Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always cre...Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.展开更多
The published article titled“Truncated Bid Overexpression Induced by Recombinant Adenovirus Cre/LoxP System Suppresses the Tumorigenic Potential of CD133+Ovarian Cancer Stem Cells”has been retracted from Oncology Re...The published article titled“Truncated Bid Overexpression Induced by Recombinant Adenovirus Cre/LoxP System Suppresses the Tumorigenic Potential of CD133+Ovarian Cancer Stem Cells”has been retracted from Oncology Research,Vol.25,No.4,2017,pp.595–603.展开更多
This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
This paper puts forward a new framework of multi-agent based equipment bidding system on the Web (MAEBSW). The purpose of the paper is to make the process of enterprise equipment bidding, especially the decision proce...This paper puts forward a new framework of multi-agent based equipment bidding system on the Web (MAEBSW). The purpose of the paper is to make the process of enterprise equipment bidding, especially the decision process of enterprise equipment bidding, more intelligent. The system discussed in this paper is an efficient method for the enterprises doing business electronically. We also present our opinion of the approaches to defining agents. We emphasize the importance of agent being able to provide explanation about its behavior for the user or other agents. Based on this opinion we design a new common architecture of most agents in MAEBSW.展开更多
Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol c...Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.展开更多
The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tenderi...The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tendering, and the functions of the estimate of reasonable low price in the bidding were revealed. On this basis, a new bidding mode of the project with bill of quantities was pro- posed. The application of the new mode will be advantageous to the promotion of the bill of quantities in China.展开更多
According to the multi-project and program management theory, this paper analyzes the program generation principle and establishes a program based on progress goals. On the basis of the present situation of calculatio...According to the multi-project and program management theory, this paper analyzes the program generation principle and establishes a program based on progress goals. On the basis of the present situation of calculation of penalty for delay of the bidding section construction period with the critical path method, we studied the effects of contractor-induced delay of the bidding section construction period in detail, including the effects on the construction period of the bidding section itself, the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections, and the construction period of the program, and then constructed a penalty model for delay of the bidding section construction period from the perspective of programs. Using the penalty model, we conducted a practical analysis of penalty for delay of the construction period of the Baoying station program in the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. The model can help determine the amount of penalty for delay of the construction period in bidding sections scientifically and reasonably,展开更多
I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state m...I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.展开更多
The clearing price and bidding price in electricity market are two key indicators to measure whether it is reasonable or not. Based on the grey incidence analysis, this paper studies the correlation coefficient betwee...The clearing price and bidding price in electricity market are two key indicators to measure whether it is reasonable or not. Based on the grey incidence analysis, this paper studies the correlation coefficient between the clearing price and bidding price with the generation cost, the supervision and rules of the market, the supply and demand situation, the behavior of market members over the same period, which is based on the actual data of the trans-provincial centralized trading market of East China Power Grid. The results show that the factors affecting the clearing price and bidding price from largest to smallest are generation cost, supervision and rules of the market, the supply and demand situation, the behavior of market members. The conclusion is that the trans-provincial trading platform of East China Power Grid is a reasonable regional market which can discover the market cost, and regulate the market supply and demand balance, and promote healthy competition.展开更多
The bidding strategies of power suppliers to maximize their interests is of great importance.The proposed bilevel optimization model with coalitions of power suppliers takes restraint factors into consideration,such a...The bidding strategies of power suppliers to maximize their interests is of great importance.The proposed bilevel optimization model with coalitions of power suppliers takes restraint factors into consideration,such as operating cost reduction,potential cooperation,other competitors’bidding behavior,and network constraints.The upper model describes the coalition relationship between suppliers,and the lower model represents the independent system operator’s optimization without network loss(WNL)or considering network loss(CNL).Then,a novel algorithm,the evolutionary game theory algorithm(EGA)based on a hybrid particle swarm optimization and improved firefly algorithm(HPSOIFA),is proposed to solve the bi-level optimization model.The bidding behavior of the power suppliers in equilibrium with a dynamic power market is encoded as one species,with the EGA automatically predicting a plausible adaptation process for the others.Individual behavior changes are employed by the HPSOIFA to enhance the ability of global exploration and local exploitation.A novel improved firefly algorithm(IFA)is combined with a chaotic sequence theory to escape from the local optimum.In addition,the Shapley value is applied to the profit distribution of power suppliers’cooperation.The simulation,adopting the standard IEEE-30 bus system,demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method for solving the bi-level optimization problem.展开更多
This work suggested a novel model for obtaining optimum bidding/offering strategy to improve the benefits in case of big users.Aiming this regard,several electrical energy resources including:micro turbines,green powe...This work suggested a novel model for obtaining optimum bidding/offering strategy to improve the benefits in case of big users.Aiming this regard,several electrical energy resources including:micro turbines,green power sources(wind turbine and photovoltaic system),power storage unit such as Hydrogen storage system with fuel cell,as well as mutual treaties are taken into account in offered model.Considering various models for uncertain parameters based on their natures such as power demand,electricity market tariffs,solar irradiation,temperature and wind speed is one of the contributions of the proposed model.Uncertainty of power demand is modeled by robust optimal method whereas remain uncertain parameters are incorporated in model by stochastic method.Considering of wind speed cased is made by Weibull distribution.While,normal distribution is utilized for production of cases for electricity market tariffs,solar irradiation and temperature.In order to reduce the bidding error loss,the storage devices are corporate with green energy in power unbalanced conditions.Combined-integer linear programming method is applied for handling of pricing method profiles that have strength against considered uncertainties on power demand of big user.The obtained results confirm,the entire electrical energy supplement expenditure of big user in absence of demand uncertainty is$39.63 whereas it is augmented up to$49.47 to achieve robustness vs.demand uncertainty.Also,using of hydrogen storage system by considering the reliability index is reduced the bidding price of the system.展开更多
In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria ...In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.展开更多
Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pric...Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pricing of China is therefore presented in this paper. The es EVE method is different from two part and one part tariffs. It is more like the UK's method in form, but revised for China with some new concepts and procedure. The main contributions of it include: (1) Find two kinds of eigenvalue, namely EVEs, in an optimization model, (2) Define new concepts of virtual units and feasible region, (3) Twice merit orderings are employed successively to find marginal price. They are simple maximum and minimum comparison procedures and so on. The special economic significance of the method for China is discussed, and some suggestion for ESI restructuring based on es EVE method are provided. A case study is offered at the end of the paper.展开更多
Bidding has long been used as a method for allocating and procuring goods and services. An acurrate and comprehensive evaluation of bidders is the key to make the bidding a successful one for tenderee. However, evalua...Bidding has long been used as a method for allocating and procuring goods and services. An acurrate and comprehensive evaluation of bidders is the key to make the bidding a successful one for tenderee. However, evaluation of bidders is a tough work and the result of evaluation is always affected by the evaluator's understanding of the standards set for evaluation, and the evaluator's expertise, experience and preferrence. We make an effort to find a method for selecting bidders as accurately as possible. A grey decision model is presented, and an example is illustrated to make the practioners know how to use the model.展开更多
The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder c...The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.展开更多
In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For ea...In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.展开更多
In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted b...In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.展开更多
The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping i...The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.展开更多
This paper mainly talks about the main layer analytical method, and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, fuzzy hierarchical analysis (AHP) method of a deeper connotation, and further discusses its application in bidding qu...This paper mainly talks about the main layer analytical method, and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, fuzzy hierarchical analysis (AHP) method of a deeper connotation, and further discusses its application in bidding quotation for petroleum geophysical prospecting project. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) integrates many merits of AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation organically. It determines the weight of each affecting factor using analytic hierarchy process at first, and then uses the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method to determine each scheme index. FAHP can effectively enhance the decision-making efficiency.展开更多
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No.2020YFB1005500)the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No.BK20202001)+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.XJSJ23040)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No.2021K596C)。
文摘Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.
文摘The published article titled“Truncated Bid Overexpression Induced by Recombinant Adenovirus Cre/LoxP System Suppresses the Tumorigenic Potential of CD133+Ovarian Cancer Stem Cells”has been retracted from Oncology Research,Vol.25,No.4,2017,pp.595–603.
基金The work has been supported by Chinese NSF grants 90103033NKBBSFG199803060
文摘This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions.We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
文摘This paper puts forward a new framework of multi-agent based equipment bidding system on the Web (MAEBSW). The purpose of the paper is to make the process of enterprise equipment bidding, especially the decision process of enterprise equipment bidding, more intelligent. The system discussed in this paper is an efficient method for the enterprises doing business electronically. We also present our opinion of the approaches to defining agents. We emphasize the importance of agent being able to provide explanation about its behavior for the user or other agents. Based on this opinion we design a new common architecture of most agents in MAEBSW.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61103235,61170321,and 61373131the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions(PAPD)+1 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province,China(BK2010570)State Key Laboratory of Software Engineering,Wuhan University(SKLSE2012-09-41)
文摘Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.
文摘The possibility and rationality of introducing an bid-winning estimate based on a reasonable low price into construction bidding mode with bill of quantities were analyzed by setting up a model for bidding and tendering, and the functions of the estimate of reasonable low price in the bidding were revealed. On this basis, a new bidding mode of the project with bill of quantities was pro- posed. The application of the new mode will be advantageous to the promotion of the bill of quantities in China.
基金supported by the National Science and Technology Plan of China (Major Project of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, Grant No. 2006BAB04A13)the Philosophy and Social Science Fund of Education Department of Jiangsu Province (Grant No. 07SJD630006)+1 种基金the Third Key Discipline (Techno-Economics and Management) of the Project 211the Key Disciplines of Jiangsu Province (Engineering and Project Management)
文摘According to the multi-project and program management theory, this paper analyzes the program generation principle and establishes a program based on progress goals. On the basis of the present situation of calculation of penalty for delay of the bidding section construction period with the critical path method, we studied the effects of contractor-induced delay of the bidding section construction period in detail, including the effects on the construction period of the bidding section itself, the earliest start times of the next bidding section and other subsequent bidding sections, and the construction period of the program, and then constructed a penalty model for delay of the bidding section construction period from the perspective of programs. Using the penalty model, we conducted a practical analysis of penalty for delay of the construction period of the Baoying station program in the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. The model can help determine the amount of penalty for delay of the construction period in bidding sections scientifically and reasonably,
基金Supported by the 211 Project of Anhui University under Grant No.2009QN028B
文摘I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.
文摘The clearing price and bidding price in electricity market are two key indicators to measure whether it is reasonable or not. Based on the grey incidence analysis, this paper studies the correlation coefficient between the clearing price and bidding price with the generation cost, the supervision and rules of the market, the supply and demand situation, the behavior of market members over the same period, which is based on the actual data of the trans-provincial centralized trading market of East China Power Grid. The results show that the factors affecting the clearing price and bidding price from largest to smallest are generation cost, supervision and rules of the market, the supply and demand situation, the behavior of market members. The conclusion is that the trans-provincial trading platform of East China Power Grid is a reasonable regional market which can discover the market cost, and regulate the market supply and demand balance, and promote healthy competition.
文摘The bidding strategies of power suppliers to maximize their interests is of great importance.The proposed bilevel optimization model with coalitions of power suppliers takes restraint factors into consideration,such as operating cost reduction,potential cooperation,other competitors’bidding behavior,and network constraints.The upper model describes the coalition relationship between suppliers,and the lower model represents the independent system operator’s optimization without network loss(WNL)or considering network loss(CNL).Then,a novel algorithm,the evolutionary game theory algorithm(EGA)based on a hybrid particle swarm optimization and improved firefly algorithm(HPSOIFA),is proposed to solve the bi-level optimization model.The bidding behavior of the power suppliers in equilibrium with a dynamic power market is encoded as one species,with the EGA automatically predicting a plausible adaptation process for the others.Individual behavior changes are employed by the HPSOIFA to enhance the ability of global exploration and local exploitation.A novel improved firefly algorithm(IFA)is combined with a chaotic sequence theory to escape from the local optimum.In addition,the Shapley value is applied to the profit distribution of power suppliers’cooperation.The simulation,adopting the standard IEEE-30 bus system,demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed method for solving the bi-level optimization problem.
文摘This work suggested a novel model for obtaining optimum bidding/offering strategy to improve the benefits in case of big users.Aiming this regard,several electrical energy resources including:micro turbines,green power sources(wind turbine and photovoltaic system),power storage unit such as Hydrogen storage system with fuel cell,as well as mutual treaties are taken into account in offered model.Considering various models for uncertain parameters based on their natures such as power demand,electricity market tariffs,solar irradiation,temperature and wind speed is one of the contributions of the proposed model.Uncertainty of power demand is modeled by robust optimal method whereas remain uncertain parameters are incorporated in model by stochastic method.Considering of wind speed cased is made by Weibull distribution.While,normal distribution is utilized for production of cases for electricity market tariffs,solar irradiation and temperature.In order to reduce the bidding error loss,the storage devices are corporate with green energy in power unbalanced conditions.Combined-integer linear programming method is applied for handling of pricing method profiles that have strength against considered uncertainties on power demand of big user.The obtained results confirm,the entire electrical energy supplement expenditure of big user in absence of demand uncertainty is$39.63 whereas it is augmented up to$49.47 to achieve robustness vs.demand uncertainty.Also,using of hydrogen storage system by considering the reliability index is reduced the bidding price of the system.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70231010 and No.70321001)
文摘In this paper, the processes to determine winning probability for the corresponding bidder's deterministic bid are presented. The analysis of the winning probability is crucial for studying the bidding equilibria and designing the mechanism of procurement combinational auctions (CAs), and it also provides the decision making support for bidders who are in commercial synergies surrounding. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the feasibility and detailed processes of calculating winning probability.
文摘Due to historic reasons China encounters some special difficulties in ESI (electricity system industry) restructuring. An easy and simple electricity value equivalent (es EVE) method for day ahead pool purchase pricing of China is therefore presented in this paper. The es EVE method is different from two part and one part tariffs. It is more like the UK's method in form, but revised for China with some new concepts and procedure. The main contributions of it include: (1) Find two kinds of eigenvalue, namely EVEs, in an optimization model, (2) Define new concepts of virtual units and feasible region, (3) Twice merit orderings are employed successively to find marginal price. They are simple maximum and minimum comparison procedures and so on. The special economic significance of the method for China is discussed, and some suggestion for ESI restructuring based on es EVE method are provided. A case study is offered at the end of the paper.
基金This paper is sponsored by Doctor Station Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (20010487015).
文摘Bidding has long been used as a method for allocating and procuring goods and services. An acurrate and comprehensive evaluation of bidders is the key to make the bidding a successful one for tenderee. However, evaluation of bidders is a tough work and the result of evaluation is always affected by the evaluator's understanding of the standards set for evaluation, and the evaluator's expertise, experience and preferrence. We make an effort to find a method for selecting bidders as accurately as possible. A grey decision model is presented, and an example is illustrated to make the practioners know how to use the model.
基金Supported bythe National Natural Science Foundationof China (90104035)
文摘The authors propose a new protocol for muhizzitem electronic auctions. It has the following advantages： first, the protocol is more applicable and flexible than the previous protocols, in this protocol, each bidder can decide how many items to buy according to diiferent bidding prices, which are set by the seller at the beginning of the auction; second, privacy is well preserved, no third parties are needed in the protocol and the auction outcome is jointly computed by the bidders on their own without uncovering any additional information.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471037)211 Project Foundation of Shanghai University (8011040506)
文摘In this paper, we designed a customer-centered data warehouse system with five subjects： listing, bidding, transaction, accounts, and customer contact based on the business process of online auction companies. For each subject, we analyzed its fact indexes and dimensions. Then take transaction subject as example, analyzed the data warehouse model in detail, and got the multi-dimensional analysis structure of transaction subject. At last, using data mining to do customer segmentation, we divided customers into four types： impulse customer, prudent customer, potential customer, and ordinary customer. By the result of multi-dimensional customer data analysis, online auction companies can do more target marketing and increase customer loyalty.
文摘In this paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects of concentration of ownership in auction markets. We compare two different auction formats with uniform price. In the first, the price equals the highest accepted bid, whereas in the second the price equals the lowest rejected bid. For the former, and for a two-unit, two-plants, two-firms model, we find an equilibrium where all plants (all firms) bid according to a common bidding function. The concentration of the ownership has the same effect on the bidding behavior as eliminating one plant. However, the expected price is lower than the one expected in such three independent plant scenario. More surprisingly (and special to this 2 × 2 × 2 case), the equilibrium is efficient. In the latter, alternative auction format, firms bids asymmetrically for its two plants. Hence, the equilibrium is inefficient. Also, with this format, we show that the market price may be arbitrarily large. Thus, and contrary to some plausible expectation base in received auction theory, a (sealed-bid) auction format in which the price for a bidder is unrelated to his bid becomes less efficient than one in which the price may coincide with that bidder’s bid, when one admits that several bidders may coordinate (through ownership) their bids. The results add to a literature that favors more winner’s-bid pricing rules.
文摘The art market,following the example of financial markets,is divided into a primary market,where works are traded directly from artists,and a secondary market that is mainly the auction market.COVID-19 and galloping inflation have influenced the creation of a bull market in artwork.The high incomes of some buyers and inflation have influenced the emergence of the so-called“glittery”art market.Works by neglected artists have“very much taken on a life of their own”:fantasy art,works by young poster artists,casting“nightmares”-have been selling well for more than a year.People terrified of inflation are putting their money“in works of art”.The auction market dominates the primary market because anonymity makes it easier to enter the art market.The gallery market does not guarantee this anonymity.Very often,the auction market for works of art is used for money laundering.The purpose of this paper is to show that auction mechanisms are a good tool for the efficient allocation of goods and money in an era of galloping inflation,including non-standard objects such as works of art.These mechanisms,due to the information asymmetry,often lead to the generation of all kinds of pathologies and the increasing incidence of the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse.
文摘This paper mainly talks about the main layer analytical method, and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation, fuzzy hierarchical analysis (AHP) method of a deeper connotation, and further discusses its application in bidding quotation for petroleum geophysical prospecting project. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) integrates many merits of AHP and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation organically. It determines the weight of each affecting factor using analytic hierarchy process at first, and then uses the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method to determine each scheme index. FAHP can effectively enhance the decision-making efficiency.
