The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-...The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.展开更多
Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the...Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the limited resource, intrusion detection system (IDS) runs all the time to detect intrusion of the attacker which is a costly overhead. In our model, we use game theory to model the interactions between the intrusion detection system and the attacker, and a realistic model is given by using Bayesian game. We solve the game by finding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The results of our analysis show that the IDS could work intermittently without compromising on its effectiveness. At the end of this paper, we provide an experiment to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model.展开更多
Based on the basis of the two stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dyn...Based on the basis of the two stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dynamic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the criminals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models.展开更多
基金Supported by the Major National Science and Technology program (2011ZX03005-002)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60872041, 61072066, 60963023, 60970143)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000903001, JY10000901034)
文摘The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.
文摘Wireless ad ho network is becoming a new research fronter, in which security is an important issue. Usually some nodes act maliciously and they are able to do different kinds of Denial of Service (Dos). Because of the limited resource, intrusion detection system (IDS) runs all the time to detect intrusion of the attacker which is a costly overhead. In our model, we use game theory to model the interactions between the intrusion detection system and the attacker, and a realistic model is given by using Bayesian game. We solve the game by finding the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The results of our analysis show that the IDS could work intermittently without compromising on its effectiveness. At the end of this paper, we provide an experiment to verify the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model.
基金supported by Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC)(61321002)National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars(60925011)+2 种基金Projects of Major International(Regional)Joint Research Program NSFC(61120106010)Beijing Education Committee Cooperation Building Foundation Project,Program for Changjiang Scholars and Innovative Research Team in University(IRT1208)Chang Jiang Scholars Program and National Natural Science Foundation of China(61203078)
文摘Based on the basis of the two stage dynamic game of complete information and purely tactful perfect equilibrium theory, the non cooperative gaming between the police department and the criminals is analyzed. Dynamic game can be proved to forecast and explain potential tactful choices of the police department and the criminals at various stages, so as to analyze the essence of the law enforcement by the theoretical models.
