The trajectory of democratic transition in Africa has been marred by optimism in the post-cold war period,but it has taken a new turn in recent years with surge in autocracies and a remarkable resurgence of abrupt unc...The trajectory of democratic transition in Africa has been marred by optimism in the post-cold war period,but it has taken a new turn in recent years with surge in autocracies and a remarkable resurgence of abrupt unconstitutional seizures of power in recent years in sub-Saharan Africa.This is well manifested in the Horn of Africa,as the process of democratic transition has largely retrogressed and stalled at the best,particularly in the case of South Sudan.Despite this bumpy road to democratic transition,there is a dearth of understanding of the drivers stalling democratic transition in South Sudan.This necessitates a better analysis of these drivers and to put South Sudan on a sustainable path toward democratic transition.This paper is an attempt to provide evidence-driven understanding of democratic transitions in South Sudan.The paper adopts a multidisciplinary framework of various theoretical approaches for analyzing the democratic transition in South Sudan.Based on hybrid research methods and a thorough analysis that is grounded on the political economy approach,the paper shows that the path toward democratic transitions in South Sudan has been constrained by a web of intertwined political,economic,and security challenges that inhibit the conduct of the first general elections in the youngest country of South Sudan.Some of these challenges include the fallacy of power-sharing peace agreement,kleptocratic economic governance,and politicized and ethnicitized security sector.As a microcosm of the Horn of Africa,the case study of South Sudan provides some implications and practical recommendations for governing better the democratic transitions in the region.Some of these recommendations include adoption of a realistic and regionally-centered mediation strategy,considering other options beyond power-sharing formula for managing the post-conflict political transitions,considering more credible sunset clause besides the conduct of elections for ending the political transitions,and more involvement of civil society in all phases of peace agreements,particularly the monitoring and oversight mechanisms.展开更多
Thomas Jefferson created a public philosophy that created in essence his significance as not only a transformative president but as the founder who developed the rationale and enduring tradition for the United States ...Thomas Jefferson created a public philosophy that created in essence his significance as not only a transformative president but as the founder who developed the rationale and enduring tradition for the United States political system.Above all,Jefferson is transformative alone for having created democracy when he introduced his public philosophy,as stated in Charles E.Merriam and Carl Becker’s analysis.Jefferson’s election on March 4,1801,began his two presidencies and created the Jeffersonian Democracy.Jefferson’s definition of a public philosophy is defined by James W.Ceaser.A public philosophy as defined by James W.Ceaser who reviewed the concept that was first used by the journalist Walter Lippman,in his book The Public Philosophy,was concerned about competing philosophies with liberalism against its adversary such as Marxism.Political scientists Theodore Lowi and Samuel Beer defined a public philosophy“as a synonym for what social scientists in American politics called ideology”.Lowi and Beer further defined how a public philosophy was a transforming idea governing public opinion by utilizing Roosevelt’s New Deal to explain an example of a change in public philosophy,in which as federal government is strengthened,replacing the older idea of an inactive government.Further,Lowi described how a public philosophy is a way of understanding the significance of public policies,i.e.,New Deal Policies on society.In addition,James W.Ceaser,described a public philosophy“as a core set of values embodied in long term opinion that influences public policy over a full era.”展开更多
China＇s pre-modern legal system enjoyed a continuous history of more than four thousand years. In the course of this long process, it developed distinctive legal traditions, including a tradition that prioritized agr...China＇s pre-modern legal system enjoyed a continuous history of more than four thousand years. In the course of this long process, it developed distinctive legal traditions, including a tradition that prioritized agriculture, a stress on criminal law at the expense of civil law, an ethical orientation that stressed the five Confucian relationships, an approach to the legal traditions of different ethnic groups that embraced diversity in unity, and a Confucianized legal system based on virtue and ritual. These legal traditions were all based on the accretion of a deep-rooted legal culture which embodied the wisdom and creativity of the Chinese people. At the same time, they bore the stamp of China＇s national conditions： an economic structure dominated by agriculture, an autocratic political system, a multi-ethnic national structure, the preeminent position of Confucian thought, the uneven development of politics, culture and the economy, etc.展开更多
In the Laws （which Plato calls his ＂second-best society＂） Plato asserts that the best attainable form of society will combine the better features of autocracy and democracy. The democracy will be one where aidos ...In the Laws （which Plato calls his ＂second-best society＂） Plato asserts that the best attainable form of society will combine the better features of autocracy and democracy. The democracy will be one where aidos （＂respect＂） will be a prominent feature, as will be the rule of laws underpinned by the belief that God, not man, is the measure of all things. Unlike in the Republic, the accumulation of wealth and property will be the right of all citizens, including rulers. But it will operate under strict limits： a maximum of four quanta of property will be allowed by any citizen, while a minimum of one （which will provide a good life though perhaps not a rich one） will be guaranteed. The affinity of such a view with that of John Rawls is striking. The article ends with a brief interview between the reader and Plato, in which some of the above issues are discussed.展开更多
After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of-1.113 percent, fully d...After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of-1.113 percent, fully democratic countries have a conditioned growth rate of 1.146 while countries with the optimal level of democracy/autocracy have a conditioned growth rate of 2.665. In the case of a fully dictatorial country, moving one unit towards democracy can raise the GDP growth rate by about 1.725 points; while for a fully democratic country, moving towards autocracy by one unit can raise the growth rate by about 0.885 points. This study provides useful information for many developing countries which are experiencing political system. substantial pressures to restructure their展开更多
基金This paper is largely based on the chapter entitled“Governing Political Transition in South Sudan:The Anatomy of Elusive Quest for Democratic Transition”prepared for the Good Governance Africa-Horn of Africa(GGA-HARO)for a Book Project Entitled Governing Political Transitions in the Horn of Africa.
文摘The trajectory of democratic transition in Africa has been marred by optimism in the post-cold war period,but it has taken a new turn in recent years with surge in autocracies and a remarkable resurgence of abrupt unconstitutional seizures of power in recent years in sub-Saharan Africa.This is well manifested in the Horn of Africa,as the process of democratic transition has largely retrogressed and stalled at the best,particularly in the case of South Sudan.Despite this bumpy road to democratic transition,there is a dearth of understanding of the drivers stalling democratic transition in South Sudan.This necessitates a better analysis of these drivers and to put South Sudan on a sustainable path toward democratic transition.This paper is an attempt to provide evidence-driven understanding of democratic transitions in South Sudan.The paper adopts a multidisciplinary framework of various theoretical approaches for analyzing the democratic transition in South Sudan.Based on hybrid research methods and a thorough analysis that is grounded on the political economy approach,the paper shows that the path toward democratic transitions in South Sudan has been constrained by a web of intertwined political,economic,and security challenges that inhibit the conduct of the first general elections in the youngest country of South Sudan.Some of these challenges include the fallacy of power-sharing peace agreement,kleptocratic economic governance,and politicized and ethnicitized security sector.As a microcosm of the Horn of Africa,the case study of South Sudan provides some implications and practical recommendations for governing better the democratic transitions in the region.Some of these recommendations include adoption of a realistic and regionally-centered mediation strategy,considering other options beyond power-sharing formula for managing the post-conflict political transitions,considering more credible sunset clause besides the conduct of elections for ending the political transitions,and more involvement of civil society in all phases of peace agreements,particularly the monitoring and oversight mechanisms.
文摘Thomas Jefferson created a public philosophy that created in essence his significance as not only a transformative president but as the founder who developed the rationale and enduring tradition for the United States political system.Above all,Jefferson is transformative alone for having created democracy when he introduced his public philosophy,as stated in Charles E.Merriam and Carl Becker’s analysis.Jefferson’s election on March 4,1801,began his two presidencies and created the Jeffersonian Democracy.Jefferson’s definition of a public philosophy is defined by James W.Ceaser.A public philosophy as defined by James W.Ceaser who reviewed the concept that was first used by the journalist Walter Lippman,in his book The Public Philosophy,was concerned about competing philosophies with liberalism against its adversary such as Marxism.Political scientists Theodore Lowi and Samuel Beer defined a public philosophy“as a synonym for what social scientists in American politics called ideology”.Lowi and Beer further defined how a public philosophy was a transforming idea governing public opinion by utilizing Roosevelt’s New Deal to explain an example of a change in public philosophy,in which as federal government is strengthened,replacing the older idea of an inactive government.Further,Lowi described how a public philosophy is a way of understanding the significance of public policies,i.e.,New Deal Policies on society.In addition,James W.Ceaser,described a public philosophy“as a core set of values embodied in long term opinion that influences public policy over a full era.”
文摘China＇s pre-modern legal system enjoyed a continuous history of more than four thousand years. In the course of this long process, it developed distinctive legal traditions, including a tradition that prioritized agriculture, a stress on criminal law at the expense of civil law, an ethical orientation that stressed the five Confucian relationships, an approach to the legal traditions of different ethnic groups that embraced diversity in unity, and a Confucianized legal system based on virtue and ritual. These legal traditions were all based on the accretion of a deep-rooted legal culture which embodied the wisdom and creativity of the Chinese people. At the same time, they bore the stamp of China＇s national conditions： an economic structure dominated by agriculture, an autocratic political system, a multi-ethnic national structure, the preeminent position of Confucian thought, the uneven development of politics, culture and the economy, etc.
文摘In the Laws （which Plato calls his ＂second-best society＂） Plato asserts that the best attainable form of society will combine the better features of autocracy and democracy. The democracy will be one where aidos （＂respect＂） will be a prominent feature, as will be the rule of laws underpinned by the belief that God, not man, is the measure of all things. Unlike in the Republic, the accumulation of wealth and property will be the right of all citizens, including rulers. But it will operate under strict limits： a maximum of four quanta of property will be allowed by any citizen, while a minimum of one （which will provide a good life though perhaps not a rich one） will be guaranteed. The affinity of such a view with that of John Rawls is striking. The article ends with a brief interview between the reader and Plato, in which some of the above issues are discussed.
文摘After evening out all the benefits and costs, the overall optimal level of democracy is about 3.2, on a scale of 1 to 7. On average, fully dictatorial countries have a conditioned growth rate of-1.113 percent, fully democratic countries have a conditioned growth rate of 1.146 while countries with the optimal level of democracy/autocracy have a conditioned growth rate of 2.665. In the case of a fully dictatorial country, moving one unit towards democracy can raise the GDP growth rate by about 1.725 points; while for a fully democratic country, moving towards autocracy by one unit can raise the growth rate by about 0.885 points. This study provides useful information for many developing countries which are experiencing political system. substantial pressures to restructure their
