In the lithium-ion battery(LIB)supply-chain,transactions involve several rounds of ordering,production and delivery between LIB suppliers and electric vehicle(EV)manufacturers.The sustainable performance of LIB suppli...In the lithium-ion battery(LIB)supply-chain,transactions involve several rounds of ordering,production and delivery between LIB suppliers and electric vehicle(EV)manufacturers.The sustainable performance of LIB suppliers,related to various characteristics,significantly affects the participants’sustainable reputations.The EV-LIB supply-chain transaction mechanism is explored from the perspective of the exchange economy comprehensively addressing both short-term economic profit and long-term sustainable reputation.Specifically,a“profit-reputation”utility function is proposed to reflect participants’expectations regarding cooperation profit and sustainable reputation.Additionally,an Edgeworth box model is developed to describe the participant’s balance determinations as a contract curve,revealing the Pareto conditions for mutually beneficial transactions based on sustainable performance.Furthermore,several principal-agent models are established to analyze the equilibrium of sustainable transactions within the EV-LIB supply-chain under varying dominance scenarios.A case study of an EV-LIB transaction is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness.This study aims to assist supply chain managers,researchers and decision-makers in exploring the role of participant’s sustainable reputation and its influence on supply-chain transaction and equilibrium,particularly in the context of designing cooperative contracts and negotiation process to foster sustainable supply chains.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No.72071181]Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province [Grant No.LY21G 020004].
文摘In the lithium-ion battery(LIB)supply-chain,transactions involve several rounds of ordering,production and delivery between LIB suppliers and electric vehicle(EV)manufacturers.The sustainable performance of LIB suppliers,related to various characteristics,significantly affects the participants’sustainable reputations.The EV-LIB supply-chain transaction mechanism is explored from the perspective of the exchange economy comprehensively addressing both short-term economic profit and long-term sustainable reputation.Specifically,a“profit-reputation”utility function is proposed to reflect participants’expectations regarding cooperation profit and sustainable reputation.Additionally,an Edgeworth box model is developed to describe the participant’s balance determinations as a contract curve,revealing the Pareto conditions for mutually beneficial transactions based on sustainable performance.Furthermore,several principal-agent models are established to analyze the equilibrium of sustainable transactions within the EV-LIB supply-chain under varying dominance scenarios.A case study of an EV-LIB transaction is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness.This study aims to assist supply chain managers,researchers and decision-makers in exploring the role of participant’s sustainable reputation and its influence on supply-chain transaction and equilibrium,particularly in the context of designing cooperative contracts and negotiation process to foster sustainable supply chains.
