Six draft sections （m specific areas of the Civil Code were submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People＇s Congress. China＇s top legislature, on August 27. One of them, the controversial draft on marr...Six draft sections （m specific areas of the Civil Code were submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People＇s Congress. China＇s top legislature, on August 27. One of them, the controversial draft on marriage and family, has aroused much debate among Internet users. It proposes a one-month cooling-off period for couples who wish to part ways and apply to divorce registration agencies. During the cooling-off month after a divorce registration agency receives a divorce application, either the husband or the wife can stop the application. After the cooling-off month, both sides are required to go to the agency for the divorce certificates. Failing to do so will mean the divorce application is canceled automatically.展开更多
Article 1077 of the Civil Code introduces the divorce cooling-off period system,aimed at curbing impulsive divorces and strengthening the foundation of family stability.However,the implementation of this system has re...Article 1077 of the Civil Code introduces the divorce cooling-off period system,aimed at curbing impulsive divorces and strengthening the foundation of family stability.However,the implementation of this system has revealed several critical issues.These include ambiguity in the scope and duration of its application,deficiencies in supporting mechanisms such as rights protection,and poor coordination with the litigation-based divorce system.To better balance personal freedom of divorce and the stability of family and society,it is necessary to narrow the applicable scope,allow flexible adjustment of the cooling-off period,and enhance the protection of individual rights.展开更多
China’s Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests,which has been in place for 15 years,will soon undergo a major amendment.According to Professor Liu Junhai at Beijing-based
The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.Ho...The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.However,whether reappointing these directors after a“cooling-off period”following mandatory rotation undermines the effectiveness of supervision remains an open question.We investigate whether independent directors can effectively monitor tunneling activities after their reappointment.We find that their monitoring is less effective during their reappointment term than in their first term,reflected in a significant increase in related-party transactions with controlling shareholders.A mechanism test reveals that independent directors’monitoring behavior is more passive during the reappointment term,as evidenced by less dissent and a lower likelihood of challenging proposals related to controlling shareholders.These effects are more pronounced when reappointed independent directors are less willing or able to supervise,or when the company’s internal and external governance environment is poor.Supervision also appears to be more effective if they are reappointed after a cooling-off period of more than three years.This paper extends research on the governance impact of reappointed independent directors and provides empirical evidence that can help to improve their post-term management practices.展开更多
文摘Six draft sections （m specific areas of the Civil Code were submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People＇s Congress. China＇s top legislature, on August 27. One of them, the controversial draft on marriage and family, has aroused much debate among Internet users. It proposes a one-month cooling-off period for couples who wish to part ways and apply to divorce registration agencies. During the cooling-off month after a divorce registration agency receives a divorce application, either the husband or the wife can stop the application. After the cooling-off month, both sides are required to go to the agency for the divorce certificates. Failing to do so will mean the divorce application is canceled automatically.
文摘Article 1077 of the Civil Code introduces the divorce cooling-off period system,aimed at curbing impulsive divorces and strengthening the foundation of family stability.However,the implementation of this system has revealed several critical issues.These include ambiguity in the scope and duration of its application,deficiencies in supporting mechanisms such as rights protection,and poor coordination with the litigation-based divorce system.To better balance personal freedom of divorce and the stability of family and society,it is necessary to narrow the applicable scope,allow flexible adjustment of the cooling-off period,and enhance the protection of individual rights.
文摘China’s Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests,which has been in place for 15 years,will soon undergo a major amendment.According to Professor Liu Junhai at Beijing-based
基金financially supported by the National Social Science Fund of China(Grant No.23&ZD060)the National Natural Science Fund of China(Grant No.72472161)+1 种基金the Ministry of Education of China Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Fund(Grant No.22YJC630111)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(Grant No.202411103).
文摘The mandatory rotation of independent directors upon the expiration of their term is a key institutional design in China,aimed at safeguarding their independence and enhancing the effectiveness of their supervision.However,whether reappointing these directors after a“cooling-off period”following mandatory rotation undermines the effectiveness of supervision remains an open question.We investigate whether independent directors can effectively monitor tunneling activities after their reappointment.We find that their monitoring is less effective during their reappointment term than in their first term,reflected in a significant increase in related-party transactions with controlling shareholders.A mechanism test reveals that independent directors’monitoring behavior is more passive during the reappointment term,as evidenced by less dissent and a lower likelihood of challenging proposals related to controlling shareholders.These effects are more pronounced when reappointed independent directors are less willing or able to supervise,or when the company’s internal and external governance environment is poor.Supervision also appears to be more effective if they are reappointed after a cooling-off period of more than three years.This paper extends research on the governance impact of reappointed independent directors and provides empirical evidence that can help to improve their post-term management practices.
