process.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.10371067) thePlanned Item for the Outstanding Young Teachers of Ministry of Education of China (No.2057) the Special Fund for Ph.D. Program of Ministry of Education of China ( No.20020422020) and the Fok Ying Tung Education Foundation for Young College Teachers(No.91064)
文摘The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions.Then these results were applied to nonzero-sum differential games with random jumps to get the explicit form of the open-loop Nash equilibrium point by the solution of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations.
基金国家自然科学基金，Outstanding Young Teachers of Ministry of Education of China，Special Fund for Ph.D.Program of Ministry of Education of China，Fok Ying Tung Education Foundation
文摘The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward- backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions. Then these results were applied to nonzero-sum differential games with random jumps to get the explicit form of the open-loop Nash equilibrium point by the solution of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(61503225)the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province(ZR2015FQ003,ZR201709260273)
文摘Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the modeling and analysis of networked evolutionary games(NEGs) with finite memories, and presents a number of new results. Firstly, a kind of algebraic expression is formulated for the networked evolutionary games with finite memories, based on which the behavior of the corresponding evolutionary game is analyzed. Secondly, under a proper assumption, the existence of Nash equilibrium of the given networked evolutionary games is proved and a free-type strategy sequence is designed for the convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, an illustrative example is worked out to support the obtained new results.
文摘In game theory, in order to properly use mixed strategies, equalizing strategies or the Nash arbitration method, we require cardinal payoffs. We present an alternative method to the possible tedious lottery method of von Neumann and Morgenstern to change ordinal values into cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy process. We suggest using Saaty’s pairwise comparison with combined strategies as criteria for players involved in a repetitive game. We present and illustrate a methodology for moving from ordinal payoffs to cardinal payoffs. We summarize the impact on how the solutions are achieved.
文摘In the case of on-line action role-playing game, the combat strategies can be divided into three distinct classes, Strategy of Motion(SM), Strategy of Attacking Occasion (SAO) and Strategy of Using Skill (SUS). In this paper, we analyze such strategies of a basic game model in which the combat is modeled by the discrete competitive Markov decision process. By introducing the chase model and the combat assistant technology, we identify the optimal SM and the optimal SAO, successfully. Also, we propose an evolutionary framework, including integration with competitive coevolution and cooperative coevolution, to search the optimal SUS pair which is regarded as the Nash equilibrium point of the strategy space. Moreover, some experiments are made to demonstrate that the proposed framework has the ability to find the optimal SUS pair. Furthermore, from the results, it is shown that using cooperative coevolutionary algorithm is much more efficient than using simple evolutionary algorithm.
