In recent years,much attention has been focused on designing provably secure cryptographic primitives in the presence of key leakage.Many constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed....In recent years,much attention has been focused on designing provably secure cryptographic primitives in the presence of key leakage.Many constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed.However,for any polynomial time adversary,most existing leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that their outputs are random,and any polynomial time adversary can obtain a certain amount of leakage on the secret key from the corresponding output of a cryptographic primitive.In this study,to achieve better performance,a new construction of a chosen ciphertext attack 2(CCA2)secure,leakage-resilient,and certificateless public-key encryption scheme is proposed,whose security is proved based on the hardness of the classic decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.According to our analysis,our method can tolerate leakage attacks on the private key.This method also achieves better performance because polynomial time adversaries cannot achieve leakage on the private key from the corresponding ciphertext,and a key leakage ratio of 1/2 can be achieved.Because of these good features,our method may be significant in practical applications.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Key R&D Program of China(No.2017YFB0802000)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61572303 and 61772326)+2 种基金the National Cryptography Development Fund During the 13thFive-Year Plan Period,China(No.MMJJ20170216)the Foundation of State Key Laboratory of Information Security,China(No.2017-MS-03)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(No.GK201803064)
文摘In recent years,much attention has been focused on designing provably secure cryptographic primitives in the presence of key leakage.Many constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed.However,for any polynomial time adversary,most existing leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that their outputs are random,and any polynomial time adversary can obtain a certain amount of leakage on the secret key from the corresponding output of a cryptographic primitive.In this study,to achieve better performance,a new construction of a chosen ciphertext attack 2(CCA2)secure,leakage-resilient,and certificateless public-key encryption scheme is proposed,whose security is proved based on the hardness of the classic decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.According to our analysis,our method can tolerate leakage attacks on the private key.This method also achieves better performance because polynomial time adversaries cannot achieve leakage on the private key from the corresponding ciphertext,and a key leakage ratio of 1/2 can be achieved.Because of these good features,our method may be significant in practical applications.
