In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the suc...In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the success or failure of these entities.Research by Balsmeier et al.(2022)indicates that the greater the independence of a listed company’s board of directors,the higher its innovation output(both in terms of quantity and quality of patents)^([1]).This finding suggests a strong correlation between the performance of a company and the independence of its board.The present study has selected listed companies on the A-share market of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2013 as the subjects of its research.A sample of 960 companies was initially obtained from the CSMAR database.Following a rigorous financial data screening,a final sample of 944 valid companies was retained for further analysis.展开更多
When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can...When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers,and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors' reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.展开更多
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample c...The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.展开更多
This study examines the relationship among independent boards of directors, board size, managerial share ownership （MSO）, and earnings quality. The study of these relationships is controlled by firm size based on a ...This study examines the relationship among independent boards of directors, board size, managerial share ownership （MSO）, and earnings quality. The study of these relationships is controlled by firm size based on a sample of 114 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange （TSE） for the period from 2008 to 2010. The results demonstrate that there was an insignificant positive relationship among independent boards of directors, managerial ownership, and earnings quality. Subsequent analysis shows an insignificant negative relationship between board size and earnings quality. It also provides evidence of the negative relationship between firm size as a control variable and earnings quality. This can be attributed to the fact that large firms are claimed to be politically sensitive and thus have the incentive to lessen variances in changes in their reported earnings.展开更多
In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requireme...In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.展开更多
文摘In the context of China’s rapidly evolving capital market,the proliferation of listed companies has been a salient phenomenon.The quality of corporate governance has emerged as a pivotal factor in determining the success or failure of these entities.Research by Balsmeier et al.(2022)indicates that the greater the independence of a listed company’s board of directors,the higher its innovation output(both in terms of quantity and quality of patents)^([1]).This finding suggests a strong correlation between the performance of a company and the independence of its board.The present study has selected listed companies on the A-share market of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2013 as the subjects of its research.A sample of 960 companies was initially obtained from the CSMAR database.Following a rigorous financial data screening,a final sample of 944 valid companies was retained for further analysis.
基金the China National Natural Science Foundation "Internal Control of Listed Companies and Investors Protection" (Project No. 70972076)Humanities Social Science Foundation of the Ministry of Education "Internal Control, Overinvestmentand Financial Crisis" (Project No. 09YJA790199)+2 种基金The Key Research Institutions of Humanities and Social Science Foundation of Guangdong Province "Internal Control and Value Creation–An Empirical Study Based on China’s Capital Market"(Project No. 11JDXM79004)National Social Science Foundation Youth Project (Project No.10CGL041)Academic New Distinguished Scholar Prize 2011 for PhD candidates offered by the Ministry of Education (14000-3191033)
文摘When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers,and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors' reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.
文摘The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.
文摘This study examines the relationship among independent boards of directors, board size, managerial share ownership （MSO）, and earnings quality. The study of these relationships is controlled by firm size based on a sample of 114 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange （TSE） for the period from 2008 to 2010. The results demonstrate that there was an insignificant positive relationship among independent boards of directors, managerial ownership, and earnings quality. Subsequent analysis shows an insignificant negative relationship between board size and earnings quality. It also provides evidence of the negative relationship between firm size as a control variable and earnings quality. This can be attributed to the fact that large firms are claimed to be politically sensitive and thus have the incentive to lessen variances in changes in their reported earnings.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China,Grant No.71972180
文摘In this study we examine how the regulation of director attendance disciplines directors’behavior,and consider the governance effect of such regulations.This examination exploits the differences between the requirements for director attendance at board meetings enacted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange(SHSE)and by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange(SZSE).Using a difference-indifferences model with a sample of A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2017,we document that the rate of meeting attendance by independent directors who serve with firms listed on the SHSE(SHIDs)has increased significantly since the exchange’s enforcement of the regulation on attendance.This positive effect has been more pronounced for independent directors with legal backgrounds.Further investigations find that the regulation of attendance plays a corporate governance role through the mechanism of enhanced monitoring.The attendance regulation increases the SHIDs likelihood of casting dissenting votes,and it leads to both better accounting performance and higher firm value.In addition,SHIDs are more likely to depart from firms listed on the SHSE,and to transfer their directorships to firms listed on the SZSE,which has a less constraining attendance requirement.Our findings provide evidence of how external regulation shapes director attendance and voting behavior in emerging markets.
