The Trusted Platform Module （TPM） is a dedicated hardware chip designed to provide a higher level of security for computing platform. All TPM functionalities are implemented in TPM corntrends to achieve specific sec...The Trusted Platform Module （TPM） is a dedicated hardware chip designed to provide a higher level of security for computing platform. All TPM functionalities are implemented in TPM corntrends to achieve specific security goals. We attempt to analyze the security properties of these commands, especially the key management API. Our study utilizes applied pi calculus to forrmlize the commands and determine how their security properties affect TPM key rmnagement. The attacker is assumed to call TPM comrmnds without bounds and without knowing the TPM root key, expecting to obtain or replace the user key. The analysis goal in our study is to guarantee the corre- sponding property of API execution and the integrity of API data. We analyze the security properties of TPM commands with a process reduction method, identify the key-handle hijack attack on a TPM newly created key, and propose reasonable solutions to solve the problem. Then, we conduct an experiment involving a key-handle attack, which suc- cessfully replaces a user key with an attacker＇s key using lmlicious TPM software. This paper discloses the weakness of the relationship between the key handle and the key object. After the TPM software stack is compromised, the attacker can hunch a keyhandle attack to obtain the user key and even break into the whole storage tree of user keys.展开更多
基金This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No.91118006, No. 61202414 the Knowledge Innovation Project of Chinese Academy of Science under Grant No. ISCAS2009-DR14.
文摘The Trusted Platform Module （TPM） is a dedicated hardware chip designed to provide a higher level of security for computing platform. All TPM functionalities are implemented in TPM corntrends to achieve specific security goals. We attempt to analyze the security properties of these commands, especially the key management API. Our study utilizes applied pi calculus to forrmlize the commands and determine how their security properties affect TPM key rmnagement. The attacker is assumed to call TPM comrmnds without bounds and without knowing the TPM root key, expecting to obtain or replace the user key. The analysis goal in our study is to guarantee the corre- sponding property of API execution and the integrity of API data. We analyze the security properties of TPM commands with a process reduction method, identify the key-handle hijack attack on a TPM newly created key, and propose reasonable solutions to solve the problem. Then, we conduct an experiment involving a key-handle attack, which suc- cessfully replaces a user key with an attacker＇s key using lmlicious TPM software. This paper discloses the weakness of the relationship between the key handle and the key object. After the TPM software stack is compromised, the attacker can hunch a keyhandle attack to obtain the user key and even break into the whole storage tree of user keys.
