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Environment-dependent continuous time random walk
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作者 林方 包景东 《Chinese Physics B》 SCIE EI CAS CSCD 2011年第4期103-108,共6页
A generalized continuous time random walk model which is dependent on environmental damping is proposed in which the two key parameters of the usual random walk theory: the jumping distance and the waiting time, are ... A generalized continuous time random walk model which is dependent on environmental damping is proposed in which the two key parameters of the usual random walk theory: the jumping distance and the waiting time, are replaced by two new ones: the pulse velocity and the flight time. The anomalous diffusion of a free particle which is characterized by the asymptotical mean square displacement (x^2(t)) - t^a is realized numerically and analysed theoretically, where the value of the power index a is in a region of 0 〈 a 〈 2. Particularly, the damping leads to a sub-diffusion when the impact velocities are drawn from a Gaussian density function and the super-diffusive effect is related to statistical extremes, which are called rare-though-dominant events. 展开更多
关键词 continuous time random walk environment-dependent rare-though-dominate events anomalous diffusion
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Environment-Dependent Payoffs in Finite Populations
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作者 徐微鸿 张艳玲 +1 位作者 谢广明 封雪 《Chinese Physics Letters》 SCIE CAS CSCD 2015年第2期160-162,共3页
In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the... In finite population games with weak selection and large population size, when the payoff matrix is constant, the one-third law serves as the condition of a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the cases of environment-dependent payoff matrices which exhibit the feedback from the environment to the population. Finally, a more general law about cooperation-dominance is obtained. 展开更多
关键词 environment-dependent Payoffs in Finite Populations
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