主题语境:茶文化篇幅:302词建议用时:6分钟。1 Brewing a truly great cup of tea demands both skillful methods and cultural appreciation.According to tea experts,every step matters—from choosing the tea leaves to how you ...主题语境:茶文化篇幅:302词建议用时:6分钟。1 Brewing a truly great cup of tea demands both skillful methods and cultural appreciation.According to tea experts,every step matters—from choosing the tea leaves to how you pour the water.2 Professional tea taster Maisha Rahman,the first woman tea auctioneer(拍卖人)in Bangladesh,believes that the color of tea is the first sign of its quality.展开更多
The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a block...The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.展开更多
Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always cre...Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.展开更多
The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integra...The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.展开更多
In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely...In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.展开更多
In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the fi...In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions.We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies.For seller or auction house,whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function,the size of the fixed commission proportion,but also related with the value of the item auctioned.So,in the practical auctions,the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.展开更多
I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state m...I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.展开更多
Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol c...Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.展开更多
The problem of allocating a number of exploration tasks to a team of mobile robots in dynamic environments was studied. The team mission is to visit several distributed targets. The path cost of target is proportional...The problem of allocating a number of exploration tasks to a team of mobile robots in dynamic environments was studied. The team mission is to visit several distributed targets. The path cost of target is proportional to the distance that a robot has to move to visit the target. The team objective is to minimize the average path cost of target over all targets. Finding an optimal allocation is strongly NP-hard. The proposed algorithm can produce a near-optimal solution to it. The allocation can be cast in terms of a multi-round single-item auction by which robots bid on targets. In each auction round, one target is assigned to a robot that produces the lowest path cost of the target. The allocated targets form a forest where each tree corresponds a robot’s exploring targets set. Each robot constructs an exploring path through depth-first search in its target tree. The time complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial. Simulation experiments show that the allocating method is valid.展开更多
Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framewor...Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.展开更多
A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at...A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at maximizing the utilities of service providers(SPs)and satisfying the delay requirements of mobile terminals(MTs).The auction process consists of the bidding submission,winner determination and pricing stages.At the bidding submission stage,the MTs take available resources from SPs and distance factors into account to decide the bidding priority,thereby reducing the processing delay and improving the successful trades rate.A resource constrained utility ranking(RCUR)algorithm is put forward at the winner determination stage to determine the winners and losers so as to maximize the utilities of SPs.At the pricing stage,the sealed second-price rule is adopted to ensure the independence between the price paid by the buyer and its own bid.The simulation results show that the proposed JRAPA algorithm outperforms other existing algorithms in terms of the convergence rate and the number of successful trades rate.Moreover,it can not only achieve a larger average utility of SPs but also significantly reduce the average delay of MTs.展开更多
With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spe...With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.展开更多
We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secu...We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.展开更多
It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incen...It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.展开更多
An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auctio...An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.展开更多
文摘主题语境:茶文化篇幅:302词建议用时:6分钟。1 Brewing a truly great cup of tea demands both skillful methods and cultural appreciation.According to tea experts,every step matters—from choosing the tea leaves to how you pour the water.2 Professional tea taster Maisha Rahman,the first woman tea auctioneer(拍卖人)in Bangladesh,believes that the color of tea is the first sign of its quality.
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62273310)the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province of China(LY22F030006,LZ24F030009)
文摘The increased demand for personalized customization calls for new production modes to enhance collaborations among a wide range of manufacturing practitioners who unnecessarily trust each other.In this article,a blockchain-enabled manufacturing collaboration framework is proposed,with a focus on the production capacity matching problem for blockchainbased peer-to-peer(P2P)collaboration.First,a digital model of production capacity description is built for trustworthy and transparent sharing over the blockchain.Second,an optimization problem is formulated for P2P production capacity matching with objectives to maximize both social welfare and individual benefits of all participants.Third,a feasible solution based on an iterative double auction mechanism is designed to determine the optimal price and quantity for production capacity matching with a lack of personal information.It facilitates automation of the matching process while protecting users'privacy via blockchainbased smart contracts.Finally,simulation results from the Hyperledger Fabric-based prototype show that the proposed approach increases social welfare by 1.4%compared to the Bayesian game-based approach,makes all participants profitable,and achieves 90%fairness of enterprises.
基金supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No.2020YFB1005500)the Leading-edge Technology Program of Jiangsu Natural Science Foundation (No.BK20202001)+1 种基金the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No.XJSJ23040)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (No.2021K596C)。
文摘Electronic auctions(e-auctions)remove the physical limitations of traditional auctions and bring this mechanism to the general public.However,most e-auction schemes involve a trusted auctioneer,which is not always credible in practice.Some studies have applied cryptography tools to solve this problem by distributing trust,but they ignore the existence of collusion.In this paper,a blockchain-based Privacy-Preserving and Collusion-Resistant scheme(PPCR)for double auctions is proposed by employing both cryptography and blockchain technology,which is the first decentralized and collusion-resistant double auction scheme that guarantees bidder anonymity and bid privacy.A two-server-based auction framework is designed to support off-chain allocation with privacy preservation and on-chain dispute resolution for collusion resistance.A Dispute Resolution agreement(DR)is provided to the auctioneer to prove that they have conducted the auction correctly and the result is fair and correct.In addition,a Concise Dispute Resolution protocol(CDR)is designed to handle situations where the number of accused winners is small,significantly reducing the computation cost of dispute resolution.Extensive experimental results confirm that PPCR can indeed achieve efficient collusion resistance and verifiability of auction results with low on-chain and off-chain computational overhead.
基金Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China("863"Program)(20060AA12A105)the Chinese Airspace Management Commission Researching Program(GKG200802006)~~
文摘The airspace congestion is becoming more and more severe.Although there are traffic flow management（TFM）initiatives based on CDM widely applied,how to reschedule these disrupted flights of different airlines integrating TFM initiatives and allocate the limited airspace resources to these airlines equitably and efficiently is still a problem.The air traffic management（ATM）authority aims to minimizing the systemic costs of congested airspaces.And the airlines are self-interested and profit-oriented.Being incorporated into the collaborative decision making（CDM）process,the airlines can influence the rescheduling decisions to profit themselves.The airlines maybe hide the flight information that is disadvantageous to them,but is necessary to the optimal system decision.To realize the coincidence goal between the ATM authority and airlines for the efficient,and equitable allocation of airspace resources,this paper provides an auction-based market method to solve the congestion airspace problem under the pre-tactic and tactic stage of air traffic flow management.Through a simulation experiment,the rationing results show that the auction method can decrease the total delay costs of flights in the congested airspace compared with both the first schedule first service（FSFS）tactic and the ration by schedule（RBS）tactic.Finally,the analysis results indicate that if reallocate the charges from the auction to the airlines according to the proportion of their disrupted flights,the auction mechanism can allocate the airspace resource in economy equitably and decrease the delay losses of the airlines compared with the results of the FSFS tactic.
基金partially supported by the Science and Technology Development Fund,Macao SAR (0050/2020/A1)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62103411, 72171230)。
文摘In the era of big data,there is an urgent need to establish data trading markets for effectively releasing the tremendous value of the drastically explosive data.Data security and data pricing,however,are still widely regarded as major challenges in this respect,which motivate this research on the novel multi-blockchain based framework for data trading markets and their associated pricing mechanisms.In this context,data recording and trading are conducted separately within two separate blockchains:the data blockchain(DChain) and the value blockchain(VChain).This enables the establishment of two-layer data trading markets to manage initial data trading in the primary market and subsequent data resales in the secondary market.Moreover,pricing mechanisms are then proposed to protect these markets against strategic trading behaviors and balance the payoffs of both suppliers and users.Specifically,in regular data trading on VChain-S2D,two auction models are employed according to the demand scale,for dealing with users’ strategic bidding.The incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)model is deployed to the low-demand trading scenario,while the nearly incentive-compatible monopolistic price(MP) model is utilized for the high-demand trading scenario.With temporary data trading on VChain-D2S,a reverse auction mechanism namely two-stage obscure selection(TSOS) is designed to regulate both suppliers’ quoting and users’ valuation strategies.Furthermore,experiments are carried out to demonstrate the strength of this research in enhancing data security and trading efficiency.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foun-dation of China(70071012)
文摘In a SIPV model,when the commission proportion is not certain,but related with bargain price,generally,it is a linear function of the bargain price,this paper gives bidders'equilibrium bidding strategies in the first-and secondprice auctions.We find that the equilibrium strategies in second-price auction are dominant strategies.For seller or auction house,whether the fixed proportion or the unfixed proportion is good is not only related with constant item and the linear coefficient of the linear function,the size of the fixed commission proportion,but also related with the value of the item auctioned.So,in the practical auctions,the seller and the auction house negotiated with each other to decide the commission rules for their own advantage.
基金Supported by the 211 Project of Anhui University under Grant No.2009QN028B
文摘I present a new protocol for three-party quantum secure direct communication （QSDC） with a set of ordered M Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen （EPR） pairs. In the scheme, by performing two unitary operations and Bell state measurements, it is shown that the three legitimate parties can exchange their respective secret message simultaneously. Then I modify it for an experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction （QSBD） protocol. Furthermore, I also analyze th^ecurity of the protocol, and the scheme is proven to be secure against the intercept-and-resend attack, the disturbancb attack and the entangled-and-measure attack.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61103235,61170321,and 61373131the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions(PAPD)+1 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province,China(BK2010570)State Key Laboratory of Software Engineering,Wuhan University(SKLSE2012-09-41)
文摘Recently, an experimentally feasible three-party quantum sealed-bid auction protocol based on EPR pairs [Z.Y. Wang, Commun. Theor. Phys. 54 （2010） 997] was proposed. However, this study points out Wang＇s protocol cannot resist some internal bidders＇ attacks, such as the Twiee-CNOT attack, the collusion attack. A malicious bidder can launch the Twice-CNOT attack to obtain the other＇s bid, or the dishonest auctioneer may collude with one bidder and help him/her win the action by changing his/her bid. For preventing against these attacks, a simple solution by using the QKD-based message encryption and a post-confirmation mechanism by adopting the hash function are proposed.
基金Project(A1420060159) supported by the National Basic Research of China projects(60234030 60404021) supported bythe National Natural Science Foundation of China
文摘The problem of allocating a number of exploration tasks to a team of mobile robots in dynamic environments was studied. The team mission is to visit several distributed targets. The path cost of target is proportional to the distance that a robot has to move to visit the target. The team objective is to minimize the average path cost of target over all targets. Finding an optimal allocation is strongly NP-hard. The proposed algorithm can produce a near-optimal solution to it. The allocation can be cast in terms of a multi-round single-item auction by which robots bid on targets. In each auction round, one target is assigned to a robot that produces the lowest path cost of the target. The allocated targets form a forest where each tree corresponds a robot’s exploring targets set. Each robot constructs an exploring path through depth-first search in its target tree. The time complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial. Simulation experiments show that the allocating method is valid.
基金supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation of China (4102050)
文摘Cognitive radio（CR） technology is considered to be an effective solution to allocate spectrum resources,whereas the primary users of a network do not fully utilize available frequency bands.Spectrum auction framework has been recognized as an effective way to achieve dynamic spectrum access.From the perspective of spectrum auction,multi-band multi-user auction provides a new challenge for spectrum management.This paper proposes an auction framework based on location information for multi-band multi-user spectrum allocation.The performance of the proposed framework is compared with that of traditional auction framework based on a binary interference model as a benchmark.Simulation results show that primary users will obtain more total system revenue by selling their idle frequency bands to secondary users and the spectrum utilization of the proposed framework is more effective and fairer.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61741102,61471164,61601122)
文摘A joint resource allocation algorithm based on parallel auction(JRAPA)is proposed for mobile edge computing(MEC).In JRAPA,the joint allocation of wireless and cloud resources is modeled as an auction process,aiming at maximizing the utilities of service providers(SPs)and satisfying the delay requirements of mobile terminals(MTs).The auction process consists of the bidding submission,winner determination and pricing stages.At the bidding submission stage,the MTs take available resources from SPs and distance factors into account to decide the bidding priority,thereby reducing the processing delay and improving the successful trades rate.A resource constrained utility ranking(RCUR)algorithm is put forward at the winner determination stage to determine the winners and losers so as to maximize the utilities of SPs.At the pricing stage,the sealed second-price rule is adopted to ensure the independence between the price paid by the buyer and its own bid.The simulation results show that the proposed JRAPA algorithm outperforms other existing algorithms in terms of the convergence rate and the number of successful trades rate.Moreover,it can not only achieve a larger average utility of SPs but also significantly reduce the average delay of MTs.
基金This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61601107,U1708262 and 61872449)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M653568)The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.Nl 72304023).
文摘With the development of communication 5G networks and technologies,spectrum resources are increasingly scarce.The scarcity of the spectrum resource makes market-driven spectrum auction become an important means of spectrum allocation,and due to the complexity of the network environment,the security of spectrum auctions can not be ignored.Most existing secure spectrum auction schemes introduce a semi-honest agent to complete spectrum auction.However,the hypothetical semi-honest model does not guarantee the security of spectnim auction in the actual application scenario,which may lead to potential security threats:the agent may reveal the privacy of bidders,agent or auctioneer may collude with the bidder to manipulate the spectrum auction,and so on.In this paper,a secure spectrum auction scheme without a trusted party is proposed based on the smart contract technology,and the smart contract written into the blockchain replaces the traditional semi-honest agent to cooperate with the auctioneer server to complete the auction.In order to ensure the security of our scheme,a secure spectrum auction protocol is designed,in which the Software Guard Extensions(SGX)technology and Paillier cryptosystem are used to protect the privacy of bidders.Public verification is provided in our protocol by using extensive Pedersen commitment,which prevents the auctioneer server and the bidder from colluding with each other and verifies group bid sum values.Finally,the security analysis is given to propose several types of attacks that can be defended.Besides,theoretical analysis and simulation experiments of our protocol are also provided.
基金supported in part by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.SS2015AA011306National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)under Grant No.2014AA01A701National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No.61379006 and 61521003
文摘We consider a cellular network with a full-duplex base station, multiple uplink users and an eavesdropper. The full-duplex base station transmits jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper channel when receiving secure multi-user signals. To maximize the secrecy rate of uplink communications, we propose a distributed ascending-clock auction(ACA) algorithm to allocate subcarriers and jamming power. Specifically, the impact of the self-interference of the full-duplex base station on the secrecy rate is considered. The proposed algorithm consists of two parts. Firstly, subcarriers and the jamming power are respectively priced by the base station. Secondly, users select the subcarrier and the jamming power based on the price. Moreover, the convergence of the proposed auction algorithm is mathematically proved. Simulation results show that the proposed auction algorithm is more beneficial to improve the uplink secrecy performance compared to traditional auction algorithms.
基金Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
文摘It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
基金Sponsored by Excellent Young Scholars Research Fund of Beijing Institute of Technology(00Y03-13)
文摘An improved genetic algorithm is proposed to solve the problem of bad real-time performance or inability to get a global optimal/better solution when applying single-item auction （SIA） method or combinatorial auction method to multi-robot task allocation. The genetic algorithm based combinatorial auction （GACA） method which combines the basic-genetic algorithm with a new concept of ringed chromosome is used to solve the winner determination problem （WDP） of combinatorial auction. The simulation experiments are conducted in OpenSim, a multi-robot simulator. The results show that GACA can get a satisfying solution in a reasonable shot time, and compared with SIA or parthenogenesis algorithm combinatorial auction （PGACA） method, it is the simplest and has higher search efficiency, also, GACA can get a global better/optimal solution and satisfy the high real-time requirement of multi-robot task allocation.
