Exploiting the Opinions on Establishing an Accountability System for Illegal Operations and Investments in State-owned Enterprises(SOEs)as a quasi-experiment,we find that although accountability for illegal operations...Exploiting the Opinions on Establishing an Accountability System for Illegal Operations and Investments in State-owned Enterprises(SOEs)as a quasi-experiment,we find that although accountability for illegal operations and investments(AIOI)effectively reduces accrual-based earnings management,it also prompts SOEs to resort to covert real earnings management tactics,sug-gesting a transfer effect between them.This effect is more pronounced in SOEs with weaker digital transformation and decentralized decision-making power.Our mechanism analysis reveals that AIOI primarly influences SOEs'earnings management strategies by improving the external supervision environment and the internal organizational environment.Further analysis of the economic con-sequences shows that AIOI ultimately enhances the overall value of SOEs.展开更多
Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019,we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads.The negative re...Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019,we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads.The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect.We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls,external monitoring,information asymmetry and default risk.Moreover,the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms,those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation.Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.展开更多
基金supported by"the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities",Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(Grant Nos.202411117).
文摘Exploiting the Opinions on Establishing an Accountability System for Illegal Operations and Investments in State-owned Enterprises(SOEs)as a quasi-experiment,we find that although accountability for illegal operations and investments(AIOI)effectively reduces accrual-based earnings management,it also prompts SOEs to resort to covert real earnings management tactics,sug-gesting a transfer effect between them.This effect is more pronounced in SOEs with weaker digital transformation and decentralized decision-making power.Our mechanism analysis reveals that AIOI primarly influences SOEs'earnings management strategies by improving the external supervision environment and the internal organizational environment.Further analysis of the economic con-sequences shows that AIOI ultimately enhances the overall value of SOEs.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.72072012,71672007,71972010 and 71972011)the National Social Science Fund of China(No.18BGL090)
文摘Using hand-collected data on purchases of D&O insurance by Chinese listed firms for the period from 2008 to 2019,we empirically find that D&O insurance negatively associates with credit spreads.The negative relationship still holds after conducting a series of robustness tests and is not driven by the eyeball effect.We also show that D&O insurance can reduce credit spreads via the channels of internal controls,external monitoring,information asymmetry and default risk.Moreover,the negative effect of D&O insurance on credit spreads is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms,those located in regions with a low level of marketization or that employ rating agencies with a bad reputation.Our study complements the literature on the credit spreads and corporate governance.
