Supply chain finance(SCF) is concerned because of its service efficiency for the real economy. Beside the bank, some enterprises have provided the SCF service. E-commerce platform firms develop small and micro loan sy...Supply chain finance(SCF) is concerned because of its service efficiency for the real economy. Beside the bank, some enterprises have provided the SCF service. E-commerce platform firms develop small and micro loan system in China. A given small enterprise can apply for a loan through its platform. Based on the latest SCF developments and the relevant literature, this study focuses on the coordination mechanism of SCF. We construct a game theory model including supplier, retailer and financial service provider to analyze the decision making of them. We find the optimal solution to the supplier, retailer and financial service provider.展开更多
After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic...After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.展开更多
The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status,...The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status, which becomes an important problem that must be considered on cluster supply chains. A symmetrical coordination game model is constituted to describe the competition and cooperation relationship of the same-quality manufacturers on cluster supply chains. The methods of the non-cooperation game theory and the evolutionary game theory are respectively used to analyze the model, whose parameters＇ influences under each method are then compared. It can be concluded that the analysis of the evolutionary game theory is more realistic and practical. Finally, three approaches are considered to break away from being path-dependence locked-in non-efficient status during this coordination game evolutionary process, which provide the development of cluster supply chains with an effective forecasting and Pareto optimizing method.展开更多
From the perspective of supply chain of agricultural products,by establishing Stackelberg game model based on triple supply chain,this paper researches the price formation and profit distribution mechanism of agricult...From the perspective of supply chain of agricultural products,by establishing Stackelberg game model based on triple supply chain,this paper researches the price formation and profit distribution mechanism of agricultural products under circumstance of non-cooperation and cooperation.The results show the main factors responsible for the hiking of prices of agricultural products as follows:the cost of agricultural products climbs incessantly;the circulation cost hovers at high level;the factor inputs of agricultural products are short;inflation pressure is incessantly mounting;the profit distribution of supply chain is irrational.Finally,corresponding countermeasures are put forward.展开更多
In recent years, the rapid innovation and development of financial industry has made financial enterprises have a lot of information. However, the large amount of information is tampered with and fragmented, which can...In recent years, the rapid innovation and development of financial industry has made financial enterprises have a lot of information. However, the large amount of information is tampered with and fragmented, which cannot be shared. With the constant innovation of science and technology, it is the most effective way to solve the information lag and asymmetry of financial products. This article aims to start from the problem of asymmetric information of financial products, the analysis of the emerging block chain technology applied in the financial sector, and with the development of asset securitization information known as the typical scenario for the first time, a concrete analysis information game process, and discuss about the application of chain blocks in securitization feasibility.展开更多
The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and...The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.展开更多
In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the ...In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the research on cooperative relation among enterprises respectively for the three modes of alliance structures of supply chains, point out the conditions on which the supply chains can be set up and steadily keep up for a long time, and scientifically interpret the cooperative relation among enterprises.展开更多
This paper studies firms’ innovation behavior in a supply chain where two firms first invest to reduce component’ cost according to different innovation modes (non-cooperative innovation, sequential innovation, and ...This paper studies firms’ innovation behavior in a supply chain where two firms first invest to reduce component’ cost according to different innovation modes (non-cooperative innovation, sequential innovation, and cooperative innovation) and then decide the prices according to different market powers (Supplier-Stackelberg, Manufacturer-Stackelberg, and Nash). We find that both the supplier and the manufacturer make more innovation efforts and profits under sequential innovation than under non-cooperative innovation when the market power is any one of three structures. Moreover, the firm prefers to invest as the follower in sequential innovation. We also show that the firms are easy to achieve cooperative innovation under symmetrical power market structure than asymmetrical power market structure. By using a concept named innovation-desirability-index that measures a firm’s desire to innovate in the supply chain, we show that it is optimal for a firm in the chain to cooperate with such a firm whose market power is close to his own if the innovation-desirability-index is higher, otherwise with such a firm whose market power is lower to his own.展开更多
Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capa...Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.展开更多
Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calcu...Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calculating the maximum profit. According to the analysis, it is found that the profit from supply chain cooperation between coal and power enterprises is more than that of non- cooperation. The cooperation is validated to be beneficial for both units; however, the profit is mainly taken by the power enterprise. Thus, it is necessary to set up the incentive mechanism to distribute cooperation value between coal and power enterprises to promote their continual cooperation.展开更多
This paper presents the game of production technical standards between downstream and upstream suppliers on a manufacturing supply chain network when the two parties have different partnership densities, namely, the n...This paper presents the game of production technical standards between downstream and upstream suppliers on a manufacturing supply chain network when the two parties have different partnership densities, namely, the numbers of replaceable and mature manufacturing partners. We firstly constructed a manufacturing chain network and analyzed its three relationship structures among suppliers with the presence of different relationship densities, and found that all the three relationships brought about the game of production technical standards between partnership-rich and partnership-scanty suppliers. Then we built a two-party payoff matrix, and analyzed the two-party game and evolutionary stable strategy, based on replication dynamic equation and asymmetric evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary stable strategies of two parties under varying payoff parameters were validated through numerical simulation. Finally, we proposed some suggestions for both those manufacturers with more partners and fewer partners, respectively.展开更多
To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the dece...To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.展开更多
基金the National Social Science Foundation of China(No.11CGL031)the China Scholarship Foundation(No.201208310194)+1 种基金the Shanghai Normal University Outstanding Teacher Project(No.B-6001-12-309013)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71371139 and 71471117)
文摘Supply chain finance(SCF) is concerned because of its service efficiency for the real economy. Beside the bank, some enterprises have provided the SCF service. E-commerce platform firms develop small and micro loan system in China. A given small enterprise can apply for a loan through its platform. Based on the latest SCF developments and the relevant literature, this study focuses on the coordination mechanism of SCF. We construct a game theory model including supplier, retailer and financial service provider to analyze the decision making of them. We find the optimal solution to the supplier, retailer and financial service provider.
基金the Natural Science Research Fund of Hubei Province(No.2014BDH121)
文摘After building a dynamic evolutionary game model, the essay studies the stability of the equilibrium in the game between the commercial banks and the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) enterprises. By design of systematic mechanism based on system dynamics theory, capital chains of independent small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) on CLSC are organically linked together. Moreover, a comparative simulation is studied for the previous independent and post-design dependent systems. The study shows that with business expanding and market risk growing, the independent finance chains of SMEs on CLSC often take on a certain vulnerability, while the SMEs closed-loop supply chain finance system itself is with a strong rigidity and concerto.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60374023)the Natural ScienceFoundation of Guangdong Province (011629).
文摘The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status, which becomes an important problem that must be considered on cluster supply chains. A symmetrical coordination game model is constituted to describe the competition and cooperation relationship of the same-quality manufacturers on cluster supply chains. The methods of the non-cooperation game theory and the evolutionary game theory are respectively used to analyze the model, whose parameters＇ influences under each method are then compared. It can be concluded that the analysis of the evolutionary game theory is more realistic and practical. Finally, three approaches are considered to break away from being path-dependence locked-in non-efficient status during this coordination game evolutionary process, which provide the development of cluster supply chains with an effective forecasting and Pareto optimizing method.
文摘From the perspective of supply chain of agricultural products,by establishing Stackelberg game model based on triple supply chain,this paper researches the price formation and profit distribution mechanism of agricultural products under circumstance of non-cooperation and cooperation.The results show the main factors responsible for the hiking of prices of agricultural products as follows:the cost of agricultural products climbs incessantly;the circulation cost hovers at high level;the factor inputs of agricultural products are short;inflation pressure is incessantly mounting;the profit distribution of supply chain is irrational.Finally,corresponding countermeasures are put forward.
文摘In recent years, the rapid innovation and development of financial industry has made financial enterprises have a lot of information. However, the large amount of information is tampered with and fragmented, which cannot be shared. With the constant innovation of science and technology, it is the most effective way to solve the information lag and asymmetry of financial products. This article aims to start from the problem of asymmetric information of financial products, the analysis of the emerging block chain technology applied in the financial sector, and with the development of asset securitization information known as the typical scenario for the first time, a concrete analysis information game process, and discuss about the application of chain blocks in securitization feasibility.
基金Sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of "985 Project" of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student’s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘The Shapley value of fuzzy bi-eooperative game is developed based on the conventional Shapley value of bi-cooperative game. From the viewpoint that the players can participate in the coalitions to a certain extent and there are at least two independent cooperative projects for every player to choose, Shapley value which is introduced by Grabisch is extended to the case of fuzzy bi-cooperative game by Choquet integral. Moreover, the explicit fuzzy Shapley value is given. The explicit fuzzy Shapley function can be used to allocate the profits among players in supply-chain under the competitive and uncertain environment.
文摘In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the research on cooperative relation among enterprises respectively for the three modes of alliance structures of supply chains, point out the conditions on which the supply chains can be set up and steadily keep up for a long time, and scientifically interpret the cooperative relation among enterprises.
文摘This paper studies firms’ innovation behavior in a supply chain where two firms first invest to reduce component’ cost according to different innovation modes (non-cooperative innovation, sequential innovation, and cooperative innovation) and then decide the prices according to different market powers (Supplier-Stackelberg, Manufacturer-Stackelberg, and Nash). We find that both the supplier and the manufacturer make more innovation efforts and profits under sequential innovation than under non-cooperative innovation when the market power is any one of three structures. Moreover, the firm prefers to invest as the follower in sequential innovation. We also show that the firms are easy to achieve cooperative innovation under symmetrical power market structure than asymmetrical power market structure. By using a concept named innovation-desirability-index that measures a firm’s desire to innovate in the supply chain, we show that it is optimal for a firm in the chain to cooperate with such a firm whose market power is close to his own if the innovation-desirability-index is higher, otherwise with such a firm whose market power is lower to his own.
文摘Based on the actual experience of cooperation in the supply chain, the Nash solution of two enterprises cooperative games is given. Not only is the solution unique, but it is also stable, and neither side has the capability to deviate the allocation of interests from the equilibrium point. If some firm tries to withdraw from cooperation or threaten to use other particular strategy, the negotiations are likely to achieve the distribution by the threat game; The calculating method of the choice of the optimal bargaining base point and the corresponding optimal pay-off vector are given.
文摘Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calculating the maximum profit. According to the analysis, it is found that the profit from supply chain cooperation between coal and power enterprises is more than that of non- cooperation. The cooperation is validated to be beneficial for both units; however, the profit is mainly taken by the power enterprise. Thus, it is necessary to set up the incentive mechanism to distribute cooperation value between coal and power enterprises to promote their continual cooperation.
基金Supported by the Science and Technology Development Strategy Research Project of Tianjin(13ZLZLZF08900)
文摘This paper presents the game of production technical standards between downstream and upstream suppliers on a manufacturing supply chain network when the two parties have different partnership densities, namely, the numbers of replaceable and mature manufacturing partners. We firstly constructed a manufacturing chain network and analyzed its three relationship structures among suppliers with the presence of different relationship densities, and found that all the three relationships brought about the game of production technical standards between partnership-rich and partnership-scanty suppliers. Then we built a two-party payoff matrix, and analyzed the two-party game and evolutionary stable strategy, based on replication dynamic equation and asymmetric evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary stable strategies of two parties under varying payoff parameters were validated through numerical simulation. Finally, we proposed some suggestions for both those manufacturers with more partners and fewer partners, respectively.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034)the Talent Foundation of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (s0670-082).
文摘To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.
