In a first for the African continent,Senegal will host the Dakar 2026 Youth Olympic Games(YOG)from 31 October to 13 November.The Dakar 2026 YOG carry a strong symbolic ambition,embodied by their motto“Africa welcomes...In a first for the African continent,Senegal will host the Dakar 2026 Youth Olympic Games(YOG)from 31 October to 13 November.The Dakar 2026 YOG carry a strong symbolic ambition,embodied by their motto“Africa welcomes,Dakar celebrates.”Host Senegal sees the event as a catalyst for its influence,the modernisation of its infrastructure,and the mobilisation of its youth.展开更多
The problem of maneuvering for a servicing spacecraft(inspector)to inspect a noncooperative spacecraft(evader)in cislunar space is investigated in this paper.The evader,which may be a malfunctioning or uncontrolled sa...The problem of maneuvering for a servicing spacecraft(inspector)to inspect a noncooperative spacecraft(evader)in cislunar space is investigated in this paper.The evader,which may be a malfunctioning or uncontrolled satellite,introduces uncertainties due to its potential maneuvering capabilities.To address this challenge,the scenario is modeled as a special orbital game,incorporating the unique complexities of the cislunar environment.A variable-duration,turn-based inspection and anti-inspection game model is designed.The model defines both players'rules,constraints,and victory conditions,providing a framework for non-cooperative inspection.Strategies for both players are developed and validated based on their dynamical properties.The inspector's strategy integrates two-body Lambert transfers with shooting methods,while the evader's strategy aims to maximize the inspector's fuel consumption.Simulation results show that the evader's optimal strategy involves deliberate fluctuations in its lunar periapsis altitude,with the inspector's requiredΔV up to eight times greater than the evader's.The impact of game constraints is evaluated,and the effectiveness of deploying the inspector in low lunar orbit is compared with the inspector at the Earth-Moon Lagrange point L1.The strengths and weaknesses of both are shown.These findings provide valuable insights for future orbital servicing and orbital games.展开更多
This paper suggests a way to improve teamwork and reduce uncertainties in operations by using a game theory approach involving multiple virtual power plants(VPP).A generalized credibility-based fuzzy chance constraint...This paper suggests a way to improve teamwork and reduce uncertainties in operations by using a game theory approach involving multiple virtual power plants(VPP).A generalized credibility-based fuzzy chance constraint programming approach is adopted to address uncertainties stemming from renewable generation and load demand within individual VPPs,while robust optimization techniques manage electricity and thermal price volatilities.Building upon this foundation,a hierarchical Nash-Stackelberg game model is established across multiple VPPs.Within each VPP,a Stackelberg game resolves the strategic interaction between the operator and photovoltaic prosumers(PVP).Among VPPs,a cooperative Nash bargaining model coordinates alliance formation.The problem is decomposed into two subproblems:maximizing coalitional benefits,and allocating cooperative surpluses via payment bargaining,solved distributively using the alternating direction method of multipliers(ADMM).Case studies demonstrate that the proposed strategy significantly enhances the economic efficiency and uncertainty resilience of multi-VPP alliances.展开更多
This paper studies an indefinite mean-field game with Markov jump parameters,where all agents'diffusion terms depend on control variables and both state and control average terms(x.^((N)),u.^((N)))are considered.O...This paper studies an indefinite mean-field game with Markov jump parameters,where all agents'diffusion terms depend on control variables and both state and control average terms(x.^((N)),u.^((N)))are considered.One notable aspect is the relaxation of the assumption regarding the positivity or non-negativity of weight matrices within costs,allowing for zero or even negative values.By virtue of mean-field methods and decomposition techniques,we have derived decentralized strategies presented by Hamiltonian systems and a new type of consistency condition system.These systems consist of fully coupled regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations that do not conform to the Monotonicity condition.The well-posedness of these strategies is established by employing a relaxed compensator method with an easily verifiable Condition(RC)and the decomposition technique.Furthermore,we demonstrate that the resulting decentralized strategies achieve anϵ-Nash equilibrium in the indefinite case without any assumptions on admissible control sets using novel estimates of the disturbed state and cost function.Finally,our theoretical results are applied to resolve a class of mean-variance portfolio selection problems.We provide corresponding numerical simulation results and economic explanations.展开更多
Game theory-based models and design tools have gained substantial prominence for controlling and optimizing behavior within distributed engineering systems due to the inherent distribution of decisions among individua...Game theory-based models and design tools have gained substantial prominence for controlling and optimizing behavior within distributed engineering systems due to the inherent distribution of decisions among individuals.In non-cooperative settings,aggregative games serve as a mathematical framework model for the interdependent optimal decision-making problem among a group of non-cooperative players.In such scenarios,each player's decision is influenced by an aggregation of all players'decisions.Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking in aggregative games has emerged as a vibrant topic driven by applications that harness the aggregation property.This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the current research on aggregative games with a focus on communication topology.A systematic classification is conducted on distributed algorithm research based on communication topologies such as undirected networks,directed networks,and time-varying networks.Furthermore,it sorts out the challenges and compares the algorithms'convergence performance.It also delves into real-world applications of distributed optimization techniques grounded in aggregative games.Finally,it proposes several challenges that can guide future research directions.展开更多
To avoid uneven energy consuming in wireless sen- sor networks, a clustering routing model is proposed based on a Bayesian game. In the model, Harsanyi transformation is introduced to convert a static game of incomple...To avoid uneven energy consuming in wireless sen- sor networks, a clustering routing model is proposed based on a Bayesian game. In the model, Harsanyi transformation is introduced to convert a static game of incomplete information to the static game of complete but imperfect information. In addition, the existence of Bayesian nash equilibrium is proved. A clustering routing algorithm is also designed according to the proposed model, both cluster head distribution and residual energy are considered in the design of the algorithm. Simulation results show that the algorithm can balance network load, save energy and prolong network lifetime effectively.展开更多
This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the ...This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service （QoS） standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio （S/NR） and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium （NE） in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.展开更多
A centralized-distributed scheduling strategy for distribution networks based on multi-temporal and hierarchical cooperative game is proposed to address the issues of difficult operation control and energy optimizatio...A centralized-distributed scheduling strategy for distribution networks based on multi-temporal and hierarchical cooperative game is proposed to address the issues of difficult operation control and energy optimization interaction in distribution network transformer areas,as well as the problem of significant photovoltaic curtailment due to the inability to consume photovoltaic power locally.A scheduling architecture combiningmulti-temporal scales with a three-level decision-making hierarchy is established:the overall approach adopts a centralized-distributed method,analyzing the operational characteristics and interaction relationships of the distribution network center layer,cluster layer,and transformer area layer,providing a“spatial foundation”for subsequent optimization.The optimization process is divided into two stages on the temporal scale:in the first stage,based on forecasted electricity load and demand response characteristics,time-of-use electricity prices are utilized to formulate day-ahead optimization strategies;in the second stage,based on the charging and discharging characteristics of energy storage vehicles and multi-agent cooperative game relationships,rolling electricity prices and optimal interactive energy solutions are determined among clusters and transformer areas using the Nash bargaining theory.Finally,a distributed optimization algorithm using the bisection method is employed to solve the constructed model.Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed optimization strategy can facilitate photovoltaic consumption in the distribution network and enhance grid economy.展开更多
In this paper,we investigate the distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking problem for aggregative games with multiple uncertain Euler–Lagrange(EL)systems over jointly connected and weight-balanced switching networks.T...In this paper,we investigate the distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking problem for aggregative games with multiple uncertain Euler–Lagrange(EL)systems over jointly connected and weight-balanced switching networks.The designed distributed controller consists of two parts:a dynamic average consensus part that asymptotically reproduces the unknown NE,and an adaptive reference-tracking module responsible for steering EL systems’positions to track a desired trajectory.The generalized Barbalat’s Lemma is used to overcome the discontinuity of the closed-loop system caused by the switching networks.The proposed algorithm is illustrated by a sensor network deployment problem.展开更多
In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters...In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.展开更多
In recent years,with the continuous advancement of the intelligent process of the Internet of Vehicles(IoV),the problem of privacy leakage in IoV has become increasingly prominent.The research on the privacy protectio...In recent years,with the continuous advancement of the intelligent process of the Internet of Vehicles(IoV),the problem of privacy leakage in IoV has become increasingly prominent.The research on the privacy protection of the IoV has become the focus of the society.This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the existing location privacy protection system structure and algorithms,proposes a privacy protection system structure based on untrusted data collection server,and designs a vehicle location acquisition algorithm based on a local differential privacy and game model.The algorithm first meshes the road network space.Then,the dynamic game model is introduced into the game user location privacy protection model and the attacker location semantic inference model,thereby minimizing the possibility of exposing the regional semantic privacy of the k-location set while maximizing the availability of the service.On this basis,a statistical method is designed,which satisfies the local differential privacy of k-location sets and obtains unbiased estimation of traffic density in different regions.Finally,this paper verifies the algorithm based on the data set of mobile vehicles in Shanghai.The experimental results show that the algorithm can guarantee the user’s location privacy and location semantic privacy while satisfying the service quality requirements,and provide better privacy protection and service for the users of the IoV.展开更多
With the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,China has posited the direction of“new infrastructure”in 2020.As one of the seven major industries of the“new infrastruct...With the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,China has posited the direction of“new infrastructure”in 2020.As one of the seven major industries of the“new infrastructure”,the charging infrastructure(CI)industry not only supports the upgrade of the new energy vehicle industry but also provides developing platforms for emerging industries,such as wireless charging,energy storage,smart microgrid,and new energy consumption.Therefore,the government’s supporting role is crucial for the CI industry.To effectively explore the effectiveness of government’s subsidy policy in the CI industry and promote its healthy development,we employed a game model and discussed the government's evolution process of different game strategies between CI and battery-swapping station(BSS)operators in this study.First,China's government subsidies for the electric vehicle(EV)industry were classified into CIs and BSSs.The subsidies obtained by the CI operators were operating subsidies,whereas those obtained by BSSs were investment subsidies.Second,a game model was constructed,involving the government,operators,and users.The model used backward induction to seek the refined Nash equilibrium solution for CIs and BSS operators.The Nash equilibrium solution indicated that the optimal investment amount and BSS quantity of the operator were positively correlated with the government subsidy intensity.When the profitability of the operators increased and the amount of the subsidies increased,consumers’willingness to use EVs increased and the policy effects were closely related to the benefits of government management.The decisions made by either the users or the operators were inversely related to the operators’management efficiency.Besides,the subsidy policy was affected by the government management.Therefore,in the implementation stage of the government’s future subsidy policies,the government needs to innovate and improve management effectiveness.The government could use subsidy policies as a driving force for developing the CI industry to build a comprehensive ecosystem of the industry,which is also the next key point for the government to promote the development of the CI industry in the future.展开更多
Consensus and disagreements between China and the U.S. are the key factors influencing the direction that global climate negotiation is heading for. By taking into account the uncertainties of temperature increment an...Consensus and disagreements between China and the U.S. are the key factors influencing the direction that global climate negotiation is heading for. By taking into account the uncertainties of temperature increment and its impact on GDP growth, together with the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change investment on utility, a strategic simulation model including China and the U.S. is developed. Based on utility and game theory, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The results show that the first-mover disadvantage exists in the game, and the scale of each country＇s climate change investment under non-cooperative win-win basis for global cooperation, the technology transfer and funding to China scenario is too small to ensure the 2℃ simulation results also indicate that it target. To guarantee the stability and makes sense to assist and compensate展开更多
The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes coope...The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.展开更多
We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate ...We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.展开更多
成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博...成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博弈论领域顶级期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》2018年第2期。论文研究成果初步解决了诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伊德·沙普利(Lloyd S. Shapley)提出的抽象市场博弈核非空的猜想。展开更多
The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work pr...The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.展开更多
This paper introduces a conceptual framework for developing pedagogical games of mathematical proof (PGMP) designed to help non-STEM students learn mathematical reasoning in a playful manner and without “fear”. With...This paper introduces a conceptual framework for developing pedagogical games of mathematical proof (PGMP) designed to help non-STEM students learn mathematical reasoning in a playful manner and without “fear”. Within the constructivist learning paradigm it develops an in-class learning activity where social science students learn the concept of mathematical deduction playfully using toys to construct tables from which formal proofs of propositions are derived without calculations. A PGMP pedagogy quality assurance evaluation method based on fuzzy evaluation mappings capturing learning effectiveness, learning efficiency, and learning satisfaction is introduced. Our results from an in-class experiment show that pedagogical games of mathematical proof help non-STEM students to effectively engage with mathematical reasoning playfully. The results are consistent according to a quality assurance consistency index.展开更多
Background Autism spectrum disorder(ASD)is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by difficulties in social communication and restricted,repetitive behaviors.Early intervention is essential to improve develo...Background Autism spectrum disorder(ASD)is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by difficulties in social communication and restricted,repetitive behaviors.Early intervention is essential to improve developmental outcomes in children with ASD.Serious games,which combine educational objectives with game based interactions,have shown potential as tools for early intervention in patients with ASD.However,in China,the development of serious games specifically designed for children with ASD remains in its infancy,with significant gaps in technical frameworks and effective data management methods.Method This paper proposes a framework aimed at facilitating the development of multimodal serious games designed for ASD interventions.We demonstrated the feasibility of the framework by developing and integrating several components,such as web applications,mobile games,and augmented reality games.These tools are interconnected to achieve data connectivity and management.Additionally,adaptive mechanics were employed within the framework to analyze real-time player data,which allowed the game difficulty to be dynamically adjusted and provide a personalized experience for each child.Results The framework successfully integrated various multimodal games,ensuring that real-time data management supported personalized game experiences.This approach ensured that the interventions remained appropriately challenging while still achievable.Conclusion The results indicate that the proposed framework enhances collaboration among therapists,parents,and developers while also improving the effectiveness of ASD interventions.By delivering personalized gameplay experiences that are both challenging and achievable,the framework offers a scalable platform for the future development of serious games.展开更多
文摘In a first for the African continent,Senegal will host the Dakar 2026 Youth Olympic Games(YOG)from 31 October to 13 November.The Dakar 2026 YOG carry a strong symbolic ambition,embodied by their motto“Africa welcomes,Dakar celebrates.”Host Senegal sees the event as a catalyst for its influence,the modernisation of its infrastructure,and the mobilisation of its youth.
基金supported by the National Key R&D Pro-gram of China:Gravitational Wave Detection Project(Nos.2021YFC2026,2021YFC2202601,2021YFC2202603)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.12172288 and 12472046)。
文摘The problem of maneuvering for a servicing spacecraft(inspector)to inspect a noncooperative spacecraft(evader)in cislunar space is investigated in this paper.The evader,which may be a malfunctioning or uncontrolled satellite,introduces uncertainties due to its potential maneuvering capabilities.To address this challenge,the scenario is modeled as a special orbital game,incorporating the unique complexities of the cislunar environment.A variable-duration,turn-based inspection and anti-inspection game model is designed.The model defines both players'rules,constraints,and victory conditions,providing a framework for non-cooperative inspection.Strategies for both players are developed and validated based on their dynamical properties.The inspector's strategy integrates two-body Lambert transfers with shooting methods,while the evader's strategy aims to maximize the inspector's fuel consumption.Simulation results show that the evader's optimal strategy involves deliberate fluctuations in its lunar periapsis altitude,with the inspector's requiredΔV up to eight times greater than the evader's.The impact of game constraints is evaluated,and the effectiveness of deploying the inspector in low lunar orbit is compared with the inspector at the Earth-Moon Lagrange point L1.The strengths and weaknesses of both are shown.These findings provide valuable insights for future orbital servicing and orbital games.
基金supported by Science and Technology Project of SGCC(Research on Distributed Cooperative Control of Virtual Power Plants Based on Hybrid Game)(5700-202418337A-2-1-ZX).
文摘This paper suggests a way to improve teamwork and reduce uncertainties in operations by using a game theory approach involving multiple virtual power plants(VPP).A generalized credibility-based fuzzy chance constraint programming approach is adopted to address uncertainties stemming from renewable generation and load demand within individual VPPs,while robust optimization techniques manage electricity and thermal price volatilities.Building upon this foundation,a hierarchical Nash-Stackelberg game model is established across multiple VPPs.Within each VPP,a Stackelberg game resolves the strategic interaction between the operator and photovoltaic prosumers(PVP).Among VPPs,a cooperative Nash bargaining model coordinates alliance formation.The problem is decomposed into two subproblems:maximizing coalitional benefits,and allocating cooperative surpluses via payment bargaining,solved distributively using the alternating direction method of multipliers(ADMM).Case studies demonstrate that the proposed strategy significantly enhances the economic efficiency and uncertainty resilience of multi-VPP alliances.
基金supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China(2023YFA1009200)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(12401583,12571482,12521001)+2 种基金the Taishan Scholars Climbing Program of Shandong(TSPD20210302)the Basic Research Program of Jiangsu(BK20240416)the General Program of Philosophy and Social Science Research(PSSR)of Shandong Higher Education Institutions(2024ZSMS007)。
文摘This paper studies an indefinite mean-field game with Markov jump parameters,where all agents'diffusion terms depend on control variables and both state and control average terms(x.^((N)),u.^((N)))are considered.One notable aspect is the relaxation of the assumption regarding the positivity or non-negativity of weight matrices within costs,allowing for zero or even negative values.By virtue of mean-field methods and decomposition techniques,we have derived decentralized strategies presented by Hamiltonian systems and a new type of consistency condition system.These systems consist of fully coupled regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations that do not conform to the Monotonicity condition.The well-posedness of these strategies is established by employing a relaxed compensator method with an easily verifiable Condition(RC)and the decomposition technique.Furthermore,we demonstrate that the resulting decentralized strategies achieve anϵ-Nash equilibrium in the indefinite case without any assumptions on admissible control sets using novel estimates of the disturbed state and cost function.Finally,our theoretical results are applied to resolve a class of mean-variance portfolio selection problems.We provide corresponding numerical simulation results and economic explanations.
基金supported in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(SWU-XDJH202312)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173278)the Chongqing Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars(2024NSCQJQX0103).
文摘Game theory-based models and design tools have gained substantial prominence for controlling and optimizing behavior within distributed engineering systems due to the inherent distribution of decisions among individuals.In non-cooperative settings,aggregative games serve as a mathematical framework model for the interdependent optimal decision-making problem among a group of non-cooperative players.In such scenarios,each player's decision is influenced by an aggregation of all players'decisions.Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking in aggregative games has emerged as a vibrant topic driven by applications that harness the aggregation property.This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the current research on aggregative games with a focus on communication topology.A systematic classification is conducted on distributed algorithm research based on communication topologies such as undirected networks,directed networks,and time-varying networks.Furthermore,it sorts out the challenges and compares the algorithms'convergence performance.It also delves into real-world applications of distributed optimization techniques grounded in aggregative games.Finally,it proposes several challenges that can guide future research directions.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Fundation of China (60974082 60874085)+2 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (K50510700004)the Technology Plan Projects of Guangdong Province (20110401)the Team Project of Hanshan Normal University (LT201001)
文摘To avoid uneven energy consuming in wireless sen- sor networks, a clustering routing model is proposed based on a Bayesian game. In the model, Harsanyi transformation is introduced to convert a static game of incomplete information to the static game of complete but imperfect information. In addition, the existence of Bayesian nash equilibrium is proved. A clustering routing algorithm is also designed according to the proposed model, both cluster head distribution and residual energy are considered in the design of the algorithm. Simulation results show that the algorithm can balance network load, save energy and prolong network lifetime effectively.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61172073the Open Research Fund of National Mobile Communications Research Laboratory,Southeast University under Grant No.2012D19+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,Beijing Jiaotong University under Grant No.2013JBZ01the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of Ministry of Education of China under Grant No.NCET-12-0766
文摘This paper addresses the power con- trol problems of Cognitive Radio （CR） trader transmission power and interference tempera- ture constraints. First, we propose the interfer- ence constraint which ensures that the Quality of Service （QoS） standards for primary users is considered and a non-cooperative game power control model. Based on the proposed model, we developed a logical utility function based on the Signal-to-Interference-Noise Ratio （S/NR） and a novel algorithm network power control. that is suitable for CR Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium （NE） in our utility function are proved by the principle of game theory and the corresponding optimi- zations. Compared to traditional algorithms, the proposed one could converge to an NE in 3-5 iterative operations by setting an appropriate pricing factor. Finally, simulation results ver- ified the stability and superiority of the novel algorithm in flat-fading channel environments.
基金funded by the Jilin Province Science and Technology Development Plan Project(20230101344JC).
文摘A centralized-distributed scheduling strategy for distribution networks based on multi-temporal and hierarchical cooperative game is proposed to address the issues of difficult operation control and energy optimization interaction in distribution network transformer areas,as well as the problem of significant photovoltaic curtailment due to the inability to consume photovoltaic power locally.A scheduling architecture combiningmulti-temporal scales with a three-level decision-making hierarchy is established:the overall approach adopts a centralized-distributed method,analyzing the operational characteristics and interaction relationships of the distribution network center layer,cluster layer,and transformer area layer,providing a“spatial foundation”for subsequent optimization.The optimization process is divided into two stages on the temporal scale:in the first stage,based on forecasted electricity load and demand response characteristics,time-of-use electricity prices are utilized to formulate day-ahead optimization strategies;in the second stage,based on the charging and discharging characteristics of energy storage vehicles and multi-agent cooperative game relationships,rolling electricity prices and optimal interactive energy solutions are determined among clusters and transformer areas using the Nash bargaining theory.Finally,a distributed optimization algorithm using the bisection method is employed to solve the constructed model.Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed optimization strategy can facilitate photovoltaic consumption in the distribution network and enhance grid economy.
基金supported by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region under the Grant No.14201621。
文摘In this paper,we investigate the distributed Nash equilibrium(NE)seeking problem for aggregative games with multiple uncertain Euler–Lagrange(EL)systems over jointly connected and weight-balanced switching networks.The designed distributed controller consists of two parts:a dynamic average consensus part that asymptotically reproduces the unknown NE,and an adaptive reference-tracking module responsible for steering EL systems’positions to track a desired trajectory.The generalized Barbalat’s Lemma is used to overcome the discontinuity of the closed-loop system caused by the switching networks.The proposed algorithm is illustrated by a sensor network deployment problem.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No. 10672081）.
文摘In this paper, we study the public goods games with punishment by adopting the well-known approximate best response dynamics. It shows that the evolution of cooperation is affected by two aspects when other parameters are fixed. One is the punishment mechanism which can avoid the dilemma of lacking investment, and the other is the degree of rationality. Theoretical analysis and numerical results indicate that the existence of punishment mechanism and distribution of rationality are the keys to the enhancement of cooperation level. We also testify that they can heavily influence the payoffs of system as well. The findings in this paper may provide a deeper understanding of some social dilemmas.
基金This work is supported by Major Scientific and Technological Special Project of Guizhou Province(20183001)Research on the education mode for complicate skill students in new media with cross specialty integration(22150117092)+2 种基金Open Foundation of Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory of Public Big Data(2018BDKFJJ014)Open Foundation of Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory of Public Big Data(2018BDKFJJ019)Open Foundation of Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory of Public Big Data(2018BDKFJJ022).
文摘In recent years,with the continuous advancement of the intelligent process of the Internet of Vehicles(IoV),the problem of privacy leakage in IoV has become increasingly prominent.The research on the privacy protection of the IoV has become the focus of the society.This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the existing location privacy protection system structure and algorithms,proposes a privacy protection system structure based on untrusted data collection server,and designs a vehicle location acquisition algorithm based on a local differential privacy and game model.The algorithm first meshes the road network space.Then,the dynamic game model is introduced into the game user location privacy protection model and the attacker location semantic inference model,thereby minimizing the possibility of exposing the regional semantic privacy of the k-location set while maximizing the availability of the service.On this basis,a statistical method is designed,which satisfies the local differential privacy of k-location sets and obtains unbiased estimation of traffic density in different regions.Finally,this paper verifies the algorithm based on the data set of mobile vehicles in Shanghai.The experimental results show that the algorithm can guarantee the user’s location privacy and location semantic privacy while satisfying the service quality requirements,and provide better privacy protection and service for the users of the IoV.
基金National Social Science Foundation of China Key Project“Technologydriven New Energy Vehicle Industry Business Model Innovation Research”[Grant Number.16AGL004].
文摘With the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,China has posited the direction of“new infrastructure”in 2020.As one of the seven major industries of the“new infrastructure”,the charging infrastructure(CI)industry not only supports the upgrade of the new energy vehicle industry but also provides developing platforms for emerging industries,such as wireless charging,energy storage,smart microgrid,and new energy consumption.Therefore,the government’s supporting role is crucial for the CI industry.To effectively explore the effectiveness of government’s subsidy policy in the CI industry and promote its healthy development,we employed a game model and discussed the government's evolution process of different game strategies between CI and battery-swapping station(BSS)operators in this study.First,China's government subsidies for the electric vehicle(EV)industry were classified into CIs and BSSs.The subsidies obtained by the CI operators were operating subsidies,whereas those obtained by BSSs were investment subsidies.Second,a game model was constructed,involving the government,operators,and users.The model used backward induction to seek the refined Nash equilibrium solution for CIs and BSS operators.The Nash equilibrium solution indicated that the optimal investment amount and BSS quantity of the operator were positively correlated with the government subsidy intensity.When the profitability of the operators increased and the amount of the subsidies increased,consumers’willingness to use EVs increased and the policy effects were closely related to the benefits of government management.The decisions made by either the users or the operators were inversely related to the operators’management efficiency.Besides,the subsidy policy was affected by the government management.Therefore,in the implementation stage of the government’s future subsidy policies,the government needs to innovate and improve management effectiveness.The government could use subsidy policies as a driving force for developing the CI industry to build a comprehensive ecosystem of the industry,which is also the next key point for the government to promote the development of the CI industry in the future.
基金supported by the Natural Science Foundation(No.71273153)the National Key Technology R&D Program(No.2012BAC20B04)
文摘Consensus and disagreements between China and the U.S. are the key factors influencing the direction that global climate negotiation is heading for. By taking into account the uncertainties of temperature increment and its impact on GDP growth, together with the positive, negative and spillover effects of climate change investment on utility, a strategic simulation model including China and the U.S. is developed. Based on utility and game theory, a sensitivity analysis is conducted. The results show that the first-mover disadvantage exists in the game, and the scale of each country＇s climate change investment under non-cooperative win-win basis for global cooperation, the technology transfer and funding to China scenario is too small to ensure the 2℃ simulation results also indicate that it target. To guarantee the stability and makes sense to assist and compensate
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71871171,71871173,and 71701076)
文摘The emergence of cooperation still remains a fundamental conundrum in the social and behavior sciences.We introduce a new mechanism,deposit mechanism,into theoretical model to explore how this mechanism promotes cooperation in a well-mixed population.Firstly,we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection in public good game by adding a third strategy,namely,deposit cooperation.The players with deposit cooperation strategy pay a deposit in advance to obtain the benefits of public good at a lower contributions compared with the players with cooperation strategy,when the provision of public good is successful.Then,we explore the evolution of cooperation in the public good game with deposit by means of the replicator dynamics.Theoretical computations and stimulations show that the deposit mechanism can promote cooperation in a well-mixed population,and the numbers of equilibrium point are determined by variables of public good game.On the one hand,when the coexistence of cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary system,increasing the threshold of public good and adopting the weak altruism way for share benefits can enhance the level of cooperation in the population.On the other hand,if the coexistence of deposit cooperators and defectors is the stable equilibrium point,it is effective to promote the deposit cooperation by lowering the values of discount and deposit,and raising the threshold of public good.
基金Supported by National Nature Science Foundation under Grant No.60904063the Tianjin municipal Natural Science Foundation under Grant Nos.11JCYBJC06600,11ZCKF6X00900,11ZCKFGX00900
文摘We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies： cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature （London） 425 （2003） 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner＇s and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner＇s payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner＇s payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.
文摘成果名称:Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games主要作者:曹志刚,秦承忠,杨晓光奖项类别:著作论文奖获奖等级:二等奖获奖论文《Shapley's Conjecture on the Cores of Abstract Market Games》发表于博弈论领域顶级期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》2018年第2期。论文研究成果初步解决了诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伊德·沙普利(Lloyd S. Shapley)提出的抽象市场博弈核非空的猜想。
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71901217)the National Key R&D Program of China(2018YFC0806900).
文摘The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.
文摘This paper introduces a conceptual framework for developing pedagogical games of mathematical proof (PGMP) designed to help non-STEM students learn mathematical reasoning in a playful manner and without “fear”. Within the constructivist learning paradigm it develops an in-class learning activity where social science students learn the concept of mathematical deduction playfully using toys to construct tables from which formal proofs of propositions are derived without calculations. A PGMP pedagogy quality assurance evaluation method based on fuzzy evaluation mappings capturing learning effectiveness, learning efficiency, and learning satisfaction is introduced. Our results from an in-class experiment show that pedagogical games of mathematical proof help non-STEM students to effectively engage with mathematical reasoning playfully. The results are consistent according to a quality assurance consistency index.
基金Supported by the Public Welfare Technology Application Research Project of Zhejiang Province(No.LTGY23F020001)the Provincial Construction Programme for First-Class Online and Offline Blended Courses(No.Z202Y22513)the Higher Education Teaching Reform Research Programme of Communication University of Zhejiang“Research on Contextualized Teaching Mode for the New Generation of Engineering Students Based on Convergence Media”。
文摘Background Autism spectrum disorder(ASD)is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by difficulties in social communication and restricted,repetitive behaviors.Early intervention is essential to improve developmental outcomes in children with ASD.Serious games,which combine educational objectives with game based interactions,have shown potential as tools for early intervention in patients with ASD.However,in China,the development of serious games specifically designed for children with ASD remains in its infancy,with significant gaps in technical frameworks and effective data management methods.Method This paper proposes a framework aimed at facilitating the development of multimodal serious games designed for ASD interventions.We demonstrated the feasibility of the framework by developing and integrating several components,such as web applications,mobile games,and augmented reality games.These tools are interconnected to achieve data connectivity and management.Additionally,adaptive mechanics were employed within the framework to analyze real-time player data,which allowed the game difficulty to be dynamically adjusted and provide a personalized experience for each child.Results The framework successfully integrated various multimodal games,ensuring that real-time data management supported personalized game experiences.This approach ensured that the interventions remained appropriately challenging while still achievable.Conclusion The results indicate that the proposed framework enhances collaboration among therapists,parents,and developers while also improving the effectiveness of ASD interventions.By delivering personalized gameplay experiences that are both challenging and achievable,the framework offers a scalable platform for the future development of serious games.
